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1Introduction
Adam Fforde
In December 1996 the Australian National University held the
latest in its series of regular 'Vietnam Updates'. As is now usual,
this had a main topic (the 'Mass Media')1 and also updating
papers on Vietnam's economy, international relations, politics
and society. Because of the ten years that had passed since the
announcement of Doi Moi (renewal) by the Vietnamese
Communist Party at its December 1986 VI Party Congress, the
1996 Update also included a panel session on 'Ten Years of Doi
MoV. The panel was made up of: HE Ambassador Sue Boyd,
Professor Tuong Lai (Institute of Sociology, Hanoi); Adam
Fforde (ADUKI Pty Ltd and the ANU), and Ray Mallon, an
independent consultant based in Hanoi. Ray's contribution to the
present volume is based upon his oral presentation; Sue Boyd and
Tuong Lai both delivered papers. The next section of the
Conference saw four papers—Ben Kerkvliet's update on society,
Thaveeporn Vasavakul's political update, Adam Fforde's
economic update and Carl Thayer's update on international
relations and security. These are complementary in a number of
ways to the panel discussion, as the authors tended to take a
historical perspective. One reason for this is the current tendency
to take a fresh look at Vietnam's recent past. From the research
angle, many issues certainly remain contentious. Fundamental
appears to be the nature of the role played by the Vietnamese party
1 The papers from this part of the conference are being edited separately
by David Marr.
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and state in the changes the country has undergone. More
importantly, what conclusions can or should be drawn from the
apparent economic success of the Doi Moi project?
A way in to these issues appears to be the different meanings
people attach to two important years—1986 and 1989. The VI Party
Congress of December 1986 indeed saw the emergence of the
slogan of Doi Moi, and the shift of official policy towards an
avowedly pro-market stance. This encouraged the private sector
in what was officially referred to as the 'multi-sectoral' economy
(kinh te nhieu thanh phan). Prior to the Congress, 1986 had seen
the death in office of long-time party general secretary Le Duan.
Afterwards, political manoeuvrings saw Truong Chinh
temporarily take his place before being replaced by Nguyen Van
Linh at the end-year Congress. In office until the 1991 VII
Congress, Nguyen Van Linh saw Vietnam de-Stalinise; the
social and political atmosphere changed beyond recognition as
the country enjoyed a period of 'fresh air' (thoang). This did not
happen overnight, itself a pointer to the processes that were going
on, and the absence of a coherent reform strategy that could be
implemented at will. In the period 1987-88, as Gorbachev presided
over the move towards the fall of the Communist regimes in
Eastern Europe and the eventual collapse of Soviet Russia, the
private sector was certainly encouraged. Yet agricultural
decollectivisation had to wait until 1988 (with Decree # 10), whilst
planning reform took the shape of various steps to reduce
planners' controls over state enterprises (for example, Decree #
217 of 1987). Food rations remained in force, however, and the
street life typical of a South East Asian country, with its plethora
of foodstalls and other small-scale service industries, remained
strikingly absent. Whilst there was certainly an easing of the
political atmosphere, such crucial indicators as Vietnamese
ability to have relatively normal relations with foreigners did
not come until the end of the decade.
Major changes occurred in 1989 as well. Rationing was de
facto abolished, and the streets returned to the normal
polychromatic hubbub of a market economy. Loss of Soviet aid
coincided with removal of the system of delivery of low price
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supplies to state enterprises. Loss of Comecon markets forced
attention to be paid to gaining new outlets. Indeed, it is possible to
date to 1989 the emergence of Vietnam's 'market economy'.2 But
what were the reasons for this? Different positions taken on this
issue started to re-emerge in the second half of the 1990s as, for
various reasons, people started to re-examine what they thought of
Vietnam, and what that implied for their business, lending,
assistance or other strategies. Should the success of Doi Moi be
attributed to good policies, implying that the Vietnamese
leadership has retained the initiative? Or should it be seen as a
process where bad policies have, for reasons to do with policy
unimplementability, not mattered so much? Or what? These
questions can and are answered in different ways. But they are
increasingly being posed.
From around 1995, there are signs that many appear to have
started to question the views about Vietnam that they had formed
in the early 1990s. Across a wide range of opinion, from foreign
commercial investors through to NGOs, the assumptions that
drove the initial decision-making that led to commitment to
operate in Vietnam had been formed in the very early 1990s. At
that time the atmosphere was clearly heavily influenced by what
was widely seen as the success of government policies in 1989:
the decisions to raise interest rates to very high levels in order to
attack inflation; the positive output response to the liberalisation
of domestic and foreign trade despite the loss of Soviet aid; and
the termination of the residual elements of central planning in
the formal economic mechanism.
Certainly, economic activity recovered very quickly, despite
the loss of Soviet resources. Real living standards leapt up a step.
And the atmosphere in the country shifted to one of optimism.3
2 This is argued in Stefan de Vylder and Adam Fforde, From Plan to
Market: the Economic Transition in Vietnam (Boulder: Westview Press,
1996).
3 For a good Vietnamese description of 1989 see—Viet nam co mot nam
nhu the ! [Vietnam — What a year] by Nguyen Manh Hung and Cao Ngoc
Thang (Hanoi: Su That, 1990).
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Underlying the differences between the various papers in this
collection is a fundamental question—to what extent can the
Vietnamese government claim credit for these successes? It is
quite natural to understand 1989 in terms of the consequences of
state policy. Yet is this quite correct? The policy stance of the late
1980s clearly encouraged the emergence of a level playing field
and a 'multi-sectoral' economy within which the private sector
would play a central role. Yet through the 1990s industrial policy
increasingly gave priority to the state sector, whilst, perhaps
contradictorily, trade policy opened the economy to inward
investment and increasing foreign competition. By the late 1990s
no privatisation drive can be seen; policy at the VIII Congress
strongly asserted the 'leading role' of the state sector; and
gathering competition was revealing high levels of unpayable
SOE debts.
The state focus of development can also be seen in the rural
areas, with the signs of the emergence of movements to re
establish 'cooperatives of a new type' and the choice of SOEs as the
preferred site for state support and credits. It was this policy set
that was one of the main factors in encouraging 'a revision of
views.' A second was the sense that transactions costs—the
'hassle factor' in doing business in Vietnam—were not only far
too high but that any shift to a 'Rule of Law' (or 'Rule by Law') was
too weak and too incoherent to do much about it. Foreign
businesses noted that their Vietnamese private sector colleagues
faced formidable bureaucratic hurdles to establishing and
running their businesses. Many were giving up. How had this
situation come about and what did it mean? The papers in this
volume explore possible explanations. A key element is the
meaning attached to '1989'.
What is clear is that the more 1989 is explained in terms of
conscious top-down 'reform'—in the classical sense—then the
more difficult it is to understand the problems of the late 1990s. If
1989 is seen as evidence for the coherent and purposive
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implementation of a series of policy measures, then that implies
that the Vietnamese party and central government possess
adequate authority and power to implement other measures. Yet
the experience of the period that followed was that this was not the
case. Muddle and confusion remained. During the 1980s muddle
and confusion did not matter so much, as liberalisation simply
required winning the arguments that broke down fences and
barriers. However, when the issue was the establishment of new
fences, of new 'rules of the game', then it started to become clear
to many that confusion and muddle did not have their own built-
in 'error correction devices'. Far more purposive and coherent
policy-making and implementation was required to set up the
institutions of a market economy that could compare with those
in Vietnam's competitors. At the end of the day, as time passed
people asked the question—why are these issues still coming up
when we are now—in 1997—eight years from 1989 and the
emergence of Vietnam's market economy?
If the nature of policy remains an issue for academic debate
and investor concern, it is clear that there have been many
important changes in Vietnam since 1989. Rapid growth has
been a reality, although with increasing signs of distributional
tensions. For many, things have not happened as had been
expected. Central to these issues is the overall development
strategy of the Vietnamese government, and the attitude taken
towards important groups, such as private sector businesses and
foreign investors. Another issue is the fact that operating in
Vietnam has not become as easier since the start of the decade as
many had thought and hoped it might be. These are fundamental
issues and, with time, can lead to major shifts in views held.
The south-east corner of Australia, for various reasons,
contains rather a large number of those foreigners who have,
also for various reasons, developed programs of research into
contemporary Vietnam. It also contains a number of
communities who maintain an informed interest in the country.
The 1996 ANU Vietnam Update shows part of the former
community engaged in, once again, attempting to puzzle out just
what is going on in Vietnam, and then (perhaps equally
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difficult) find a way of presenting it to a very knowledgable
audience. This sense of audience-researcher interaction was
heightened by the particular theme of the 1996 Conference: 'Mass
Media' and the participation of a number of Vietnamese
intellectuals whose overall attitude of sceptical inquiry was close
to that of the foreigners.
The papers that follow very much reflect the 'work in
progress' spirit of the Conference. They point both to what is
known with reasonable certainty, and what is not. As a group,
they also show up well the differences in conclusions and overall
analytical thrust that come from the diversity of experiences and
perceptions that are a natural part of most research activities,
especially, for various reasons, those regarding Vietnam. The
papers stand (or fall) on their own merits. As editor, it is perhaps
useful to point out to the reader some elements of the context
within which they were prepared.
Ray Mallon's contribution remains optimistic. It was written
after the Conference and in Vietnam. It relies heavily upon
official data and a sense that the overall direction of institutional
change is positive and in the right direction. Ray tends to
discount arguments that industrial policy is particularly state-
focussed, and in particular statements from the VIII Congress
pointing to the 'leading role of the state'. It is worth pointing out
that others, taking different perspectives, have also at times
argued that official documents do not reflect real policy
directions. Certainly, Vietnam's economic performance since
1989-90 has been impressive. He points to worries that unless the
pace of institutional reform is maintained economic difficulties
will mount. He points to the employment creating capacity of the
small-scale private sector, and the importance of encouraging
new entrants to industries which offer opportunities for large-
scale employment creation.
Carl Thayer's chapter looks at the medium-term shifts in
Vietnam's official thinking regarding international relations
It spends more time on alliance and strategic issues than on
commercial or economic matters. It shows the profound
rethinking that has happened. It also argues that there is a
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certain 'lightness' in foreign policy, with little real commitment
to any particular direction. How can this be related to concerns
expressed in other papers?
Ben Kerkvliet looks at social issues. These are strongly
related to the impact of the policy concerns discussed by the
economists upon the sensitivities of ordinary people. How can
they have recourse when regulations are flouted? What do they
see as the core communities to which they belong? What do they
feel about corruption?
Thaveeporn Vasavakul attempts the most difficult of all
analyses—the political. She uses two main analytical tools. The
first is the argument that the shift from central-planning to a
market economy imposes constraints upon, and structures,
political reforms. She uses this to examine various measures
taken by the Vietnamese Communist Party, and on the whole
concludes that they have had not inconsiderable success. A
second line of approach, which is more implicit, is that
Vietnamese political leaders tend to look for balance and
harmony, and so attempt to adapt to and co-opt emerging political
groups and forces. Again, she sees a certain degree of success in
this area. The contrasts between her paper and others are useful
and should point the reader to areas where they can ask
themselves relevant questions. For example, what are the
interactions between political and economic factors? And, how
can we understand processes of change?
Ambassador Boyd's presentation shows the importance a
country such as Australia, with its regional perspective, attaches
to attaining a suitable commercial relationship with Vietnam.
Uncertainties clearly abound—Will Vietnam remain a high
risk-high return prospect, perhaps analagous to some parts of
Africa? Instead, will it settle down to a more orderly and
predictable state of affairs, encouraging quite different
strategies of investment and ways of managing a company's
involvement? The view from the diplomat's chair is one of
studied caution, with pointers to fundamentals such as a 9 per
cent annual growth rate' and a certain 'unpredictability and
inconsistency in decision-making', with no 'major or sudden
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change in the political system itself.' The view is still one that
encourages involvement, with the warning that delay now may
lead to missed opportunities. Yet the lack of Australian
commercial organisations to provide mutual support and reduce
costs (probably most crucially for the medium-sized ventures) is
striking—maybe the law firms are supplying some of these
services.
Adam Fforde presents a more pessimistic viewpoint, based
upon a view of the nature of change in Vietnam. He argues that
political economy considerations lead to an analysis of the
situation in 1995-97 that points to a rather high level of risk.
There is a possibility of a 'fire sale' of state assets as the need for
funds for a state drained by its over-commitments to SOEs
threatens macroeconomic stability.
Professor Tuong Lai's paper concludes the collection. His
arguments are based upon important survey work, which showed
that households with officials as their heads tended to be amongst
the richest in Hanoi. This is despite official incomes that are
extremely low. He points to the energies and dynamism released
by the market economy, and the positive as well as negative
aspects of these. He seems to feel that the need is for 'rules of the
game' that are better suited to these unleashed forces, lest they
become a source of confusion and disturbance. This has obvious
implications for the nature and tasks of official policy.
2Doi Moi and Economic Development in Vietnam:
ARapid Overview ofa Decade ofReform
Raymond Mallon
Introduction
In commenting on some of the major impacts of a decade of Doi
Moi on the Vietnamese economy, I take a somewhat more
optimistic view of the current economic situation in Vietnam
than that of some other analysts. This reflects both the longer
time perspective, and the fact that I would not be too concerned
about a moderate slow-down in economic growth from recent
high levels. An average annual growth rate in excess of 8 per
cent year over the five years 1996 to 2000 would still be an
impressive performance, even by regional standards.
An overview of changes in the economic environment
The magnitude of the changes that have taken place in Vietnam
since the introduction of Doi Moi is reflected in a comparison of
key indicators at the time of the VI, VII and VIII Party Congress
(see Table 1).
When the VI Party Congress was held at the end of 1986, the
country was facing a major economic crisis. Despite price
controls on most goods and services, the annual rate of inflation
was over 700 per cent. The value of exports amounted to some US$
500 million, considerably less the half the total value of imports
(US$ 1,221 million). While the Government had recorded some
notable achievements in the areas of health and education, the
10 Mallon
fiscal deficit was not sustainable, people had to queue for food,
and sections of the population faced regular periods of famine.
There was virtually no foreign investment, visits by Vietnamese
nationals to market economies were very rare and, apart from a
limited number of diplomats and aid workers, there very few
foreigners from market economies working in Vietnam.
When the VII Party Congress met in 1991, reforms already
implemented provided greatly improved incentives to make
investments to increase the level and quality of production.
Farmers had been given medium-term rights to the use of land;
prices and the exchange rate were largely market determined;
laws on foreign investment, private enterprises, and companies
had been enacted. Economic growth had accelerated to 6 per cent,
but part of this growth (oil and electricity) was the result of
previous large USSR financed investments. The value of
exports, at just over US$ 2 billion, was about four times that
recorded in 1986, but exports were dominated by three main
commodities (oil, rice and sea products) and there were doubts
about whether this growth was sustainable.
The Government also continued to intervene in micro aspects
of economic and personal decisions. Travel by Vietnamese
citizens continued to be restricted. The number of Vietnamese
being permitted to travel and study in market economies was
beginning to increase, but the number of policy and decision
makers with such exposure was still limited. The number of
foreigners working in Vietnam had increased, but official
permission was needed for internal travel, and any travel was
limited to those provinces specified in the travel permit. Foreign
business people, embassies and international agencies had
limited flexibility in the recruitment of local staff. The (1980)
Constitution provided little protection for the private sector and
foreign investors.
Continuing major macroeconomic imbalances, partly as a
result of the sharp decline in economic cooperation with the
former Eastern European countries, meant that the prospects for
sustained economic development were still uncertain.
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Table 1: Key Indicators of Economic Transformation
IndisoIr Vr Party VIII Party
. Congesss Congrrs Congress
Economic Growth (%) 3.4 6.0 9.5
Income/capita (US$) 21 n.a. 128 290
CPI (%, year to Dec.) 775 67 < 6
Food grain production 301 323 385
(kg of paddy/person)
Fiscal Deficit 3/ -6.2 -3.7 -0.5
Budget revenue 3/ 14.0 13.5 23.0
Capital Investment 3/ 6.3 2.8 5.3
Government Social 3.2 4.4 8.2
Service Expenditure 3/
Domestic Savings 3/ n.a. 13.2 17.7
-government n.a. 1.3 5.0
-non-government n.a. 11.9 12.0
Foreign Savings 3/ n.a. 1.9 11.8
National Investment 3/ n.a 15.1 29.5
FDI - US$million - 220 2,300
ODA - US$ million - 110 764
Exports -US$million 494 2,042 6,800
Imports -US$million 1,121 2,105 10,200
l/projected based on preliminary Ministry for Planning and Investment
(Vietnam) data as of November 1996. 21 sharp increase partly due to inflation
differential being only partly offset by a depreciation in the Dong. 3/ per cent of
GDP.
Sources: General Statistical Office, Impetus and Present Situation in Vietnam
Society and Economy after Ten Years of Doi Moi (Hanoi: Statistical Publishing
House, 1996), World Bank, Vietnam: Economic Report on Industrialization and
Industrial Policy (Washington, 1995); World Bank, Vietnam: Fiscal
Decentralization and the Delivery of Rural Services (Washington: 1996).
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Inflation was running at a high 67 per cent, after having being
brought down to single digit levels in 1989.
The previous large levels of external assistance and other
forms of economic cooperation with the former USSR had stripped.
Vietnam's access to financing from the IMF, World Bank and
the Asian Development Bank continued to be blocked by the US
Government. State enterprises were being restructured and State
employment was falling. Redundancies in State enterprises and
Government agencies (including the military) were of major
concern, particularly in some of the larger population centres,
but also in rural areas.
Despite low levels of public investment the fiscal deficit
remained high, with government revenue a low 13.5 per cent of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). National investment, at 15 per
cent of GDP, was less than half that of most East Asian
economies. Foreign investment approvals were increasing, but
disbursements remained low. There remained considerable
domestic and international concern about whether initial
economic improvements could be sustained.
The situation by the time of the 1996 VIII Party Congress has
changed markedly. The economy has grown by an average 8.2
per cent per year during the previous five years. Inflation has
been brought down to an annual rate of under 3 per cent by
October 1996. Convertible currency exports continued has grown
strongly—from US$ 2.1 billion in 1991 to a projected US$ 6.8
billion for 1996. Exports are more diversified, with strong growth
in exports of garments, footwear, and processed agriculture
commodities such as coffee, tea cashews, and rubber. The ratio of
Government revenue to GDP has almost doubled to 25 per cent.
Importantly, in terms of sustaining economic growth, national
investment has doubled to almost 30 per cent of GDP, mostly as a
result of growth in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The ratio of
domestic savings to GDP has not changed greatly, but has
increased in absolute terms.
While it would be difficult to find any foreign investor
claiming it is easy to do business in Vietnam, FDI inflows have
increased substantially and, as a ratio of GDP, inflows are high
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even compared to other East Asian economies. Inflows of ODA
are also beginning to increase. Private property rights have been
better clarified under the 1992 Constitution, the recently approved
Civil Code, and other legislation. The number of registered
private enterprises are increasing rapidly, albeit from a small
base. Permission is no longer required for internal travel, and
the number of Vietnamese visiting and studying in market
economies is growing.
Table 2: Sector Share ofGDP
VI Party VrI rrIg Vin Party
, ,. Congress Congress Congrss
-1986 -1991
Agriculture 43.8 39.2 32.2
State 1.3 1.0 0.9
Non-state 42.5 39.6 31.3
Industry 25.7 23,1 28.4
State 16.1 15.1 20.0
Non-state 9.6 8.0 8.3
Services 30.5 37.7 39-4
State 15.7 17.0 18.2
Non-state 14.8 20.7 21.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
State 33.1 33.2 39.2
Non-state 66.9 66.8 60.8
* projected - based on preliminary Ministry of Planning and Investment
data for first ten months.
Source: World Bank and Ministry of Planning and Investment.
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Paradoxically, the reported share of the State sector has
increased over this period despite the growing legal protection
provided to the private sector. The reported State share of GDP
increased from 33 per cent in 1991 to almost 40 per cent in 1996.
This partly reflects data problems and a rapidly growing
unrecorded informal sector. There is a continuing strong
suspicion by the private sector of the State bureaucracy, and
considerable incentive to avoid the official taxes, reporting
requirements, and additional unofficial charges that may be
incurred in moving to- the formal sector.
Reported State enterprise output has benefited greatly from
foreign investment in joint-ventures with state enterprises.1 For
example, foreign investment has played an important role in
upgrading technology and transferring skills that have
contributed to strong growth in telecommunication services and
in oil production, but national statistics record output from these
sectors as being 100 per cent State output. Continuing preferences
given to State enterprises (access to decision makers, access to
quotas and land, preferential access to credit) is also a factor in
the relatively strong performance of this sector, and partly
explains the strong interest shown by foreign investors in doing
business with State enterprises in Vietnam.
Despite continuing constraints to private sector development,
the number of registered private companies increased rapidly
during the 1990s, from 770 in 1990 to nearly 25,000 by mid-1995
(compared with about 6,000 State enterprises). Private enterprises
are mostly very small scale, but the numbers are continuing to
rise, and the scale of operations of a number of these are
beginning to become more substantial. Most of the former
industrial and service sector cooperatives have been disbanded,
but some have been reorganised as private enterprises. The
number of individual or household business operations is
' Limited output data is sometimes made available in the form that
identifies 'businesses with fdi' as being separate from SOEs.
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estimated to have increased from 568,000 in 1986 to 835,800 in
1990, and 1,882,798 by 1995.2
More generally, Doi Moi appears to have had an impact on the
lives of the majority of the population in terms of increasing the
supply of basic commodities, in particular food, clothing and
shelter. Strong economic growth has contributed to marked
improvements in per capita income over the last decade. Growth
in per capita incomes have been reported throughout the country,
but strongest growth has been recorded in urban areas. The
UNDP recently reported a reduction in the incidence of poverty
from 70 to 50 per cent since the beginning of Doi Moi? These
developments have been important in mobilizing sustained
support for the reform process.
The VIII Party Congress documents include a recognisation
that there is a long term role for the private sector, whereas prior
reports only recognised a role for the private sector in the
transition period. However, given the range of possible
interpretations of these documents, I believe that it is difficult to
draw any strong conclusions about future policy directions from
the Report of the VIII Party Congress.
Selected issues
Commitment to reform
Some international observers have recently expressed concerns
about the Government's continuing commitment to" reform. The
political debates and delays in decision-making during the
lead-up to the VIII Party Congress contributed to such concerns.
These concerns were reinforced by the high profile measures
aimed at reducing social vices, 'unhealthy' foreign influences
2 General Statistical Office, Impetus and Present Situation in Vietnam
Society and Economy after Ten Years of Doi Moi, (Hanoi: Statistical
Publishing House, 1996).
3 UNDP/UNICEF, 1996, Catching Up: Capacity Building for Poverty
Alleviation in Vietnam, Hanoi.
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(including actions against advertisers and the press), and
corruption. Inconsistencies in policy making (e.g., policies
relating to land use, the property market, and bank operations),
and frequent changes to policies directly affecting the potential
viability of investments (e.g. tax policies) have not helped. There
were also a number of high profile disputes between foreign
investors and local partners, and concerns about mechanisms
for dispute resolution.
Despite these concerns increasing inflows of FDI suggests
that most major foreign investors—mainly East Asian
investors—remain convinced of Vietnam's economic potential
with actual inflows of FDI at high levels as indicated in a later
table. Moreover, an increasing proportion of approved foreign
investment is being directed away from property development to
manufacturing activities, which are likely to have longer pay
back periods. Domestic private investors are also acting as if
they have confidence in future economic prospects. The number
of limited liability companies, and limited liability share
holding companies, being registered continues to increase.
Distribution ofeconomic growth and poverty alleviation
Since the introduction of doi moi, economic growth has been
fairly broadly based with strong growth in coffee, tea, rubber,
cashews, other industrial crops, horticulture, marine products
and livestock in the agriculture sector; energy, construction
materials, garments, footwear, foodstuffs, chemicals and
electronic assembly in the industry sector; and in the service
sector there has been strong growth in trade, tourism, finance
and public services. While agriculture growth has been
impressive by regional standards, most economic growth has
been in the industry and service sectors, as shown below.
Reported private domestic savings (and investment) remain
low compared with other East Asian economies. This partly
reflects: under-developed market institutions; continuing
suspicions about official institutions; and continuing
preferential treatment to State enterprises and foreign
Doi Moi and Economic Development 17
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investment. If recent high growth is to be sustained, greater
emphasis will need to be given to addressing these issues and
increasing private domestic savings. The following chart is not
encouraging in this regard. Growth in formal employment has
been much lower than economic growth and only marginally
higher than population growth.
Government policy statements indicate that the reduction of
poverty and the reduction of economic inequalities are important
objectives. The key to achieving this will be the creation of non-
agricultural employment in rural areas. Given that capital
availability is a major limiting constraint, this implies
increased investment in small and medium sized enterprises
that are most likely to generate greater employment (and output)
for a given level of capital. There are, however, contradictions
between stated poverty alleviation objectives and a public
investment plan that included substantial allocations to capital
intensive heavy industries such as the cement, steel and oil
refining industries that require large capital investments and
generate minimal employment.
There is also concern about attempts to protect capital
intensive industries through import quotas and taxes. These
restrictions are in effect a tax on unprotected sectors, including
many light industries, that are likely to generate the greatest
employment. There have also been concerns about lobbying
efforts of some foreign investors, together with their State
Enterprise joint-venture partners, to secure protection from
competition.
Savings and investment
As noted earlier FDI has been a major factor in recent growth.
National investment has almost doubled as a ratio of GDP
during the last five years—to almost 30 per cent—and most of
this growth has been financed from the rapid increases in
foreign savings, particularly the sharply increased inflows of
FDI and, to a lesser extent, ODA. However, there is some concern
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about the level of commercial foreign borrowings, with implicit
or explicit government guarantees.
Government savings and investment have also increased as
a result of improved revenue performance. However, while
private domestic savings have increased in absolute terms, the
ratio of private domestic savings to GDP has remained
unchanged at around 12 per cent. Private domestic savings (and
investment) remain low compared with other East Asian
economies. If recent high growth is to be sustained during the
next five years, much greater emphasis will need to be given to
increasing private domestic savings. Domestic private
investment will be much more likely to be directed to small and
medium size enterprises that are likely to generate a higher
incremental output (and employment) for a given level of capital
investment.
Recent economic performance in a regional perspective
Vietnam has recorded an average growth rate just above the
average rate tor all Southeast Asian countries during the last
five years. During this period Vietnam's economy, as measured
by the country's GDP, has grown at a similar rate to that achieved
by Thailand and Malaysia, and well above the Philippines and
Myanmar.
Per capita GDP in Vietnam, however, remains well below
that of most other East Asian economies. Only Cambodia, Laos
and Myanmar have similarly low levels of per capita income.
However, there is a considerably smaller gap between the level of
human development in Vietnam and other ASEAN members, as
measured by the UNDP's Human Development Index.
Vietnam has moved rapidly from a closed economy to an
increasingly open economy. External trade and foreign
investment flows as a percentage of GDP now compare favorably
with that of Vietnam's rapidly developing neighbors.
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Table 3: Economic Growth in Selected Countries
(per cent per annum)
Vietnam
Indonesia
South Korea
Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Thailand
6.0
8.9
9.1
4.0
8.6
-0.6
-0.6
8.5
8.7
7.2
5.1
7.0
7.8
9.7
0.3
8.1
8.1
7.3
5.8
5.9
8.3
5.9
2.1
8.3
8.8
7.5
8.4
8.1
9.2
6.8
4.4
8.7
Ann.
1995
9.6
7.6
9.2
7.1
9.3
7.7
4.8
8.6
(1991-
95)
-I—
8.2
7.7
7.5
6.4
8.6
5.9
2.2
8.4
215
880
8,220
320
3,520
235
960
2,210
Source: Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 1996 and 1997,
(Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996).
Annual export growth averaged 25 per cent from 1991 to 1995,
compared with 20 per cent in Thailand and 16 per cent in the
Philippines.4 However, this was initially from a low base.
Exports from Vietnam amounted to US$ 3.6 billion in 1994
compared with exports of almost US$ 13.4 billion from the
Philippines and almost US$ 45 billion from Thailand. In
contrast, exports from Myanmar amounted to less than US$ 0.4
4 Major exports are crude oil, rice, coal, coffee, marine products, textiles,
garments and footwear. Major imports are petroleum products,
machinery, vehicles, construction materials, chemicals and consumer
goods. East Asian countries, including Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong
are Vietnam's major trading partners.
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billion in the same year. Vietnam's exports growth remains
strong with exports projected to reach US$ 6.8 billion in 1996.
Table 4: Growth in Trade in Selected Countries
(per cent per year)
Aresogo
animal
(1991*
95)
Trtal Value
Exports
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Vietnam 18.0 21.2 15.2 26.3 45.0 25.1 3.6
Indonesia 10.5 14.0 8.3 9.9 11.1 10.8 40.2
Malaysia 17.0 18.1 16.1 23.1 26.6 20.2 56.9
Myanmar 11.1 25.6 10.8 7.6 8.0 12.6 0.4
Philippines 8.0 11.1 15.8 18.1 28.9 16.4 13.4
Thailand 23.8 13.7 13.4 22.2 24.5 19.5 44.5
Imports
Vietnam 18.8 20.4 38.3 28.4 58.3 32.8 3.3
Indonesia 15.7 7.8 6.0 13.9 23.1 13.3 32.3
Malaysia 26.8 10.1 17.8 28.1 30.6 22.7 55.3
Myanmar -42.5 18.5 8.8 0.5 9.0 -1.1 0.4
Philippines -1.3 20.5 21.2 20.7 24.4 17.1 21.2
Thailand 15.8 6.0 12.1 18.5 28.4 16.2 44.4
Sources: General Statistical Office; Asian Development Bank, Asian
Development Outlook 1996.
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As previously noted, inflows of FDI to Vietnam have
increased sharply in recent years,5 with other East Asian
economies the dominant source of investment. FDI inflows to
Vietnam during 1995 were high, even relative to other Southeast
Asian countries, and the WB/IMF project a further increase to
US$ 2.3 billion during 1996. While foreign investors face many
difficulties operating in Vietnam—especially during project
start-up—major investors have subsequently expanded
operations beyond that initially planned and approved. Given the
continuing high levels of approvals, the ratio of FDI inflows to
GDP are likely to remain at relatively high levels during the
next few years. The greater challenge now seem to be the
mobilisation of domestic savings and investment.
Table 5: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI in millions of US dollars)
■
Vietnam
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Total Capital of FDI
Projects Approved 1/ 539 600 1,223 1,937 2,800 4,071 6,616
IMF/WB est. of FDI
inflows2/ 100 120 220 260 832 1,048 1,781
FDI Inflows
Indonesia 682 1,093 1,482 1,777 2,004 2,109
Malaysia 1,668 2,332 3,998 5,183 5,006 4,348
Philippines 563 530 544 228 763 1,126
Thailand 1,775 2,444 2,014 2,116 1,726 640
Sources: V Ministry of Planning & Investment; 21 WB/IMF. Other country data
from ADB-Asian Development Outlook 1996. In addition to FDI, the other
Southeast Asian nations have also received increasing levels of portfolio
investments in recent years.
5 Major sources of FDI approvals to February 1996 were Taiwan (US$
3.6 billion), Japan (US$ 2.2 billion), Hong Kong (US$ 2.2 billion), South
Korea (US$ 1.5 billion), and Singapore (US$ 1.5 billion).
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Concluding remarks
While some aspects of reforms have moved ahead at a slower rate
than some observers expected and/or may have considered
desirable, a review of ten years of progress leaves little doubt that
the reforms already implemented have been substantive.
Reforms have contributed to marked improvements in macro-
economic stability and growth in output, trade, and inflows of
foreign direct investment. Economic growth during the last five
years compares favorably with that of other ASEAN economies
and the newly industrializing countries, but Vietnam has still a
long way to 'catch-up' to other ASEAN economies in terms of
levels of economic output and trade.
The country has moved from a situation where reforms
tended to be crisis driven, to a situation where the authorities are
beginning to develop a longer term vision of where the country is
heading. While there continues to be a risk of an economic
downturn, the risk of economic collapse that existed at the time of
the VII Congress appears to have been averted. This provides the
scope for greater consistency and predictability in policy
making. It also provides an opportunity for various interest
groups to be better organised, and in come cases this may imply
the need for greater efforts to 'sell' reforms. This implies in turn
a need for improved capacity to undertake more sophisticated
analysis of the distribution of the costs and benefits of proposed
reform measures.
The nature of the major challenges are also changing. In
order to sustain medium to long-term growth, there is need for a
greater focus on institutional reforms and development. Some
key medium-term challenges include: financial sector
development to improve domestic resource mobilisation and
allocation; further progress towards a more consistent
regulatory framework for all economic sectors in order to
achieve increased and more efficient commercial investment
('leveling the playing field'); further reducing institutional
constraints to small and medium enterprise development with
the aim of ensuring more equitable distribution of the benefits of
growth; improving corporate governance systems for State
24 Mallon
enterprises; increasing competition faced by remaining
monopolies; further trade liberalisation, especially in reducing
barriers to entry to external trade; accelerating implementation
of committed programs and projects to improve education,
training, and other social services; and, accelerating the
development of physical infrastructure. There is still much to be
done to develop the institutions required to support a market
economy, including capital market institutions, accounting and
other professions, and to strengthen the legal framework and
enforcement mechanisms for protection of property rights and
commercial activity.
More generally, there remains need for further public
administration reform to streamline decision making authority
and to clarify and enforce established lines of authority and
accountability. Regulations need to be simplified to reduce the
administrative discretion presently exercised by some
government agencies in order to reduce incentives and
opportunity for corruption, and to generally reduce the
transaction costs of undertaking business activities in Vietnam.
Party and Government documents include commitments to
reforms in many of these areas. While past experience suggests
that progress in addressing the issues will be gradual, the
probability of maintaining strong growth (7-10 per cent per
annum) over the next two to three years remains high, given the
already approved pipeline of investment projects. The longer-
term prospects for sustained strong growth will depend on further
progress in developing market institutions, and further
administrative reforms.
3International Relations and Security:
A Rapid Overview ofa Decade ofDoiMoi
Carlyle A. Thayer
Introduction
The topic of this paper is 'International Relations and Security'.1
This is the first time since the 1990 Vietnam Update that foreign
policy and national security has been addressed explicitly.2
This paper is divided into five unequal parts. I would like to
begin with a brief consideration of the foreign policy models
through which Vietnamese policymakers have viewed the region
and the world. Next, I would like to discuss the seminal political
event of 1996—the VIII National Congress of the Vietnam
Communist Party—and its implications for foreign policy.
Thirdly, I will provide a brief update on Vietnam's foreign
relations during 1996.
1 I would like to thank Mr Nguyen Hong Thach for valuable research
assistance without which this paper would not have been possible.
2 See Gareth Evans, 'Australia, Vietnam and the region'; Vo Dai Luoc,
'Some problems in renovating Vietnam's foreign economic policy in the
new situation'; and Gary Klintworth, 'Vietnam: forces of change'—
chapters in Dean K. Forbes, Terence H. Hull, David G. Marr and Brian
Brogan, eds, Doi Moi: Vietnam's Economic Renovation: Policy and
Performance, (Canberra: Political and Social Change Monograph no. 14,
Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University,
1991), pp. 1-11, 136-142 and 215-233.
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Fourthly, I will discuss the development of defence contacts
which is a major new development in Vietnam's external
relations.
Finally, by way of conclusion, this paper will offer a critical
perspective on the orientation of Vietnam's international
relations.
Changing foreign policy models — paradigm lost
During the mid-to late-1980s, a major transformation took place
in how Vietnam's policy elite conceptualised foreign policy. The
roots of this transformation are two fold. They lie in domestic
circumstances arising from the socioeconomic crisis which
confronted Vietnam at that time. And secondly, they lie in
external influences arising from the 'new political thinking'
fashionable in Gorbachev's Soviet Union.3
Vietnam turned from a foreign policy model heavily
structured by ideological considerations to a foreign policy
model which placed greater emphasis on national interest,
balance of power and realpolitik. Vietnamese analysis tends to
emphasise global economic forces and the impact of the
'revolution in science and technology' over military aspects of
power.4 These models are not mutually exclusive, each contains
3 See Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, Soviet Relations with
India and Vietnam (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 53-61 and 69-70;
Thayer, 'The Soviet Union and Indochina,' in Roger E. Kanet, Deborah
Nutter Miner, and Tamara J. Resler, eds, Soviet Foreign Policy in
Transition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 236-255;
and Thayer "Vietnam and the Soviet Union: perceptions and policies,' in
Pushpa Thambipillai and Daniel C. Matuszewski, eds, The Soviet Union
and the Asia-Pacific Region: Views from the Region (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1989), pp. 134-153.
4 Nguyen Manh Cam, 'Gia tri lau ben va dinh huong nhat quan,' and Vu
Khoan, 'Mot vai van de quoc te cua dai hoi VII,' Tuan bao Quoc Te, 8/1991
both reprinted in Hoi nhap quoc te va giu vung ban sac (Hanoi: Nha xua
ban chinh tri quoc te, 1995).
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elements of the other. Ideology and national interest should not
be viewed as dichotomous terms. They can and do overlap and
co-exist.
The influence of ideology on Vietnam's foreign policy prior
to the mid- to late-1980s may be illustrated as follows.5 From the
inception of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as an
established state in Southeast Asia, its elite accepted the 'two
camp' thesis that the world was divided between the forces of
socialism and capitalism.6
In the late 1960s Vietnam adopted a framework known as the
'three revolutionary currents'.7 According to this model, global
order was determined by three trends (or revolutionary
currents): the strength of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet
Union; the strength of the workers' movement in advanced
industrial countries; and by the strength of the forces of national
liberation in the Third World.
In practical terms, Vietnam allied itself with the Soviet
Union as the 'cornerstone' of its foreign policy. Hanoi's leaders
5 Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Vietnam in world affairs,' Dyason House Papers 3
no. 5 (June 1977):5-8; Thayer, 'Vietnam's External Policy: An Overview',
Pacific Community 9 no. 2, (January 1978):212-231; Thayer,' Vietnam's
foreign policy', World Review 20 no. 2 (June 1981:30-40); Thayer,
'Vietnam's foreign policy: the background factors', Current Affairs Bulletin
62 no. 9 (February 1986):21-30; and Thayer, 'Vietnam: ideology and the
lessons from experience', in William S. Turley, ed., Confrontationor
Coexistence: The Future of ASEAN-Vietnam Relations (Bangkok: The
Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University,
1985), pp. 49-74.
6 Gareth Porter, 'Vietnam and the Socialist camp: center or periphery?',
in William S. Turley, ed., Vietnamese Communism in Comparative
Perspective (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 225-264.
7 Carlyle A. Thayer, Vietnamese perspectives on international security:
three revolutionary currents', in Donald H. McMillen, ed., Asian
Perspectives on International Security (London: Macmillan Press, 1984),
pp. 57-76.
28 Thayer
also viewed Indochina as a strategic entity and sought to develop
an integrated alliance system with Laos and Cambodia.
In December 1986, at the VI National Congress, as is well
known, Vietnam adopted the policy of Doi Moi or renovation.
This policy was mainly concerned with domestic socioeconomic
reform. In the foreign policy field the main new feature was the
stress on the encouragement of foreign investment.
In 1987, the Politburo adopted Resolution No. 2 which set in
motion a strategic readjustment in Vietnam's national security
policy.8 Vietnam made the decision to withdraw from Cambodia
and Laos and to downsize its large standing army.
It was not until May 1988, however, that Vietnam's new
foreign policy orientation was codified. This took the form of
Politburo Resolution No. 13 which stressed a 'multi-directional
foreign policy' orientation.9 This resolution is now recognised
as a major landmark. It is important to note that this followed,
and was not contemporary with, the adoption of renovation in
economic policy. The emphasis was 'to maintain peace, take
advantage of favourable world conditions' in order to stabilise
the domestic situation and set the base for economic development
over the next ten to fifteen years.
An important modification of Vietnam's 'multi-directional
foreign policy' was adopted by the VII National Party Congress
in June 1991. 10 Vietnam now sought 'to be friends with all
countries' or to intensify the process of diversification by
8 Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Vietnam's strategic readjustment', in Stuart Harris
and Gary Klintworth, eds, China as a Great Power: Myths, Realities and
Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region (Melbourne: Longman Australia
Pty Ltd., 1995), pp. 185-201; and Thayer, The Vietnam People's Army
Under Doi Moi, Pacific Strategic Paper no. 7 (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), pp. 14-17.
9 Nguyen Dy Nien, 'Tiep tuc doi moi va mo cua vi su nghiep cong
nghiep hoa, hien dai hoa dat nuoc', Tap Chi Cong San 12 no. 6 (1996).
10 Vu Khoan, 'Mot vai van de quoc te cua dai hoi VH', Tuan Bao Quoc Te
8 (1991) reprinted in Hoi nhap quoc te va giu vung ban sac (Hanoi: NXB
Chinh Tri Quoc Te, 1995).
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developing its foreign relations a step further—by becoming
partners.
The major accomplishments of this new orientation were
fourfold: normalisation of relations with China (November
1991), and in 1995 normalisation of relations with the United
States, membership in ASEAN and the signing of a framework
agreement with the European Union.
For the first time, socialist Vietnam had established relations
with all five of the permanent members of the UN Security
Council, and more importantly, with the world's three major
economic centres: Europe, North America and East Asia
(Japan). Vietnam, also for the first time, began to directly
address the new post-Cold War foreign policy and security
agenda. In short, Vietnam had achieved the most favourable
circumstances for its integration with the region and the world.11
The transition from a model stressing ideology to a model
stressing national interest was not without debate.12 It must be
noted that there are sill elements within Vietnam's foreign
policy establishment who still cling to ideology. An article in the
May 1996 issue of the Communist Review, for example, argued
that Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh's Thoughts had to be
defended along with the country's air space and land and sea
territory.13 Another article in the same journal, written three
months later, noted that one danger of developing a market
11 For a current assessment see William S. Turley, "Vietnamese security
in domestic and regional focus: the political-economic nexus', in Richard J.
Ellings and Sheldon W. Simon, eds., Southeast Asian Security in the New
Millennium (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 175-220.
12 For a discourse on different aspects of foreign policy consult: Nguyen
Manh Cam, 'Gia tri lau ben va dinh huong nhat quan', and Tran Quang
Co, 'Tuong lai cua cac quan he giua Viet Nam va cac nuoc chau A - Thai
binhDuong: tac dong den phat trien kinh te cua Viet Nam', in Hoi nhap
quoc te va giu vung ban sac; and Phan Doan Nam, Ve mot so mau thuan
noi len tren the gioi hien nay\ Nghien Cuu Quoc Te no. 13 (1996):7-18.
13 Le Xuan Luu.Ve moi quan he giua xay dung va bao ve to quoc trong
giai doan cachmang moi', Tap Chi Cong San 10 no. 5 (1996).
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economy was its negative effect on political and cultural values
and the loss of Vietnam's socialist orientation.14
In sum, not only has a 'paradigm been lost' but Vietnam is
still suffering from a crisis of faith.
The VIII National Party Congress
Foreign policy issues barely figured in Vietnam's public
discourse in the lead up to the VIII National Party Congress.15
What I would like to do is to review the foreign policy section of
the Political Report to the VIII National Congress.16
14 Bui Phan Ky, 'May van de ve xay dung va bao ve to quoc XHCN
trong boi canh the gioi hien nay', Tap Chi Cong San 16 no. 8 (1996).
15 The one exception was the 'Hoang Minh Chinh affair' which
attempted to reverse the verdicts of the 1960s. Up until 1963 Vietnam had
maintained an independent line in the growing Sino-Soviet dispute. In the
words of a contemporary British diplomat it walked 'a straight zig-zag
line'. In 1963, however, Vietnam suddenly lurched towards China and in
doing so condemned Soviet revisionism. Vietnam's pro-China tilt was not
universally endorsed. Vietnamese officials in the Soviet Union, including
high-ranking military officers, refused to return home. Domestic critics
were quickly imprisoned for opposing their country's anti-Moscow stance.
They and their families suffered physically, materially and
psychologically. From the vantage point of the 1990s, it appeared that the
critics had been right. China, after all, had been declared the 'direct and
most dangerous enemy' of Vietnam by mid- 1978 even before the border
war of 1979 in which Beijing sought to 'teach' Vietnam a lesson'. Hoang
Minh Chinh's re-arrest in 1996 was directly related to a petition he
circulated calling for the redress of past wrongs including the
rehabilitation of the victims and their families. My reading of this affair is
that the party's fallibility in policy matters was being called into question.
An admission by the party that it was wrong in 1963 would also raise the
question of whether they had got foreign policy wrong in 1996 as well.
16 For a general overview see Vu Khoan, 'Dai hoi VIII va cong tac doi
ngoai', Tuan Bao Quoc Te no. 26 (26 June-2 July 1996): 1 and 10.
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There are at least three such reports known to me.17 The first
was a 'for internal circulation only' draft prepared in late 1995.
The second was a public draft released in April 1996. The third
was the final public Political Report delivered at the VIII
Congress.
When all three versions are compared it is notable that the
foreign policy section was the most heavily edited and amended
of any section of the Political Report. In each successive draft the
ideological sharpness of the language and terminology used was
blunted and toned down. For example, the 1995 confidential draft
version made reference to 'loyal comrades and friends' and to
the world's 'main contradictions.' These were deleted.
Why? Some changes were made as a result of criticism
arising from within the party. Most changes were made due to
strenuous objections by Vietnam's ASEAN partners after they
saw the April draft.
The most extensive changes were made to the April 1996
draft's eight major foreign policy tasks. In addition to being
extensively revised and re-ordered, additional tasks were added
for a final total of nine.
(1) 'To consolidate a peaceful environment and create more
favourable international conditions for promoting
economic development in the area of national
construction and defence'. Earlier wording referred to
'national industrialisation and modernisation and
support [for] the cause of national defence and
construction.' The priorities have been reversed.
17 Dang Cong San Viet Nam, Du Thao Cac Van Kien Trinh Dai Hoi VIII
cua Dang (Tai Lieu Dung Tai Dai Hoi Dang Cap Co So), Mat (Secret), Luu
Hanh Noi Bo (Internal Circulation), December 1995; 'Du Thao Bao Cao
Chinh Tri cua Ban Chap Nanh Trung Uong Dang Khoa VII Trinh Dai Hoi
Lan Thu VIII cua Dang', Nhan Dan (April 10 1996) supplement; and 'Bao
Cao Chinh Tri,' Quan Doi Nhan Dan (June 30 1996).
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(2) 'To continue our foreign policy of independence,
sovereignty, openness and diversification and multi-
lateralisation of relations in the spirit of Vietnam's
desire to make friends will all nations and to strive for
peace, independence and development.' This was left
unchanged.
(3) 'To promote multifaceted bilateral and multilateral
cooperation with all countries and international or
regional organisations on the principles of respect for
each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity, as well as on the principles of non-interference
in each other's internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit
and settlement of outstanding problems and disputes
through negotiations'.
The order of regional and international organisations
was changed to give priority to international bodies. A
similar reordering took place with respect to the
principles which were re arranged with 'equality and
mutual benefit' listed last. References to 'effect regional
and world integration' and to 'peaceful coexistence' were
dropped. The object of negotiations— 'to ensure peace,
stability and security for development'—was deleted.
(4) 'To strengthen our relations with neighbouring countries
and ASEAN member countries, to constantly consolidate
our ties with traditional friendly states, and attach
importance to our relations with developed countries and
political-economic centres in the world while at the same
time upholding the spirit of solidarity and brotherliness
with developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin
America, and with the Non-Aligned Movement'. This
point was added.
(5) 'To participate more actively in the activities of the United
Nations, Francophone countries, international financial
and monetary organisations, the World Trade
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Organisation and other international organisations.'
The words 'more' and 'Francophone countries' were
reinserted. References to unnamed 'international
forums' and 'the settlement of global issues' were listed as
a separate point (new point no. 6). Cooperation, as distinct
from participation, in the activities of the United Nations
and the Non-Aligned Movement was dropped.
(6) 'To take an active role in the endeavours of international
forums and in the settlement of global issues'. This was
formerly a part of point four.
(7) 'To support the complete ban against nuclear weapons and
other weapons of mass destruction'. This was an entirely
new point.
(8) 'To promote relations with communist and workers'
parties and other revolutionary, national independence
and progressive forces, as well as broadening our
relations with other parties, including ruling parties'.
Formerly, this was point five of eight. The phrase 'on the
basis of equality and non-interference in each other's
internal affairs' was dropped.
(9) 'To broaden external people-to-people relations and ties
with non-governmental organisations [formerly point 6],
to secure sympathy and support from broad sections of the
world's people [formerly point 7]; and contribute towards
the trend of peace, cooperation and development [formerly
point 8]'. The new point nine was formed by merging the
previous points 6, 7 and 8.
The VII Congress was attended by 35 foreign delegations.
Most important was the inclusion of non-communist ruling
parties from neighbouring states such as the PAP from
Singapore, UMNO from Malaysia and FUNCINPEC from
Cambodia. Indonesia's GOLKAR declined to attend.
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The communist parties from all socialist states in
power(China, Laos, North Korea and Cuba) as well as
communist and socialist parties and national liberation
movements not in power (eg. France, Russia, Japan, Belores,
Ukraine, Bulgaria, USA, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Argentina,
India [CPI (M) and CPI], Lebanon, Brazil, Greece, Chile)
attended.
The VII Party congress was remarkable more for the public
relations hype than for any concrete development or elaboration
of new foreign policy directions.
Update on Vietnam's foreign relations
In this section I do not intend to review Vietnam's relations with
each major partner in detail. Rather, I want suggest that there is
a hierarchy—or priority—in Vietnam's external relations.18
Relations with Southeast Asia (ASEAN and non-ASEAN
members) come first, followed by China, the United States and
then 'other countries' including Japan, South Korea, the
European Union and Australia.
Southeast Asia
As an ASEAN member, Vietnam attended the first summit
meeting of all tens heads of government in Southeast Asia held
in Bangkok in December 1995. Vietnam joined with other
regional states in endorsing the Southeast Asian Nuclear Free
Weapons Zone Treaty. In July 1996, Vietnam marked the first
anniversary of membership in ASEAN19 and the ASEAN
Regional forum. Vietnam has played a low-key role in both
bodies. It lacks the human resources to participate fully in the
more than 200 ASEAN meetings held each year.
18 Tran Quang Co, Tuong lai cua cac quan he giua Viet Nam va cac
nuocchau A - Thai Binh Duong: tac dong den phat trien kinh te cua Viet
Nam', in Hoi nhap quoc te va giu vung ban sac.
19 Nguyen Manh Hung,'Nhin lai mot nam Viet Nam gia nhap ASEAN',
Nghien Cuu Quoc Te no. 13 (1996):3-5.
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While ASEAN states are moving to reduce tariffs Vietnam
has been given a three-year exemption. This means, for the
moment, its domestic manufacturing firms have extra time to
increase their competitiveness.
At the 1996 ASEAN-United States dialogue, Washington's
discriminatory treatment of Vietnam became an issue. Other
members of ASEAN pressed Washington to treat Vietnam as a
partner (not a former enemy) and to develop a full relationship.
This is diplomatic speak for granting MFN status. ASEAN also
supports Vietnam's membership in APEC (now postponed until
1998) and the WTO.
Thailand
As a result of continuing friction between Thai and Vietnamese
fishing boats, the two countries' foreign ministers met in Hanoi
in April 1996 and agreed to set up a joint commission to resolve
the matter. Thailand is Vietnam's thirteenth largest foreign
investor.
Cambodia
In January 1996, First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh
alleged that Vietnam had encroached into Svay Rieng province
and relocated bordermarkers. Vietnamese local authorities
claimed that Cambodian troops had opened fire on unarmed
civilians without provocation. Two months later Ranariddh
threatened military action to stem what he termed Vietnam's
'border invasion'. This prompted a visit by Prime Minister Vo
Van Kiet in mid-April to diffuse the matter. Both parties agreed
to a set of procedures under which negotiation of border incidents
would be dealt with first by local and then provincial officials
before being raised at national level. High-level talks on the
border issue were held in Ho Chi Minh City in May.
Refugees
In 1996 decisive steps were taken by the international community
to resolve the long-standing problem of Vietnamese refugees in
Southeast Asia. In mid-January a UN-sponsored meeting in
Bangkok agreed that all camps outside Hong Kong should be
36 Thayer
cleared of refugees by June 1996. The UNHCR terminated its
financial assistance on 30 June. Throughout the year Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand took steps to
empty their camps. Vietnamese boat people were offered the
choice of returning voluntarily or being forcibly repatriated.
This new policy provoked rioting and violent resistance by camp
inmates in the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia. While
Malaysia succeeded in emptying its camps of those who refused
voluntary return, the Philippines abandoned forcible
repatriation after violent protests. As of the 30th June, refugee
figures stood at approximately 1,000 in the Philippines, 3,500 in
Indonesia and 4,000 in Thailand. China has brought pressure to
bear on Hong Kong to empty its camps before 30 June 1997 when
the city reverts to Chinese control.
China— 'sweet and sour'
Sino-Vietnamese relations have alternated between exchanges
of high-level delegations and progress on economic matters and
contention over contested territory since the normalisation of
relations in November 1991. Vietnam and China have since
signed some twenty economic and commercial agreements. In
November 1995, Do Muoi led a high-level party delegation to
China to step up the pace of economic relations. The only tangible
result of this visit was the decision on 12 February 1996 to reopen
rail links between Kunming in Yunnnan province with Hanoi
and Haiphong. Agreement to reopen the rail line had been
agreed originally in 1992.
In the five years since normalisation, little progress has been
made on contentious matters, such as outstanding territorial
disputes. In November 1995, the first round of talks was held on
maritime issues between expert groups of the two countries. In
January and April, the seventh and eighth round of bilateral
talks on border issues were held. No progress was recorded. In
mid-April, Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet and Premier Li Pen,
held bilateral discussions while attending the Asia Europe
Summit Meeting in Bangkok. But relations remained strained
over disputes in the South China Sea. In April Vietnam
announced the award of an oil exploration and production rights
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contract to Conoco, an American company, in an off-shore block
claimed by China. This drew Chinese protests. In May China
announced baselines for its coast line including the Paracel
Islands, which were drawn together to create an archipelago. In
effect, China unilaterally expanded its maritime jurisdiction by
2.5 million square kilometres.
In mid-year Premier Li Peng attended the VIII Party
congress and was accorded treatment which seemed to indicate
he was the most important foreign guest. Li's visit did not result
in any noticeable improvement in bilateral relations, however.
Vietnamese officials privately expressed their dissatisfaction at
the 'imperial' manner adopted by Li Peng and his abrupt
behaviour while in Hanoi.
During the year both sides continued talks on territorial and
border disputes. Most importantly, they agreed in September at
the fourth round of government talks to speed up discussions on
the land border and to try and reach a resolution by the year 2000.
This is the first time such a deadline has been indicated. In 1993,
the two sides agreed on a document setting out the principles for a
settlement of territorial disputes. It has been agreed this will be
applied to discussions on delineating the Tonkin Gulf. Little
progress was noticeable on the settlement of conflicting claims
in the South China Sea.
United States
The posting of an American ambassador has been put off by the
refusal of Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, to approve President Clinton's nominee,
Pete Peterson. A key player in the normalisation of diplomatic
relations, Vietnamese deputy foreign minister Le Mai passed
away unexpectedly in early June. In July US National Security
Adviser Anthony Lake visited Hanoi on the first anniversary of
the normalisation of relations, to discuss three sets of issues:
economic cooperation, refugee resettlement and regional
cooperation. However, Lake made clear that the full accounting
of MIAs remained America's "highest priority'.
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Vietnamese-United States economic relations have also not
yet been fully normalised despite the growth in trade and
investment figures. In September 1995 Foreign Minister Nguyen
Manh Cam and Minister of Commerce, Le Van Triet, visited
Washington, D.C. to discuss economic ties. They were told that
Vietnam was not qualified for most favoured nation (MFN)s
trading status, Export-Import Bank credits, or for insurance
cover from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
unless Vietnam complied with the terms of the Jackson-Vanik
amendment requiring free and open emigration (or a
Presidential waiver subject to annual review by Congress). Also,
Vietnam would be required to negotiate a trade agreement which
met with US Congressional approval. Negotiations on the trade
agreement commenced in late 1995 when a delegation composed
of representatives of the Departments of Commerce, State and
Treasury and OPIC visited Hanoi. In April 1996 a US
commercial office was opened. The United States is sixth among
foreign investors in Vietnam.
In October, in a potentially significant development, Kurt
Campbell, an official from the Pentagon, initiated discussions
on regional security issues during the course of a visit.
Other Countries
Japan
In September 1993, Vietnam and Japan re-established full
diplomatic relations and a year later Japan's prime minister
visited Vietnam for official talks. Japan is Vietnam's second
largest trading partner and largest aid donor.
South Korea
South Korea and Vietnam developed substantial trade and
investment relations prior to the normalisation of relations in
December 1992. In 1996 relations reached an all-time high with
the visit of the Korean president Hanoi late in the year. During
the year South Korea posted its first defence attache to Vietnam.
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European Union
In February 1993 President Francois Mitterrand of France
became the first Western head of state to visit Vietnam since
reunification. He was followed in early 1995 by Foreign
Minister Alain Juppe. In July 1993, Vo Van Kiet visited several
West European countries, including the United Kingdom,
France and Germany. In 1995, Vietnam and the European Union
signed cooperation agreement which included a human rights
provision. The two sides have reached agreement on cooperation
for the period 1996-2000 and an action program for 1996-98.
Vietnam has MFN status and benefits from the transfer of
technology. The EU provides approximately US $35-40 million in
ODA each year in addition to the bilateral programs
Germany
Germany's relations with Vietnam have been strained by the
issue of Vietnamese guestworkers originally sent to East
Germany who have remained illegally after reunification and
who now refuse to return home. Some Vietnamese gangs have
been implicated in cigarette smuggling while others have
attracted publicity as a result of violent gang warfare. Vietnam
has been reluctant to accept them back. In January 1995 Germany
agreed to provide DM100 million in development assistance
(suspended since 1990) and an equivalent amount in export
credits in return for which Vietnam agreed to accept back 40,000
of an estimated 95,000 Vietnamese living in Germany by the
year 2000. The remaining 55,000 would be given official
residence permits. As part of the agreement, Vietnam agreed to
take back 2,500 in 1995 and another 5,000 in 1996. No progress was
made until late June 1996 when Vietnam accepted an initial
batch of 3,000.
Australia
In March 1996 the conservative Liberal and Country coalition
parties were elected to office after thirteen years in opposition.
Bilateral relations with Vietnam were briefly strained when the
new foreign minister sought to withdraw financial support for
the My Thuan bridge in the Mekong Delta which the previous
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government had pledged to support. Vietnam stated that relations
could be 'seriously affected' if funding for the bridge was cut. The
new minister's attempt to cut the DIFF program proved to be
another irritant in the bilateral relationship. China, Indonesia
and the Philippines made their protests known in letters and
verbal comments to the Australian government causing much
embarrassment to the foreign minister. Vietnam, however,
adopted a quieter approach.
Australia's original policy of support for the My Thuan
bridge was reconfirmed during a well-timed visit to Hanoi by
foreign minister Alexander Downer. He was the first foreign
minister to visit Vietnam after its VIII Party congress.
During the year Australia quietly opened a regional security
dialogue with defence and foreign ministry officials in Hanoi
(see below).
Security and defence relations
In 1996 Vietnam's military strengthened its position in the
ruling Vietnam Communist Party and thus ensured for itself
greater political influence and a larger share of the national
budget. Vietnam has set itself two priorities over the next half
decade —'industrialisation and modernisation'. In the defence
area, this translates into a priority upgrading of the navy and air
force. Vietnam's military budget is presently estimated at US
$900 million or 4 per cent of GDP and is set to rise.
Vietnam, like many neighbouring states, ranks internal
security concerns above external threats on its list of national
defence concerns. The National defence and security section of
the Political Report to the VIII Congress highlighted the
following, 'We must effectively prevent and crush all plots and
activities of peaceful evolution and subversive violence and be
ready to deal with any other complicated situations that could
arise. We should strive to halt endpoint all criminal activities in
order to maintain firmly social order and safety.
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Vietnamese defence planners state that their country faces a
low-threat environment for the foreseeable future. They identify
the most likely external threats as coming from 'hot spots' like
the South China Sea which could erupt at any moment and
escalate from low intensity conflict to a larger scale.20
National defence, internal security and foreign relations are
seen as mutually reinforcing. According to the 1996 Political
Report, Vietnam's first foreign policy priority is 'to consolidate a
peaceful environment and create more favourable international
conditions in order to accelerate socioeconomic development,
implement national industrialisation and modernisation, and
support the cause of national defence and construction.'
Other objectives include 'diversification and multilateralisation
of relations', the development of 'multifaceted bilateral and
multilateral cooperation', the strengthening of relations with
neighbouring countries, ASEAN members, 'traditional friendly
states', develop and developing countries, and 'politico-economic
centres' in the world'.
Vietnam's once highly secretive military establishment is
avidly seeking to expand international relations. During 1996
defence contracts were made with at least nineteen countries.
The list includes: Australia, Bulgaria, Burma, Cambodia,
Canada, China, Cuba, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand,
United Kingdom and the United States.
The following report by Vietnam News Agency is typical of
these contacts:21
Late last month Singapore's Defence Minister Dr Tony
Tan Keng Yam visited Hanoi for three days at the
20 Foreign ministry officials are more circumspect, they see the 'Eastern
Sea' as a region of 'cooperation and competition'. See Dinh Nho Liem, 'Qua
trinh mo rong quan he voi cac nuoc cung la qua trinh vua hop tac vua dau
tranh', Tap Chi Cong San (1996).
21 Vietnam News Agency, Hanoi, in English, 1447 gmt, 27 November
1996.
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invitation of his counterpart, General Doan Khue. During
the meeting, the two sides 'compared notes on orientation
to boost cooperation between the two defence ministries,
and armies, and on other issues of common concern...'
The Singapore Defence Minister was also received by
General Secretary Do Muoi and Prime Minister Vo Van
Kiet. According to the Vietnam News Agency, 'Dr Tony
Tan Keng Yam said that Singapore is ready to share with
Vietnam its expertise in industry, technology and
management as well as in the training of technicians.'
Singapore also wishes to strengthen bilateral cooperation
between the two countries.
During 1996 defence attaches were exchanged with South
Korea and the United Kingdom while discussions with Japan are
still continuing. A Canadian warship paid a friendly port call.
Australia inaugurated its first defence contacts in April through
the medium of a 'security dialogue' held in Hanoi. A delegation
from the Joint Services Staff College visited August.
In February 1996 it was announced that a consortium of
Australian companies had signed in Perth an MOU for a A$37.5
million contract to build 20 coastal patrol boats for the Vietnam
Customs Department.22 The contract was due to be signed in Ho
Chi Minh City on 22 February. The boats would enable the
Vietnamese to upgrade maritime border security and crack
down on smuggling. The deal was drawn up between Stolkraft
International and Pacific Asia Industries (Vietnam) who then
collaborated with boatbuilder Oceanfast of Western Australia.
Under the terms of the contract, Oceanfast would build the first
four boats valued at A$7.5 million, at its Henderson yard, south
of Fremantle. Then all three companies would form a joint
venture with two other Vietnamese companies to build the
remaining 16 boats in Vung Tau for A$30 million. This deal
22 Ian Porter, '$38M contract for patrol boats', Australian Financial
Review 22 February 1996. Australia competed against bids from Russia,
Japan and Sweden.
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included a maintenance contract and raised the possibility of
commercial sales elsewhere in the region. The 22.4 metre patrol
boats will use the patented Stolkraft hull design. They will have a
beam of 7.5 metres and a draft ofl.3 metres. Each boat's water
jets will be powered by two V12 diesel engines of 1150hp each.
Oceanfast was expected to provide plasma-cut aluminium panels
and frames for the last 16 boats.
In April (17-20), Alan Behm led a delegation composed of
representatives from the Departments of Defence and Foreign
Affairs and Trade (including Commodore Chris Ritchie,
Rosemary Greaves from DFAT, and Paul Dibb from SDSC ANU)
to Hanoi for 'one-and-a-half track discussions with the Institute
of International Relation'.23 Senator Gareth Evans, then
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, approved the initiative
in 1995 when he first raised the matter with his counterpart
Nguyen Manh Cam. The Australian delegation also held talks
with Defence Ministry personnel. There are conflicting
versions of how these talks went. According to one view, talks
with the Vietnamese defence ministry did not go well as the
Vietnamese were not forthcoming on the issues discussed,
including relations with China. In contrast, DFAT officials
state that the 'one-and-a-half track' effort in April went well and
that consideration is being given to upgrading discussions to an
official 'track one' relationship. According to Greg Sheridan,
'Canberra is pursuing the possibility of a formal defence
dialogue with Vietnam'.24 Originally, Canberra planned to
accredit a defence attache to Hanoi in 1996; this idea has now
been shelved for at least one year.
Vietnamese military are also making their first
appearances at region-wide security meetings. Vietnamese
delegates attended the ASEAN Regional Forum inter-sessional
23 Work in Progress', Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Newsletter
(Winter 1996):2.
24 Greg Sheridan, 'History, interest weave close ties', The Australian
September 6 1996:17.
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meetings on confidence building held in Tokyo in January and
Jakarta in April, and the Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue hosted
by Thailand in March. Vietnam also sent representatives to the
Forum for Defence Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region held
in Japan in October. This was the first regional meeting of
defence planners. Vietnam's Defence Ministry is reportedly
preparing the first draft of a defence White Paper.
Vietnam is also attempting to upgrade its military inventory
after a severe run down following the collapse of the Soviet
Union. It is selectively seeking spare parts and electronic
equipment in addition to making limited purchases. Russia is
the main supplier. Vietnam is presently negotiating the purchase
of air defence radars, surface-to-air missiles and missile boats.
Plans are underway to establish a joint venture to build corvettes
and fast attack craft. In February, the commander of the Russian
Pacific Fleet paid an inspection visit to Cam Ranh Bay and
announced Russia's intention to continue its presence after the
present agreement expires in 2004.
Vietnam's most intense bilateral defence relationships are
with China and Thailand if measured by the seniority and
number of delegations exchanged. During the year China and
Vietnam hosted visits by their respective chiefs of staff.
Thailand's defence minister and army commander-in-chief
made separate visits to Hanoi. ASEAN members Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines were also active in
exchange visits.
Conclusions
Somewhere between the VII and VIII National Party Congresses
internal party critics have suggested that Vietnam has 'lost
direction' or suffered from a 'loss of orientation'. That is why I
used the expression 'paradigm lost' above.
Vietnam's foreign minister Nguyen Manh Cam has called
for a 'deepening of relations'. What does this mean in practical
terms? On the surface it means going beyond the simple
framework of 'diversifying relations' and 'making friends with
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all countries' to develop multifaceted relations. But Vietnam has
hardly succeeded in going beyond the economic dimension of
relations. After foreign direct investment, aid, and trade, where
does the relationship go?
Vietnam emphasises its own independence, stability,
socialist orientation and integration with the world. But political
relations are not discussed publicly.
This had led to a shallowness or flatness in relations,
especially on the political and security/defence planes. Ties in
these areas have not advanced. Note the anodyne flavour of the
following report:
The party leader [Do Muoi] said that the visit of the
Singapore defence minister would make an important
contribution to the promotion of mutual understanding
and to the consolidation of bilateral friendship and
cooperation between the two countries.
He expressed his pleasure at the fruitful development of
relations between Vietnam and Singapore as well as
between Vietnam and other members of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), thus creating
favourable conditions for Vietnam's socioeconomic
development. He further said that Vietnam wished,
together with other ASEAN countries, to build Southeast
Asia into a region of peace, stability, cooperation,
development and prosperity.
Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet highly appreciated the
friendship and cooperation between the two countries. He briefed
his guest on the socioeconomic situation of Vietnam.
Vietnam's 'loss of orientation' has led to a certain formalism
in the conduct of its foreign policy. Relations are established but
not consummated. It would appear that deep-seated insecurities
within the party structure in the main account for this. There is a
fear about developing close political ties with non-socialist
states. The initiative in bilateral relations is left to the foreign
partner. Superficial professions of friendship and cooperation
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across a spectrum of activities, from business to defence ties, fail
to develop further.
All in all, the development of Vietnam's international
relations and defence ties are vitally dependent on a deepening
and quickening of the process of socioeconomic reform. Vietnam
must increasingly work harder to preserve the gains it has
already won.
4Partial Impressions of Society in Vietnam
Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet
Introduction
From late August 1995 to early August 1996, my wife and I lived
in Vietnam while doing research. It was not my first stay in
Vietnam but it was my longest, during which time I began to have
a better 'feel' for Vietnamese society, though I hasten to add that I
remain a foreigner and cannot claim to understand many
things that Vietnamese people almost intuitively can explain
and comprehend. This chapter conveys some of my observations
on society in Vietnam, augmented by newspaper accounts and
other materials, which I have organised around three themes.
In the title I have used the word 'partial' for two reasons. One
is to indicate that what is said here reflects merely some of my
impressions, which I hope will be of interest to non-Vietnamese
readers who want to better understanding of Vietnam and to
Vietnamese readers who may find interesting, possibly
humorous, but hopefully not offensive how a newcomer sees
certain things about Vietnam. The second reason is that these
impressions reflect my own inclinations and concerns. They
are not impartial.
Rules and violations
One of my biases is a long held soft spot in my heart for Vietnam:
its people, their twentieth century struggles against colonialism
and the United States military, and those leaders who have given
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so much to make the country a better place to live now than it was
earlier this century. Previous visits in the 1990s for two months
or less reinforced my favourable impressions of Vietnam. I still
have them. While living there nearly a year, however, I began to
appreciate better some of the gathering problems that are
worrying many Vietnamese. A particular concern is the
bending and violation of rules and laws through personal
connections and corruption, about which the Vietnamese press
publishes a lot.
I used to think that personal relationships and bribery could
not be as readily used to get around laws and regulations as they
often can be in the Philippines, a country I have studied and lived
in for long periods since the late 1960s. Not only did rules and
regulations seem to be less 'negotiable' in Vietnam than in the
Philippines but there were more of them, covering a wider array
of activities in society. Part of me still thinks this is the case.
One example concerns fireworks. A new law to prohibit the
use of fireworks during the celebration of the New (lunar) Year
was rather firmly enforced across the country in 1996, according
to television and newspaper reports and accounts from friends
who had returned to their home provinces during the New Year
(Tet) break. My wife and I had also travelled from Hanoi to Ho
Chi Minh City for about two weeks during the Tet period. In each
place we stayed, we learned that very few infractions of the
firework ban had occurred, and those who did set off firecrackers
were often caught and punished.
I had an experience involving another realm of the law. In
early October 1995, a month or so after renting an apartment on
the second floor of a private residence located in a relatively
quiet neighbourhood, my wife and I found our place droning with
persistent, rumbling noises and vibrations. Seemingly
overnight, the family next door, whose house sat wall-to-wall
with the ours, had installed in their ground-level living room
four heavy machines that whirred and clattered as several
workers reduced large gauged copper wire to small gauged wire
and spun it onto spools. Day after day this racket continued, from
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about 8 a.m. until, as a written complaint said, 'the end of
television broadcasting' (after about 10 p.m.).
The complaint was initiated by families living in the
immediate area of what we came to call the factory (xuong).
These families suffered the full blast of the incessant, rumbling,
trembling noise. Others living along the narrow street were also
upset and readily signed the petition. I also signed, with
pleasure.
Initially I was confident that authorities would close down the
factory. Neighbours assured us that the operation violated
several zoning codes. But other Vietnamese friends, some of
them visitors to our apartment while the factory was in full
swing, were dubious. Several smiled and explained that the
family with the factory had probably paid considerable money to
someone high up before setting it up and/or had strong
connections to influential authorities. Closing it down, we were
told to our grief, was not a matter of rules and regulation but who
knew whom and money.
Nearly two months went by with no sign of let-up from the
factory. My wife and I considered looking for another place to
live, but we learned that numerous areas that are supposed to be
free of manufacturing, etc., in fact were not. Zoning laws did not
seem to mean much. I was becoming more resigned to staying
and coming to terms with the realisation that rules in Vietnam
were more 'negotiable' than I had previously realised.
But our agitated neighbours were not so easily defeated. They
made sure their petitions and other written complaints reached
the People's Committee of Hanoi, and they visited several
officials directly responsible for zoning matters. In early
December, a neighbour reported, with a broad smile, that city
authorities had given notice to the factory to close down. Forever,
he emphasised, not just temporarily. I was delighted—and by
then surprised. According to his explanation, he and other
neighbours gave no bribes. After all, he said, the factory clearly
violated the law. Helpful to the cause of those complaining was
that some who had complained knew key city officials for
environmental matters, but it was not as though the petitioners
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had to pull strings in order to get the law implemented. It did
involve a few lunches and drinks for some authorities, but that
was all, we were told, plus patience and persistence.
Score a victory for rules and regulations. Confidence buoyed
for my hypothesis of Vietnam being a more rule-abiding than a
negotiating society.1 That was in early December 1995. By the
following August, I was more confused due to considerable
evidence from local newspapers and other sources of rule
bending and law breaking by means of personal connections
and corruption.
Illustrating both methods is an account from a motorcycle-
taxi (xe om) driver, whom I shall call Sy. Responding to my
queries about his job, Sy noted that he would prefer being a
postman. He is 28 years old and has diploma from a Hanoi
technical college qualifying him to work in the post office, which
is also where his father worked until the father died ten years
ago. Had his father still been alive, Sy figures he could easily
have gotten a job in the post office. But because his connections
now are weak, he explained, the chances of getting work there are
slim. He had recently approached his father's good friend who is
a postman. This friend said he could get Sy a position if Sy would
1 Another bit of evidence concerns procedures for doing research. In
Vietnam researchers need proper documentation, which for foreigners
doing research is quite complicated. A foreign researcher needs a special
visa, affiliation with research institution, permits from national down to
local, commune level in order to do surveys, interviews, or other methods
of collecting information. And these things are taken seriously. For
instance, I went with a colleague from Hanoi National University to a
district office outside the city where I wanted to visit some communes. It
turned out that the one of the officials there was a classmate of my
colleague. Despite this personal connection, which in a comparable
situation in the Philippines even at the height of martial law during the
1970s would have been enough to proceed, my colleague still had to
produce the proper permits and letters of introduction arranged in Hanoi
before we could continue with our research.
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pay him US$1,500.2 That's huge, I exclaimed. But it is standard
for the post office, Sy said matter of factly, because postal jobs are
in great demand and salaries are much higher than in most
other government agencies. He then complained, of an 'unfair
society' Oca hoi khong cong bang). Later in the conversation he
talked about his wife, who has a fruit stall in a popular market.
She got the stall through her relative who works in city market's
administrative office. Also because of this connection, she does
not have to pay the usual rent for the stall. Asked if this is another
example of society not being fair, only this time he and his wife
benefit, he agreed with a broad grin.
I heard several stories about securing jobs and other
advantages through connections. One middle aged woman we
know who works in a government department secured jobs in the
same department first for one daughter and later for a second
daughter. Both daughters have university diplomas and other
basic qualifications but their mother's influence was crucial for
them to be hired. People needing services at a government office
or even a university often seek out someone they know there, like
a relative or old class mate or at least someone from their home
province or home district, in order to get the assistance they need.
There is nothing inherently wrong with this, and in a way it is
an admirable 'personal touch' in how things can get done. It
becomes a source of friction and even disgust among many
Vietnamese, however, when people without such connections are
gravely disadvantaged or they resort to bribery in order to make
up for their lack of personal connections.
Officials accepting or demanding bribes is a common form
of corruption. Another involves embezzlement or other ways in
which officials personally benefit from illegally using state
2 At 11,000 dong per US dollar, that is 16.5 million dong, or about three
and a half years basic salary for a university lecturer (which is roughly
400,000 dong per month).
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property and other resources entrusted to them or to which they
have access because of their position.3
One news account involving both bribery and embezzlement
told about Nguyen Minh Man, vice director of a joint venture
company based in Cuu Long province. In October 1990 he had
been sent to prison for embezzling two billion dong. But for the
next six years, he actually spent little time behind bars. He
wheedled his way out of prison by bribing police, investigators,
and other provincial and district officials. To the assistant chief
of the investigation office of the provincial police, for instance, he
gave a Honda Accord automobile as partial payment for keeping
the 'prisoner' out of jail. In April 1996, that assistant chief and
three other officials were convicted of bribery and other
violations. Meanwhile, however, Vice director Man remained at
large, perhaps protected by still other police officers.4
Most stories about bribery told to me involved modest amounts
of money paid to officials in order to get a motorcycle license, for
example, or process a building permit, get an urgently needed
legal document, or reduce one's tax liability. One of the most
surprising stories I heard concerned universities. Some
candidates for graduate degrees now give gifts and other
gratuities to their supervisors as enticements for the supervisor to
select examiners who will not criticise the candidate's thesis.
For good measure, the candidate may arrange for each examiner
to receive an envelope with money or some other gift. While such
behaviour is not common, it reportedly happens frequently
enough to give the system in some universities a bad name.
Police (including cong an and canh sat) are probably the
group of officials most often linked to bribery.5 In a congested
3 The distinction, frequently subtle, between bribery and embezzlement,
is found in the literature on corruption, including that written by
Vietnamese academics. See the series of articles by Professor Ly Chanh
Trung in Dai Doan Ket 10, 13, 17, 20, 24, and 27 June 1996.
4 See Dai Doan Ket 7 (May 1996):6.
5 Many accounts in the media, including weekly television programs by
the cong an itself, portray the police favourably. Yet other media accounts
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neighbourhood of Hanoi, police closed a cafe (giai khat) because
the young waitresses doubled as prostitutes. A few weeks later,
however, the place was not only back in business but was
expanding. The owners had reportedly paid off the local police
and now would enlarge the premises and employ more women.
One version of this story said that the owners had to expand in
order to increase their income so as to meet the high payments the
police required as a quid pro quo.
Taking bribes to fix traffic violations is a popular way for
police to make extra money. A reader's letter to a daily
newspaper refers to 'pliable law' (luat mem) enforcement in
which a policeman and traffic law violator negotiate a fee that is
paid directly to the policeman.6 That amount is cheaper and the
inconvenience considerably less than were the cop to insist on
'stiff law' (luat cung) enforcement entailing the violator going to
the police station to complete various procedures and then pay the
fine specified by law.7 With 1995-96 being a period when new
traffic laws received a lot of attention, there was considerable
'pliable' law enforcement going on.
Police are rumoured to be partners in organised crime. In
May 1996, a gang of extortionists ransacked a hotel on Kim Ma
street in the west side of Hanoi less than 100 meters from a police
station. No cops interrupted the hoodlums as they emptied the
report not only police corruption but police physically abusing people in
their custody, sometimes to the point of reportedly beating to death
suspects they have arrested. See, for instance, Dai Doan Ket 2 April
1996: Iff; 9 April 1996: Iff; 3 May 1996:6; 17 June 1996:lff; 1 August 1996:lfif.
The last tells of policemen badly beating a suspect, who is probably
innocent of wrong doing, and then roughing up journalists who were
covering the story. The indignant writer of the article, quoting a law
protecting journalists (dieu 15, Luat Bao Chi), admonishes police for also
abusing the rights ofjournalists.
6 Ha Noi Moi 1 1 December 1995:2.
7 The letter writer, I hasten to add, blames this bribery on not only the
police but also on the traffic offender and certain provisions in the traffic
laws.
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hotel of its air conditioners, refrigerators, and other values and
loaded the goods into four waiting trucks. Replying to
journalists' queries as to why the police had done nothing,
officials said that one policeman was in cahoots with the gang.
Many citizens, according to the journalists writing the account,
doubted that police involvement was limited to one individual.8
Police investigators later arrested several gang members,
including its leader, and recovered the loot. They also arrested
another police officer in connection with the case.9
Many Vietnamese- believe some police are linked to Mafia
like organisations and sell contraband goods (ranging from
foreign-brand cigarettes to automobiles and heroin). Some of the
illegal drug trade that has been spreading during the last couple
of years in Hanoi and other cities has been linked to the police,
such as the policeman arrested in July 1996 for heroin
trafficking. Authorities later found in his house five kilos of
heroin and US$ 82,250. 10 One entertaining account involving a
lesser offence tells of a police lieutenant who, after chauffeuring
the Can Tho provincial police (cong an) director home, took the
director's car and made a dash to a town near the Cambodian
border where he bought over 5,000 cartons of contraband
cigarettes, no doubt planning to sell them to his contacts in the
black market. While returning to Can Tho he encountered a
police road block, which he rammed through, precipitating a wild
60 kilometer chase. Ultimately he was apprehended and later
was sentenced to prison. He was also fined 25 million dong for
repairs to the vehicles he had damaged when running the road
block.11
8 Perhaps for protection against possible adverse repercussions for
having written this story, the author(s) are referred to only as Nhom PV
[Phong Vien] Dan Chu va Phap Luat (Group for Democratic and Legal
Studies). Dai Doan Ket 6 June 1996: Iff.
9 Reuters News Service, 12 August 1996.
10 Vietnam News Agency, Hanoi, 21 October 1996, from BBC
Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts, Asia-Pacific 22 October 1996.
11 Dai Doan Ket 1 August 1996:6.
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Accounts of illegally using state property or a governmental
position for personal gain usually involve officials in public
enterprises, government ministries, districts, and communes.
Such officials composed 243 out of 386 individuals caught for
corruption (including bribe taking) in Hanoi in 1995, and most
of those, judging from available examples, were embezzlers.12
For instance, the director of the state-run Ba Dinh Import/Export
Company stole 50 million dong by forging documents and
receipts. Similar cases are reported for other parts of the country.
In the south, the director, vice director, and accountant of a state
owned freezing plant stole over 239 billion dong over the course of
seven years by doctoring financial books and falsifying reports.
In 1996 they were arrested and convicted.13 Perhaps the highest
ranking national official to face corruption charges in 1996 was
Le Thanh Dao, the country's chief prosecutor whom the National
Assembly dismissed in November on account of allegations of
gross graft.14 In villages and rural towns, corrupt officials
enrich themselves by illegally using land under their
jurisdiction. For instance, six district officials in Nghe An
province, including the secretary of the Communist party and the
district's president, were convicted of pocketing hundreds of
millions of dong by illegally buying and selling land,
appropriating land for themselves and family members, and
demanding bribes.15
The sad news is that up to now corruption has outpaced the
campaign against it, a point that some state officials
acknowledge. For instance, Ta Huu Thanh, the state's Inspector
General and a member of the Communist Party's Central
Committee, recently said, 'Despite all our efforts [against
corruption], the results are still low and corruption is still
12 Nhan Dan 26 January 1996:2. The account does not explain who were
the remaining 143.
13 Dai Doan Ket 17 May 1996:6.
14 Reuters News Service, 7 November 1996.
15 Nhan Dan 15 October 1995:4; also 27 June 1994:lff.
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common and serious in some areas'.16 Communist Party
General Secretary Do Muoi has acknowledged that corrupt
officials are putting their ill-gotten money in foreign banks,
beyond the government's scrutiny.17 When the National
Assembly met in November 1996, members had to hear 'yet
again' reports about corruption, said an article in the National
Peasant Organization's newspaper. One report, continued the
article, contained 'the startling figure' of 5,000 known cases of
corruption thus far in 1996 involving money and property worth
US$109 million.18 That is 2,000 more cases than was reported for
all of 1992. The average value per case in 1996 is US$ 21,800,
nearly ten times more than the 1992 average of US$ 2,920.19 A 1996
survey found that business people ranked Vietnam as one of the
three most corrupt places to do business in Asia.20
The encouraging news is that the government is accelerating
its efforts to counter the problem in order to overtake the spread of
corruption. Lt. General Le Kha Phieu, a member of the
Communist Party's political bureau, recently made a 'hard
hitting speech' to the Economic Police, one of the country's key
corruption-fighting units, that insisted on strict enforcement of
the laws against corrupt officials no matter '...who they are and
what position they are in'.21 Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet,
16 Lao Dong, 18 September 1996: 1.
17 Financial Times 22 October 1996.
18 Nong Thon Ngay Nay, 6 November 1996:4. The value is reported as
follows in the article: '5000 vu tham nhung voi so tien, tai san bi thiet hai
len den 1,2 ty dong, 34 trieu USD (sic).'
19 For 1992 figures, see Ben Kerkvliet, 'Politics of society in the mid
1990s', in Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, ed., Dilemmas of Development:
Vietnam Update 1994 (Canberra: Department of Political and Social
Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National
University, 1995), p. 2.
20 The other two countries were China and Indonesia. The Philippines
was cited as being the fourth most corrupt Asian country (Agence France
Presse, 7 April 1996).
21 Reuters News Service 21 October 1996.
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addressing the National Assembly in November, proposed new
penalties against corruption and smuggling. And at least one
other high ranking official, Le Duc Binh, assistant to the
Communist Party's Secretary General, has publicly criticised
the Prime Minister for not proposing sufficiently specific action.
Meanwhile, the Secretary General himself, Do Muoi, has
proposed several new measures including requiring
government officials, regardless of rank, to declare all their
assets.22
Also encouraging is that many people from many different
walks of life oppose it. Indeed, corruption is one political issue
that appears to upset a large proportion of people. They may not
quite know what to do nor are as effective opposing it as they
would want, but nevertheless they do what they can. A friend of
mine who is clerk in a government office was furious about
superiors who milked citizens of money for services that they
should have provided without charge. Feeling powerless to
confront her bosses yet unable to stomach the situation, she
eventually quit her job and found another, where she hoped she
would not encounter a similar dilemma. Other indignant
citizens petition authorities and write to national newspapers
naming names. In the Nghe An example above, residents'
persistent complaints against district officials, even to the point
of disputing the results of earlier investigations that found no
wrong doing, ultimately helped to expose the corrupt officials.
Sometimes when whistle blowers are victimised by the very
officials they complain about, other citizens rally to support them
by petitioning higher officials and writing to national
magazines.23 About forty people in Hanoi were so upset about
blatant corruption that they boldly demonstrated in front of the
office of the city's Communist party chief. They were protesting
against officials who had pocketed money intended for them as
22 Reuters News Service, 14 November 1996.
23 For instance, see Dai Doan Ket 4 April 1996: Iff, and 20 June 1996:6.
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compensation for land, which the city had taken from them in
order to build new roads.24
Voters' petitions and letters to the National Assembly
frequently urge protection for those who expose corruption. Those
petitions and letters also praise journalists who write about
corrupt officials. Discontent about corruption generally was one
of the dozen or so major themes citizens emphasised in their
communications to the National Assembly in 1995 and 1996.
Many complained about ineffectual implementation of anti-
corruption laws and regulations and called for the establishment
of new, special organisations at local levels across the nation
whose job would be to fight corruption.25 Several newspaper
readers commenting on the draft report of the Communist party's
Central Committee, which circulated nationwide prior to the mid
1996 VIII Party Congress, criticised the lack of determination on
the part of leaders, including those in the Communist party, to
punish corrupt officials.26 Writing in the same context—the lead
up to that Party Congress—a concerned lawyer warned that
embezzlement and the squandering of state resources constitute a
'national plague' (quoc nan) and one of the matters that 'stung
people the most and that most undermined popular support'.27
'Our state and our system,' he continued, 'cannot co-exist with the
embezzlement and squander enemy'.28 Taking this point a bit
further, another writer warned that corruption had destroyed
other countries; hence, it must be vigorously fought in order to
save Vietnam.29 Corruption will continue to be a serious problem
in the country for some time to come. The chances are good,
24 The Straits Times 5 May 1996.
25 Dai Doan Ket 18 October 1995:3, and 14 March 1996:4.
26 See, for instance, Ha Noi Moi 24 May 1996: Iff and Nhan Dan 27 May
1996: Iff.
27 'Nan tham o lang phi la mot trong nhung dieu nhuc nhoi bac nhat cua
nhan dan, mot trong nhung dieu chu chot lam mat long dan.'
28 Dai Doan Ket 28 May 1996:6. 'Nha nuoc ta, che do ta khong the chung
song voi giac tham o lang phi.'
29 Dai Doan Ket 3 June 1996:lff.
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however, it will be significantly reduced if Vietnamese citizens
continue to object and to pressure authorities to take effective
measures against it.
Socioeconomic differentiation
A second broad impression left on me after nearly a year in
Vietnam is poverty and socioeconomic inequality. Having lived
off and on in the Philippines, I have become somewhat 'numbed'
to sights of poverty and socioeconomic inequality, just as by
living in the United States and Australia I tend to forget, because
the standard of living for most people is reasonably comfortable,
that only a tiny fraction of the population has about half the wealth
in each of those two countries. Nevertheless, visible evidence of
poverty and inequality in Vietnam continues to startle me.
In each of the four times that I have returned to Vietnam
between 1990 and 1995-96, the contrasts between rich and poor
living conditions or even between poor and middle class ones
have grown more distinct, both in the cities and in the
countryside. Leaping out before my eyes in Hanoi in September
1995 were several automobile show rooms which I had not seen
before. Particularly striking was a Chrysler dealership, which
had a gleaming red model basking in the plate-glass filtered
sunshine. The first time I saw it, there happened to be squatting
in the shade a few meters away an elderly lady wearing tattered,
dusty clothes. She soon stood up and raised to her shoulder, with a
grimace crossing her wrinkled face, a long bamboo pole with a
heavy basket of bananas hanging from each end. The contrast
between her appearance and gait, on the one hand, and hundreds
of Honda motorcycles whizzing around her, on the other, was
stark enough; the sight of her shuffling down the street directly
in front of that red Chrysler was mind boggling. Many months
later I saw for the first time a new Chrysler actually being driven
through the streets of Hanoi. (It had a Vietnam government
license plate.) As it jostled with pedicabs, bicycles, and
motorcycles (including mine) on crowded Hang Bong street in
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late afternoon trañì́c, I recalled that poor banana Vendor and
wondered how she was doing.
Most efforts to define and measure poverty in Vietnam
emphasise income, which, as one analysis reminds us, does not
capture the multifaceted, complex elements of being poor.30 Even
When just looking at income, analysts do not agree on the extent
of poverty in the country, although all agree that it is a serious
matter. One Vietnamese social scientist, Summarising vaI'ious
survey results and apparently using relatively low criteria for
what constitutes poverty, concluded that between 25 and 30 per
cent of the country's Population is poor, 10-15 per cent are rich,
and 55-65 per cent are in between.31 Using different cr'iteria, a
World Bank study concludes that about 51 per cent of Vietnam's
population is at or below the poverty line.32 It does not comment
on the proportion of people who are rich or in the middle.
Applying the bank's criteria converted into monetary terms (1.09
million dong per person per year) to income distribution data
from a national Survey collected by Vietnamese government
agencies with assistance from international agencies including
30 Cong 'I`y Aduki, Van De Ngheo O Viet (Hanoi: NXB Chinh Tri Quoc
Gia, 1996), PP. 3-32.
31 Nguyen Huu Dung, 'Thuc Hien Mot Chinh Sach Xa Hoi Cong Bang
va Nhan Dao Gop Phan Dieu Chinh Su Bien Doi Co Cau Xa Hoi o Nuoc
Ta trong Qua Trinh Doi Moi' [Implenting a Just Social Policy and
Adjusting in a Humane Manner to Social Structural Changes in Our
Country during the Process of Renovationl, in Do Nguyen Phuong, ed., Ve
Su Phan Tang Xa Hoi 0 Nuoc Ta trong Giai Doan Hien Nay (Hanoi:
Chuong Trinh Khoa hoc Cong Nghe Cap Nha Nuoc KX 07, De Tai KX 07,
05, 1994), p. 66. For a similar estimate, see in the same book Do Nguyen
Phuong, 'Phan Tang Xa Hoi: Mot Xu The Tat Yeu cua Xa Hoi Viet Nam
Hien Nay' [Social Differentiationz An Inevitable Trend in Vietnamese
Society at the Present Timel, pp. 7-9.
32 World Bank, Country Operations Division, Vietnam: Pouertjy
Assessment and Strategy (January 1995) , p. 7.
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the World Bank, I calculate that around 64 per cent of
Vietnamese are poor.33
I hasten to add that having a large percentage of people who
are poor is not new in Vietnam. Poverty is not the result of
renovation (Doi Moi) Most of the country's population has been
poor all of this century and probably the centuries before that.
And compared to how the poor lived forty years ago, the poor today
in most, perhaps all parts of the country are better off.
Considerable strides have been made under the Communist
Party's social policies since the mid 1950s. Indicative is that life
expectancy has risen from 55 years in 1970 to 67 in 1990 and
infant mortality during those two decades has fallen from 104 per
1,000 to 42. 34 A 1992-93 sample survey found that living
conditions had improved during the previous five years in 95 per
cent of 120 rural communities across the country. The main
explanation people cited was the changes in agricultural policies
during the last decade (decollectivisation, etc.).35
All sources recognise that the proportion of people who are poor
is higher in the rural areas than in the urban ones and is highest
in the north central and northern uplands regions and lowest in
the south east region. The World Bank's study says rural poverty
averages 57 per cent across all regions, which is '...about twice as
high as the 27 per cent poverty rate found in the urban areas'.36
Compared to other Asian countries, the degree of income
inequality is modest in Vietnam, but several studies argue that
the gap has been rapidly widening since the early 1980s.37
33 The income distribution is in State Planning Committee and General
Statistics Office, Khoa Sat Muc Song Dan Cu Viet Nam: Vietnam Living
Standards Survey 1992/1993 (Hanoi: 1994) , p. 28.
34 Frida Johansen, 'Poverty Reduction in East Asia: The Silent
Revolution', World Bank Discussion Paper 203 (Washington: The World
Bank, 1993), pp. 51-2.
35 World Bank, Vietnam: Poverty Assessment, p. 9.
36 World Bank, Vietnam: Poverty Assessment, pp. 12-65.
37 One analyst says that income of the rich in the 1970-1980 period was
three to four times that of the poor, but in the 1982-1992 period it became
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Sociologist Pham Bich San summarised the situation well when
he reportedly said that ten years ago Vietnam had mainly two
groups, the poor and the less poor; now it still has the poor and less
poor but in addition has well-to-do and very wealthy sectors of
society.38 The GINI coefficient, a standard indicator of
inequality, averages 0.38 across the country, according to 1993
income data, but ranges from 0.245 in rural northern uplands to
0.48 in the urban areas of the Mekong delta. Such data show that
income inequality is largest in areas with fastest economic
growth (the urban areas) and least in slow growth parts. My
visual impressions support this.
A simple example is ice cream, which many Vietnamese
enjoy. Those residents in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh city with very
little discretionary income but wanting a treat on a hot, muggy
day will savour a small cone of rather watery ice cream that costs
around one thousand dong, purchased at a small stand or from a
passing vendor and eaten while loitering around or walking
down the street. Those with somewhat more income may chose to
sit in a neighbourhood refreshment bar and order ice cream
served in a cup and eaten with a tiny aluminium spoon. That
costs between two and three thousand dong in Hanoi and a bit
more in Ho Chi Minh City. Better off people in the cities have
additional options. They can go to recently re-decorated
refreshment bars with wooden or plastic chairs and tables and
order Italian or French styled ice creams served in dainty glass
cups with little cookies and a bit of fruit on top. That will cost five
or six thousand dong. The places of even higher status are well
appointed, air conditioned ice cream parlours featuring banana
splits, malts, and other elaborate ice cream concoctions costing
40,000 dong and up. The cheapest item is a single scoop cone
fifteen to twenty times greater. Nguyen Huu Dung, "Thuc Hien Mot Chinh
Sach', p. 66.
38 Associated Press, 28 October 1996.
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costing 12,000 dong (more than one US dollar), about twelve times
what the poorest ice cream eater could afford to pay.39
The scale of differences in ice cream is readily replicated in
modes of transportation, housing, appliances, drinks, brands of
cigarettes, clothing, shoes, hair styles, and where one's kids go to
school. These and many other things differentiate urban people
more clearly now than they did a few years ago. Even private
telephones, which up until just three or four years ago, were rare
as hen's teeth are no longer an oddity. And for people with
money, not just any phone will do. They must have the latest
model of mobile phone, costing upwards of US$ 600 per unit, not to
mention monthly service charges. The number of mobile phone
subscribers has accelerating rapidly, from 3,200 in 1994 to 57,000
in October 1996, and is expected to reach 200,000 by the year 2000.40
Contrasts in the rural areas are less striking although are
nevertheless apparent. From roadways on top of the tall dikes
winding through the Red River delta one sees in village after
village recently built three, four, even five story homes towering
over the single story houses of residents of more modest means.
In southern villages, sturdy brick and concrete houses with tiled
roofs and elaborate court yards stand in contrast to the far more
numerous homes made of bamboo and thatching. Appliances and
other furnishings within houses further signify material
differences among villagers.
Mrs. Huyen, 67 years old, lives with her husband, daughter,
son, daughter-in-law, and grandchildren in a small house in a
village of Da Ton commune south of Hanoi. The main room has
two wooden beds, a plain chest of drawers on which deceased
relatives' pictures and the family's ancestral alter sit, an old
black and white television, a small wooden table sitting between
39 One top-of-the-line place is Baskin-Robbins, the American-based ice
cream chain that has opened within the last couple of years several
establishments in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City to which flock well-heeled
local people (particularly fashionably dressed teenagers) and foreigners.
40 Financial Times 28 October 1996:6; Reuters News Service, 4 October
1996.
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two wooden benches. Apart from some clothing and blankets
piled on the beds about the only other item in the room is an
electric motor for a water pump lying on the floor between the two
beds, where Mrs. Huyen's husband stores it when not being used
in their rice fields. The family cooks with coal in a small
kitchen to one side of the main room and draws its household
water from an outside well. The toilet is a makeshift outhouse
near the pig sty. Though in one of Da Ton's poorest households,
Mrs. Huyen is generally upbeat about her family's situation in
1996 because it was much worse ten years ago. At that time, for
instance, her family had no bicycle whereas now the household
has two. And they had no blankets, she said, pointing with some
pride to the several heavy blankets the family now owns. During
winters they used to pile rice straw on one bed where everyone
slept together in order to keep warm.
About two kilometers away lives Mrs. Ly, aged 48, in a house
similar in shape to Mrs. Huyen's but about twice as large. That
and the contents suggest that Mrs. Ly's households is one of the
better off ones in Da Ton commune. At one end of the large
central room is a floor to ceiling modern wooden cabinet
designed to hold the family's large coloured television set, a
video cassette recorder, and a stereo system as well as several
decorations. There is even a telephone, installed a year ago,
making Mrs. Ly's household one of the first in the commune to
own a phone. Along another wall is an elaborately decorated and
carved chest of drawers on which the family's ancestral alter
sits. The room also has two beds, which appear to be bigger and
fancier than those in Mrs. Huyen's house, and several
comfortable wooden chairs arranged around a polished
rectangular tea table on which stands an electric jug to keep
water constantly hot for the next pot of tea. Added to the house a
couple of years ago is an indoor kitchen with refrigerator,
electric stove, and several cupboards and counters, and an
indoor bathroom, complete with a shower and bathtub.
Both of these households farm land that has been distributed
remarkably equitably, not only in Da Ton but in most villages
during decollectivisation. Huyen's household actually has a bit
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more land per person than does Ly's (576 square meters
compared to 466) although Ly's has more land (about 10.5 sao or
3,732 square meters compared to Huyen's 8 sao or 2,880 square
meters) because Ly's household is larger. What helps to explain
the difference in material living standards is that Huyen's
household has only recently begun to have some income from
sources beyond their farming whereas Ly's has had other income
since 1975 when her husband (a wounded war veteran) began
working in the district administrative office.
These two households illustrate two patterns found in
national survey data: First, farming households in northern
and central Vietnam that rely entirely or largely on farm
income are generally poor while those with significant off-farm
income are generally better off. Second, few households with
members working in government jobs are poor.41 Indeed,
having a government position (including positions in state
owned enterprises) increases the chances that a household can
become relatively wealthy, particularly in urban areas.42
How to augment farm income with other work is a problem
millions of rural families seem to be trying to solve these days.
With opportunities being scarce in the countryside itself, people
by the tens of thousands migrate on a temporary or long term
basis to urban areas where they do a wide range of jobs. This is a
method earlier generations of rural Vietnamese also tried.43
Even in the 1960s, at the height of the command economy when
restrictions on unauthorised population movements were
41 World Bank, Vietnam: Poverty Assessment, pp. 14, 66.
42 Do Nguyen Phuong, Than Tang Xa Hoi', pp. 12-3.
43 Greg Lockhart writes that 'The displacement of individuals from
families or villages and their movement into the city's lower working
classes is, in various ways, a central theme in the three stories about
Hanoi workers in the 1930s, which he and Monique Lockhart have
translated. 'Introduction: First Person Narratives from the 1930s,' in The
Light of the Capital: Three Modern Vietnamese Classics, translated by
Greg Lockhart and Monique Lockhart (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
Universitty Press, 1996), p. 10.
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supposedly most strictly enforced, rural people slipped into the
urban 'sneaky economy' (kinh te chui) as one Vietnamese
described it to me. A woman now 40 years old started working as
a street vendor in Hanoi at the age of twelve—in about 1968—by
accompanying her parents who went back and forth between Hai
Hung province and Hanoi selling assorted wares.44 In recent
years, the rural-urban circular migration process has
accelerated.
Legally speaking, people are still supposed to be registered
residents in order to stay and work, even temporarily, in the
cities. But in practice, many are not. A survey by the Ministry of
Labor found in 1993 that 73 per cent of the 'spontaneous migrants'
in Hanoi had not registered and 67 per cent had left their home
places without asking the local authorities there for permission to
leave, another violation of residency laws.45 Recent reports from
Dong Da ward in Hanoi claim that only 84 per cent of the
households have proper registration papers (co ho khau thuong tru
an o dung noi quy dinh), meaning 16 per cent are not legally
registered. Three per cent of those without appropriate residency
documents are from other provinces and cities.46 An estimated
500,000 people residing and working in Ho Chi Minh City, or
about 5 per cent of that city's official population, are not registered
to live there.47
The lady from whom my wife and I regularly bought bread
(banh mi) had a husband and children still in her home village,
to which she periodically returned carrying money she had
managed to save. The middle aged woman who often sold us
bean curd (tao pho) which she and her sister made and vended
from door-to-door, was from a village in Hai Hung province 60
44 Dai Doan Ket 8 July 1996:7.
45 Li Tana, Peasants on the Move: Rural-Urban Migration in a Hanoi
Region. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), p. 31.
46 Ha Noi Moi 2 August 1996:2.
47 The article in Dai Doan Ket (18 July 1996:1) provides the figure
500,000, which would be about 5 per cent of 4.5 million, Ho Chi Minh
City's estimated population.
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kilometers southeast of Hanoi. She saw her family there once
every other month. A man named Thang with whom we
frequently chatted was from Nam Ha province near the coast
about 120 kilometers southeast of Hanoi. Leaving his wife and
kids in his home village, he had come to Hanoi over ten years
ago, working a variety of jobs until saving enough to buy a
motorcycle on which he now taxies passengers. He periodically
returns to Nam Ha, stays with his family for a few weeks, then
comes back to Hanoi to resume working.
At times the sacrifices of being far from home are onerous for
itinerant urban residents, but they persevere. Recalling her
feelings after hearing that her parents, who lived in her distant
home village, had suddenly become seriously ill, one vendor in
Hanoi said she was so sad about being unable to abandon
immediately her bread selling and return home to care for them
that she could scarcely call out her wares. 'My insides,' she said,
'were as hot as flames.. ..Life is full of sorrow. And the sorrow
from having to be far from home is extremely hard to bear'.48
Many of the pedicap drivers, street vendors, and scavengers
readily visible in Hanoi are people with one foot in the city and
the other in their home villages.49 The same is true in other
cities, like Thanh Hoa, Da Nang, and Ho Chi Minh.50 The last,
in the far south of the country, draws rural people from as far
north as Nam Ha and Hai Hung provinces.51 From sun up to late
in the evening, men and women, young and old, are walking
and cycling through city streets and alley ways or sitting on the
curbsides selling bread, rice, sticky rice, various other foods,
48 Dai Doan Ket 8 July 1996:7.
49 For two fascinating studies of such people, see Li Tana, Peasants on
the Move and Michael R. DiGregorio, Urban Harvest: Recycling as a
Peasant Industry in Northern Vietnam (Honolulu: East-West Center,
Occasional papers, Environment Series, no. 17, 1994).
50 See, for instance, the story about laborers from the countryside
looking for work in Thanh Hoa city: Dai Doan Ket 27 June 1996:7.
51 Dai Doan Ket 18 July 1996:6; conversations in Hai Hung province, 25
November 1995.
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blankets, shoes, jewellery, cosmetics, floor mats, cigarettes, beer,
lottery tickets, to name a few of their wares. Some itinerants are
looking to buy stuff—like old bicycles, old newspapers, scrap
iron, rubber, and anything else re-sellable in the recycling
market. Others are selling services and skills, like lock
smithing, watch repairing, tire pumping, bicycle and motorcycle
repairing, and shoe shinning. On the days that I went to the
national archives in Hanoi I passed dozens, sometimes
hundreds of men standing or sitting along Giang Vo street, one
of the city's several . public 'labour markets' (cho lao dong)
waiting to be hired to do any kind of job. During the cold months
of January and February, they huddled together, often barefoot
and wearing little clothing for protection against the freezing
wind. Not all of these vendors and service providers are from the
countryside, though many are. And for most—whether bonafide
city residents or migrants—making a living is often precarious
and can lead to acts of desperation, such as selling illegal drugs,
working as bar girls, or becoming prostitutes.52 Police report
food hawkers are among those selling heroin in Vietnam's
cities.53 Forty per cent of the hostesses (tiep vien) in the beer
parlours of Ho Chi Minh City are reportedly girls from the
provinces.54
The method of earning money that most staggered me
involved people, some of them elderly, forced by destitution to sell
their blood. According to a newspaper account, between 800 and
1,000 people regularly do this now to one Hanoi hospital.55 How
many people were doing the same to other medical facilities is
unknown. For 250cc of blood, a person receives 150,000 dong—
about one third to one half the monthly wage of many labourers.
52 International heroin traffickers have reportedly set out to create a
market in Vietnam. Nation wide efforts against drug trafficing and
prostitution are among the 'anti-social evils campaigns' that the state has
been pressing in 1996.
53 Reuters News Service, 17 October 1996.
54 Dai Doan Ket 18 July 1996:6.
55 Dai Doan Ket 13 June 1996:6
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Hospital regulations prohibit a person from selling blood more
than once in two months. No doubt imposed to protect the seller's
health, the regulation became a money making opportunity for
the staff member in charge of recording when a person last sold.
She would loan money to sellers desperate for cash but for whom
two months had not yet lapsed. When the time arrived that they
could sell again, she collected the loan plus 15 to 25 per cent
interest. In this manner she was netting 750,000 to 800,000 dong a
month, probably more than twice times her hospital salary.
Eventually, the police brought charges against her, and the
hospital administration removed her from her position. The
situation, however, possibly continues elsewhere in the city.
Some people manage to climb from poverty or near poverty to
wealth. One of my favourite examples is a family in Bat Trang
commune south of Hanoi, some of whose members a few years
ago peddled pottery in Hanoi. Now the family annually exports
container loads of pottery to Japan, Singapore, France, Australia,
and other countries. In addition to significantly improving their
own lot, the family's business has also helped to raise the
material living standards of its 400 workers who make and pack
the pottery, many of whom are sons and daughters of peasant
families wanting ways to supplement their small incomes from
farming. This exemplifies the trickle down approach to reducing
poverty that the Vietnamese government and international
lending and donor agencies applaud. But recent survey data
suggest that for every 27 per cent of the poor who raise their living
standard, another 40 per cent suffer setbacks.56 Poverty reduction
is likely going to be a long term project.
Public and private decorum
Most Vietnamese citizens take tremendous pride in their
nation—its history, heroes and heroines, mountains and
waterways, music, literature, architecture, cuisine, among other
attributes. People's pride in their country and in being
56 Tuoi Tre Chu Nhat 4 August 1996: 8.
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Vietnamese seems more pronounced than what Filipinos express
toward their own country and their own identity. I cannot
demonstrate or support this assessment other than to note that I
have heard Filipinos who have been to Vietnam or interacted
with Vietnamese make the same kind of comparison.
This strong love of country and shared bond of being
Vietnamese sits awkwardly alongside people's public behaviour
toward each other, which often strikes me as having an air of
distance, even disdain. Obviously, these are my impressions,
those of a foreigner. I elaborate not to defend them but to invite
others who know the country better, especially Vietnamese, to
enlighten me, help me to understand, and tell me I am just plain
wrong.
Broadly speaking, in public, Vietnamese are usually
expressionless, stern, even cold and uncaring toward strangers.
For me, walking down streets in Vietnam is distinctly different
from walking in the towns and cities of the Philippines. In the
latter, people are often laughing, giggling, horsing around, and
expressing other emotions like discontent and anger. As likely
as not, people in doorways and market stalls will smile or say
hello to those passing by even if they do not know each other. Such
greetings do occur in Vietnam but more commonly people keep
their distance, physically and through facial expressions that
seem to communicate indifference. Personally, I am not
complaining; in this respect I prefer walking in Vietnam
because I do not appreciate being gawked at, which often occurs in
the Philippines. But noticing this mood of indifference among
Vietnamese themselves, I wonder what it means, particularly
given people's shared pride in being Vietnamese.
Other public behaviour also suggests indifference, even
callousness and unconcern toward fellow citizens. In eating
stalls and cheap restaurants, customers typically dump chicken
bones, throw peelings, spit out seeds or other inedible things to the
floor, leaving garbage through which succeeding customers have
to walk and then add their own debris as they eat. Proprietors
periodically sweep but on a busy day they cannot keep the floor
free of clutter. In banks, post offices, and shops, customers often
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insist that clerks attend immediately to their requests,
seemingly unaware that others who were there first are being
served. In a photocopy shop on Hai Ba Trung street in downtown
Hanoi, for instance, I watched customer after customer come in
and rush directly to the copy machine attendant, who was copying
someone else's papers, and thrust their pages or books in front of
him, apparently expecting the attendant to stop the ongoing job to
attend to them. Sometimes he did, other times he did not. Such
aggressive, self-centred behaviour occurs even in
establishments with signs requesting customers to line up,
unless the clerk requests the customer to wait his or her turn.
Even then customers often plead that the clerk deal with their
need immediately. Coming to narrow passage ways in a street or
lane, motorcyclists will likely crowd each other in their scurry to
be the first one through, creating in effect further congestion and
making it even more difficult for anyone to move. Similarly, on
many occasions I've observed motorcyclists, in their insistence
to overtake a slower vehicle or pedestrian ahead of them as they
together approach a narrowing in the road, practically run over
the slower ones rather than let them pass through first.
A friend of ours, a foreigner who works in Vietnam, once saw
a motorcyclist hit a pedestrian who was crossing the street. The
motorcyclist saw the man go down but did not stop. Our friend,
Lee, who was several meters away when this happened, at first
did nothing himself. He expected Vietnamese passers-by to help
the man, who by now was dragging himself toward the side of the
road. But no pedestrians nor cyclists stopped. After a few minutes
Lee went over, saw the man was bleeding badly, and tried to get
the attention of others. Still no one stopped. Lee ended up hiring a
pedicab and took the injured man to a hospital, which refused to
treat him until Lee paid a deposit toward the fellow's medical
expenses.
Completely different is the behaviour among people who are
acquainted with each other and in homes, offices, and other
private settings. Vietnamese then are extremely polite and
gracious to each other. Dinner guests do not throw waste from
their bowls to their host's floor. And hosts go out of their way to
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offer tea, cigarettes, fruits, and other food to casual visitors and
put on elaborate meals for people invited to lunch or dinner.
Guests typically remove their shoes before entering someone's
home. Walking through a door or narrow passage with a group of
acquaintances is usually preceded by gracious gestures inviting
this or that person in the group to pass through first. People in
such a group never try to jostle their way through
simultaneously.
Conversations among acquaintances, friends, and relatives
who have different, conflicting, or competing needs are typically
laced with words like tinh cam and thong cam conveying
sentiments of concern, respect, and solidarity with each other
and sympathy, understanding, consideration and forbearance
toward each other. People who convey their respect and concern
for others are themselves respected and praised. On the other
hand, people who ignore others or who are thoughtless or
overbearing in their dealings with acquaintances earn enmity
and disdain.57
While trying to understand contrasting forms of behaviour
among Vietnamese, I have been toying with the distinction
between 'noi' and 'ngoai', inside and outside, that Vietnamese
often make. 'Inside' relations are generally where
consideration, respect, sympathy, and understanding apply;
'outside' relations are generally where such decorum applies
less. Vietnamese society seems to be composed of wheels within
wheels of 'inside-outside' relations, with the innermost being
one's family, particularly on the paternal side, and the outermost
being complete and total strangers, whether they be Vietnamese
or non-Vietnamese.
Relationships are, in a sense, positioned along an 'inside'-
'outside' continuum. For example, individuals from the same
province or district who are otherwise unconnected have more
basis for an inside relationship than would strangers from
57 For a discussion of such sentiments, see Shaun Malarney, 'Ritual and
Revolution in Vietnam,' PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, 1993,
pp. 195-96.
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different provinces or districts. Having attended the same school
or university or been in the same army unit is another way
individuals who otherwise have no bonds can have an inside
relationship. People within the same village but from different
family lineages would be more distant from each other than
would villagers who are of the same lineage. But the two lineages
would be inside to each other in relation to people in a different
village. Even a family can have inside and outside gradations.
The paternal side of one's family is more inside than is the
maternal side. Offspring from a man's second marriage are
less inside compared to those of the man's first marriage, and a
man's second wife and her relatives are more outside than are
his first wife and her kin. Family conflicts rarely dispute
claims of the paternal side but do contest those from the maternal
side. A woman in a rural part of Hanoi claimed, for instance, to
be suffering the double whammy of being victimised both by her
own children (particularly her sons) and by children of her
deceased husband's first marriage, all of whom, she said, were
trying to take away possessions that belonged to her.58
Relationships can change, becoming more inside or more
outside according to shifting circumstances. And there are
many means by which people can build closer bonds between
themselves. People who were once distinctly outside can become
more inside through marriage, for instance, or by joining the
same organisation, making acquaintances, or moving into the
same village or neighbourhood.
The process of bonding people together who only recently have
been in proximity with each other can take considerable time. To
become inside through residence, for example, may take years.
Relative newcomers to a village in many parts of rural Vietnam,
at least in the past, were not permitted to participate in official
activities or have claims on local resources until they had
obtained full standing in the village, which could take three or
58 Dai Doan Ket 17 June 1996:3.
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four generations.59 One of the problems agricultural
cooperatives encountered in the north during the 1960s-80s was
the animosity, distrust, even outright hostility among the several
villages Hang, thon) in a commune (xa) that were supposed to
pool their land and other resources and work together. Trying to
bond together these different villages, which had a long history of
being outside to each other, often went little further than creating
a veneer of formalistic linkages. When the fields of these
commune-sized cooperatives were re-allocated during
decollectivisation in . the late 1980s and early 1990s, bitter
conflicts erupted in many places as villagers skirmished,
sometimes violently, to reclaim land, buildings, and other
property that they said belonged to their own village.60
Presumably, inside relationships among urban
neighbourhoods are particularly hard to make unless the area is
populated by people who came from the same village or family
lineage. Without those or other ties, urban residents, even though
living close together, may see little reason to be particularly
considerate of each other. This was part of the explanation that
neighbours provided for why the family next door had
nonchalantly installed its noisy factory. That family had never
reciprocated any sign of friendship, consideration, or respect for
others living nearby, thus communicating that they were not
interested in becoming part of the neighbourhood. The wire
factory, according to this view, was but the most blatant statement
of disregard for neighbours' needs and feelings.
59 Nguyen Van Chinh, In Search of Work: Social Change, Peasant
Household Economy and Seasonal Migration in Northern Vietnam',
Political and Social Change Working Paper No. 13. (Canberra:
Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific and
Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1997), p. 1.
60 Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, 'Rural society and state relations', in
Kerkvliet and Doug J. Porter, eds., Vietnam's Rural Transformation
(Boulder: Westview Press, and Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 1995), pp. 75-6.
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Something like this seems to be what happens in traffic and
in other public places that, by their nature, are void of ties except
in the broad sense of being fellow members of the nation with
which each person derives part of her/his identity. When
contrasted with foreigners, this common bond of being
Vietnamese is significant.61 If the Vietnamese nation is
assaulted or threatened by foreigners, powerful nationalistic
sentiments can rise to the fore, overshadowing and repressing
differences. But in normal circumstances, as people go about
their own business—tending to the needs and demands of
immediate family, kin, close friends, village mates, office
mates, etc.—strangers can be safely kept at a distance.
There is virtue in special relationships among people who are
kin, work mates, or from the same village or district. But there
are also costs. Such relationships can work against rule-by-law,
fairness, and equality—other values also celebrated in various
quarters of Vietnamese society. They may foster rule-by-
connections and personal influence, creating a culture of
different rules for different folks, depending on who knows
whom. They may also nudge people to appropriate for their own,
narrow, inside use what is public or, oppositely, disregard what is
public, including the public good, because it is alien and outside
one's own personal concerns.
61 A mundane manifestation of Vietnamese distinguishing themselves
from non-Vietnamese may be that foreigners are charged more for train
tickets, plane tickets, entrance fees to certain museums and temples, phone
service, electricity, housing, and other facilities. One justification is that
foreigners generally have more money and can afford to pay more. But if
ability to pay were the primary consideration, one would expect prices to
vary according to criteria other than just nationality. Vietnamese students
or pensioners, for instance, might be charged less. Yet they pay the same
for an economy train ticket as any other Vietnamese, including salaried
and rich ones, while a foreigner pays much more.
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Endingnote
Communist party leaders often say that people should emphasise
the good of the nation and of 'the people'. The party also implores
Vietnamese to guard against tendencies toward excessive
parochialism, self-interest, and familialism, which undermine
the national and society-wide interests. Party pronouncements
also applaud equality, urge better off people to help the poor, and
encourage other civic virtues. The person most often held aloft
for how leaders and common people alike should behave is Ho
Chi Minh. He, it is said, regarded all Vietnamese as his family,
served them selflessly, and treated everyone with respect and
consideration. In short, the Communist party claims to be trying
to protect and advance the public good and the values that can
counter negative aspects of inside-outside distinctions.
At the same time, the party itself is caught up in 'outside' and
'inside' relationships that create tensions and quandaries. The
Communist party is exclusive, not inclusive. Party members are
insiders, who in turn are divided by varying degrees of
proximity to the pinnacles of the party's organisation. Non-party
members are on the outside. And activities taking place outside
the party are often regarded by party leaders with considerable
suspicion. Meanwhile, those on the outside—the vast majority of
the population—are often mystified, even wary or cynical, of
what happens inside the party or, perhaps worse, pay no attention
to what the party does because it is so alien and remote from their
own concerns.
One can appreciate why party leaders are suspicious of
anything out of the ordinary that happens beyond the party's
reach or even in the outer circles within the party organisation.
Not long ago the Communist party was at the forefront of a bitter,
divisive struggle against rival contenders for control over
Vietnam. Though now the country is united, considerable
distrust and resentment smoulder beneath the surface. It will
take a lot of networking over many more years for the divisions
of the recent past to fade away. Understood this way, one can
appreciate why party leaders abhor any hint of a multi-party
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political system and only cautiously open doors to permit non
party people—outsiders—to hold leadership positions.
At the same time, the party and Vietnamese people generally
have the problem of how to hold Communist party and
government officials accountable in order to rein in abuses of
power and corruption, which if not checked could destroy the
credibility of the party and the state it runs and provoke
widespread discontent, even uprisings. This is not a situation
peculiar to the present time or to the Communist party. Before
reunification, the north's government had difficulties with
corruption and self-aggrandisement. Corruption and
favouritism were rampant in the governments of the south and
contributed to their demise.
For many Vietnamese a degree of favouritism, even
corruption is tolerable, understandable, maybe even desirable.
Without it, the political system may well be paralysed by
unmanageable rules. People invest considerable time and
energy cultivating such relations, hence obviously they are
valued. Officials who live only by the literal application of the
laws and rules are seen by many Vietnamese as callous and
unmindful of people's personal feelings and relationships.
Vietnamese citizens also sympathise to a certain degree with
officials who use their positions to increase their own income;
people realise that most officials cannot possibly live on their
small salaries. The problem is the degree to which it is done.
Though the zone between tolerable and intolerable favouritism
and corruption is not standard, Vietnamese appear to have
guidelines for making the distinction. One guideline is implied
in this statement from one Vietnamese: 'Poor people want to
know why members of People's Committees get big houses before
their communities get schools and hospitals'.62 Authorities
62 The speaker is Duong Quynh Hoa, a pediatrician in Ho Chi Minh City
who once was a Communist party member and fought against the pre-
1975 southern Vietnamese government. She is quoted in The Far Eastern
Economic Review 11 July 1996: 18.
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living in comfort while the people whom they are supposed to help
are ignored is not a tolerable tradeoff.
Another gauge is the scale of abuse, which is closely related to
a third having to do with the manner in which the abuse is done.
Traffic cops taking bribes to augment a measly salary is one
thing, said a friend of mine, while police chiefs collecting
millions of dong from drug dealers or prostitution rings is
significantly different. The latter is offensive because the chiefs
rake in masses of money and because they get it by being in
cahoots with socially abhorrent activities—not to mention highly
illegal ones. In Thinh Liet commune on the outskirts of Hanoi, a
man who had been removed from the chairmanship of the
commune's agricultural cooperative and even from the
Communist party because of corruption was elected again to
chair the cooperative a year later. Cooperative members had
apparently decided to tolerate his modest indiscretions because
in many other ways he had served them well, was mindful of
fellow villagers' needs, and went out of his way to build rapport
with people. But later his corruption went too far when he used his
position to award himself, his relatives, and his cronies choice
parcels of land, some of which were sold to urban developers for
huge profits. This blatant favouritism and violation of the law
for enormous personal monetary gain so angered many
residents that this official was defeated when he ran for a seat on
the People's Council in 1994.63
This man seems to have remained cooperative chairman,
however, and he and his relatives have retained the land and
money they gained illegally. This is the rub, and a sign of deep
problems for Vietnamese society. Too often favouritism and
corruption pays. People not only get away with it but make
unconscionable amounts of money or other rewards from it. This
widens the socioeconomic gap between, on the one hand, those
holding positions of authority or having good connections to those
who do and, on the other, those who are not well placed, have no or
63 Shaun Malarney, 'The Dynamics of Local Political Leadership in
Contemporary Northern Vietnam', manuscript, (October 1996).
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only weak linkages to authorities, or refuse on principle to be
corrupt or play favourites. Corruption and favouritism are not the
only causes of poverty and widening inequality. Yet many
Vietnamese see a connection between socioeconomic deprivation
in which the majority of people live and the unfair or illegal use
of official positions that benefit only a small circle of insiders.
Allowed to persist and spread, this perceived relationship sows
distrust, disinterest, discontent, and dissent. It also aggravates
the negative aspects of inside-outside distinctions and further
undermines other celebrated values such as fairness, equality,
and serving the people.

5Sectoral Politics and Strategies for State and Party
Building from the VII to the VIII Congress of the
Vietnamese Communist Party (1991-1996)*
Thaveeporn Vasavakul
The label 'one-party rule' notwithstanding, by the mid-1990s the
Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) had become ideologically
divided. Party leaders disagreed over strategies for state
building in the post-central planning era. Their differences
were manifest in the debates prior to the VIII National Congress
that met in June 1996 and in the documents endorsed by the
Congress itself.
Policy divergences among the Vietnamese leaders were not
new. Before 1945, party leaders were split over questions such as
nationalism vs. internationalism; class struggle vs. united
front; and the urban-based vs. the rural-based revolutionary
model. Between 1945 and 1954 during the Franco-Viet Minh War,
issues under contention included appropriate revolutionary
strategies for the Viet Minh; military strategies during the War
of Resistance; and diplomatic strategies during the Geneva
conference. Between 1954 and 1975 when Vietnam was divided,
party leaders disagreed over the questions of building socialism
in the North and supporting political struggle in the South;
strategies for the construction of a socialist economy, culture, and
education; strategies for the revolution in the South; and policies
regarding the Sino-Soviet split.
Outside Vietnam, there are three competing approaches to the
study of the policy making process at the leadership level: the
factional power approach; the collegial/collective leadership
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approach; and the sectoral approach. The factional power
approach, advocated by P. J. Honey, views policy differences
among party leaders in the 1960s as being driven by
individual/factional interests and the attempt of individual
leaders to maintain their political positions. Thai Quang Trung
uses this model to discuss leadership politics after Ho Chi Minh's
death in 1969, arguing that the Le Duan-Le Duc Tho faction took
control of the Party apparatus, demoted other factional leaders,
and advocated a pro-Soviet policy.1 David Elliott and Gareth
Porter, among major advocates of the collegial/collective
leadership approach, however, contend that during the American
war in Vietnam the party leaders were similarly driven by their
perceptions of common national interests although they
disagreed over the means to achieve them.2 While the factional
* I thank Adam Fforde, David Marr, Carlyle Thayer, and William
Turley for their comments on earlier drafts of the paper. I am responsible
for any remaining errors and shortcomings.
1 See P. J. Honey's following writings: 'North Viet Nam's Party
Congress', China Quarterly, no. 4 (October-December 1960):66-75; 'The
position of the DRV leadership and the succession to Ho Chi Minh', in P. J
Honey, ed., North Viet Nam Today (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1962), pp. 47-59; Communism in North Viet Nam (Cambridge: The MIT
Press, 1963); 'Divided counsels in the Party', China News Analysis, no. 508
(13 March 1964),:l-7; The death of Ho Chi Minh and after', China News
Analysis, no. 785 (12 December 1969):l-7; and 'The reformation of the
Vietnamese Party and government', China News Analysis, no. 76 (10 April
1981); and Thai Quang Trung, Collective Leadership and Factionalism: An
Essay on Ho Chi Minh's Legacy (Singapore: ISEAS, 1985), pp. 63-96.
2 See David W.P. Elliott, 'North Viet Nam since Ho', Problems of
Communism (July-August 1975):35-52; David W. P. Elliott, 'Revolutionary
Re-Integration: A Comparison of the Foundation of Post-Liberation
Political Systems in North Vietnam and China', Ph.D dissertation, Cornell
University, 1976; and Gareth Porter, Vietnam: The Politics ofBureaucratic
Socialism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), chapter four. Amongst
other scholars, Christine White and Melanie Beresford also subscribe to
this view. See Melanie Beresford, Vietnam: Politics, Economics, and Society
(London and New York: Pinter, 1988), chapter six and Christine White,
'Recent debates in Vietnamese development policy', in Gordon White,
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power approach emphasises the existence of factions within the
party as the sources of policy divergences, the collegial/collective
leadership approach assumes a monolithic character of the
leadership fostered through similar class background and
shared revolutionary experiences and goals, while recognising
party leaders' differences over means to achieve common goals.
Differing from these two approaches, the sectoral approach,
advocated by Carlyle Thayer, examines leadership politics and
policy orientations from a structural perspective. First, Thayer
focuses on stratification and differentiation within the party
leadership.
It is argued here that those elected to leadership positions
are elected because they have a sectoral or territorial base
(e.g. a ministry or a province) rather than owing their
position to the patronage of, and their support for, a
particular Party 'heavy' or 'boss'. Implicitly, the factional
model assumes that there are only two or three important
rival politicians (e.g. Le Duan v. Truong Chinh)
connected to polarised political positions (e.g. pro-Soviet
v. pro-Chinese; orthodox Marxist-Leninists v. economic
reformers). The 'sectoral representation' hypothesis
proposed here implies that 'interest group' politics is at
work in Vietnam and that Central Committee members
represent sectorally or regionally based constituencies
rather than being straw men filling out a top leader's
'faction'.3
Robin Murray, and Christine White, eds, Revolutionary Socialist
Development in the Third World (Sussex: Wheatsheaf, 1983), pp. 234-70.
3 See Carlyle A. Thayer, 'The regularization of politics: continuity and
change in the Party's Central Committee, 1951-1986', in David Marr and
Christine White, eds, Postwar Vietnam: Dilemmas in Socialist
Development (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1988), p. 179. See
his criticism of the factional power model in 'Vietnamese perspectives on
international security: three revolutionary currents', in Donald H.
McMillen, ed., Asian Perspectives on International Security (London:
Macmillan Press, 1984), pp. 57-65.
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In studying the sectoral composition of the Central
Committees (CC), Thayer relies on the categories introduced at
the V National Party Congress (1982) to classify CC members.
Previously, members of the CC had only been divided into two
groups, full and alternate, and listed in alphabetical order. At the
V Party Congress, however, full members were divided into
seven categories: senior party leaders (mainly Politburo
members); central-level party and state officials; newly-
appointed central-level party and state officials; secondary-level
party and state officials; newly-appointed secondary-level party
and state officials; military officials; and new military
officials. Alternate members were grouped into five sub
divisions: senior state officials (vice ministers or equivalent);
technocrats and directors of key state-owned enterprises;
provincial party officials; junior provincial party officials; and
the military.4 Thayer uses these categories to group CC members
from the II Congress (1951) to the VIII Congress (1996) in order to
analyse continuity and change in the leadership over the forty-
five year period.5 He hypothesises that 'the nature, magnitude,
and frequency of changes in the composition of Party leadership
posts are the result of political development and emerging
organisational complexity, as the Vietnamese political system
responds to input demands from its domestic environment'.6
Second, Thayer links the changing sectoral composition of
the CC over time with changes in policy orientations. For
example, he points out that from the III Congress (1960) to the VI
Congress (1986), the representation of secondary party and state
officials (provincial Party secretaries, economic specialists, and
technocrats) on the CC grew from 11 to 49 per cent. He goes on to
4 Thayer, "The regularization of politics', p. 186.
5 Ibid., pp. 177-93; and 'The Regularization of Politics Revisited:
Continuity and Change in the Party's Central Committee, 1976-1996', a
paper to a panel on 'Vietnamese Politics in Transition: New Conceptions
and Inter-Disciplinary Approaches, Part 2', the 49th Annual Meeting of the
Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, 13-16 March, 1997.
■ See Thayer, The regularization of politics', pp. 178-9.
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argue that in 1986, 'the policies of the central-level economic
reformers have found broad support in an emerging coalition of
province-level officials, in both north and south Vietnam.'7 This
observation is consistent with Adam Fforde's arguments on the
rise of decentralised 'commercial interests' within the state
sector and in the provinces following economic liberalisation
after 1979.8 In a 1997 study, Thayer observes a gradual increase
in the representation of central-level positions at the VII (1991)
and the VIII (1996) Party Congresses, a reversal of decentralism
evident at the VI Congress.9 The change in the sectoral
composition of the CC in favour of the central party members is
also consistent with Fforde's observation of Vietnam's moving
towards political and economic recentralisation in the 1990s.10
The sectoral approach opens a new path to the study of apex
politics and policy making process in Vietnam. Contrary to
conventional wisdoms that have conceptualised the communist
party as monolithic, it views the party as consisting of clusters of
interests that developed as a result of both changes in domestic
structure and the increasing organisational complexity of the
party apparatus itself. The sectoral representation approach also
suggests that policy making was not only concentrated in the
hands of a small number of top leaders. Within each sector,
vertical relationships between different tiers of party members
and connections between party members and their constituencies
7 Ibid., pp. 187 and 190.
8 See Adam Fforde, 'The political economy of "reform" in Vietnam:
some reflections', in Borje Ljunggren, ed., The Challenge of Reform in
Indochina (Cambridge: Harvard Institute for International Development,
1993), pp. 293-326; and Adam Fforde and Stefan de Vylder, From Plan to
Market: The Economic Transition in Vietnam (Boulder: Westview, 1996),
chapters four and seven.
9 See Thayer, 'The Regularization of Politics Revisited', p.ll.
10 See Fforde's article in this volume.
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outside the party apparatus also contributed to the policy making
process.11
In this paper, I apply the sectoral approach to analyse party
members' debates over state building strategies in the 1990s.
However, I modify and elaborate on Thayer's approach in three
major ways. First, in addition to considering the social
composition of the CC as Thayer does, I take into consideration
the sectoral composition of the delegates elected by grassroots
level congresses to attend national congresses. It was these
delegates who elected CC and Politburo members and debated
over as well as endorsed congress documents.
Second, I move beyond the sectoral categories employed by
Thayer, also incorporating new categories introduced in the
1990s into my analysis. The categories introduced at the V
National Congress to classify CC members focused mainly on
'new' and 'old' party members on the one hand and 'central' and
'secondary/provincial' members on the other. As a result, they
only provide information on leadership renewal, generational
change and central-secondary/provincial party relations. They
give no inkling of party members' institutional affiliations; the
only two affiliations listed are the 'party/state' (or 'cadres and
civil servants') and the 'military'.
In fact, sectoral interests and their representation changed
between 1986 and 1996. As shown in Appendix I, delegates to the
VI Congress were classified according to class composition as
11 In the 1980s and 1990s, a number of Vietnam scholars turned to the
state-society approach as a tool to analyse Vietnamese politics making.
However, whether and how the state-society dichotomy is adequate and
appropriate for analysing Vietnam have to be debated. Scholars following
the state-society approach have tended to collapse the entities 'state' and
'party' and treat the party/state as monolithic. In addition, they have also
failed to take into account the nature of the political economy of state
socialism in conceptualising the 'state'. Under a system where production
units formed part of the state apparatus, should political conflict that was
fought out within these units be conceptualised as a manifestation of
conflict between the state and society or merely one within the state
apparatus itself?
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well as their central or provincial affiliations. The class labels
were industrial workers, peasants, cadres and civil servants,
and petty bourgeoisie, while the central-local labels were
members from provinces, municipalities, and special zones vs.
members from central party organisations. For the VII and the
VIII Congresses, however, new categories were introduced
(Appendix II). Delegates were divided into groups based on
sectoral affiliations: delegates from the army, those from the
security forces, those doing party work, those from the
government sector, and those responsible for mass
organisations. Central-provincial affiliations and class
composition were dropped. I will take into consideration these
additional dimensions of sectoral interests in discussing state-
building strategies in the 1990s.
Finally, in focusing on the development of sectoral interests
and competition within the party, Thayer implicitly raises the
question of how the VCP could survive internal conflicts within
its rank-and-file. In this paper, I attempt to address this question,
examining the leadership's move to reform the party apparatus
in order to create an institutional framework within which intra-
party differences could be ameliorated.
Briefly, I argue that the sectoral politics which emerged in the
1990s signified a new form of Vietnamese politics. Its
development was derived from (and marked by) the increasing
differentiation within the leadership structure following
economic liberalisation and political reform in the 1980s and
1990s. Policy differences that resulted were not precipitated by
personal or factional differences of Politburo members, but by
competition among different sectoral interests within the party.
Although these differences were expressed by individual party
leaders in the Politburo, as in any sectorally structured polity,
they were not reducible to their personal power ambitions. In
addition, the sectoral politics in the 1990s indicated a lack of
consensus among party leaders over both what national interests
were and how to achieve them. The meaning of 'national
interests' themselves had to be constantly negotiated, and in the
1990s, the term 'khoi' or 'bloc' has become a common term used to
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refer to formal or informal 'alliances' of institutionally-based
sectors with shared interests. One mechanism on which the VCP
relied to curb competition and conflict among different interests
within the party was the rebuilding and strengthening of the
framework within which differences could be minimised.
I divide this paper into four major parts. I first examine the
different dimensions of sectoral politics within the VCP in the
1990s. Owing to the limited material available at present, the
discussion in this section should be treated as preliminary. In the
second part, I map out policy campaigns and counter-campaigns
that unfolded in 1995 and 1996 and examine the debates over
strategies for state building in the lead-up to the VIII National
Party Congress in June 1996. I focus in detail on Prime Minister
Vo Van Kiet's viewpoints as expressed in his letter to the
Politburo in comparison with the opinions of other party leaders.
In the third part, I examine state-building strategies adopted by
the VIII Congress, highlighting signs of policy compromise. In
the final section, I outline certain party building measures
adopted and implemented between the III Plenum of the CC in
1992 and the VIII Congress in the context of party leaders'
attempts to create a framework within which differences between
party members could be contained and moderated.
Sectoral politics in the 1990s
The period between 1986 and 1996 saw the rise of two-dimensional
sectoral interests within the VCP. The first, as reflected in
the sectoral composition of the delegates to the VI National
Congress suggested signs of tension between central and
secondary/provincial party cadres. By the 1990s, at the VII and
VIII National Congresses, however, another dimension of
sectoral competition surfaced, centring upon party members in
the party work, the state, and the army sections. I argue that while
the central-secondary/provincial tension was largely a product
of economic reform in the 1980s, the rise to importance of tensions
between the party work, the state, and the army sectors was
precipitated by political reform in the 1990s.
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Tension between central and secondary/provincial cadres
mirrored at the VI Congress had its roots in the economic
liberalisation that unfolded after 1979. An economic crisis
following the implementation of large-scale socialist
development in the South and popular resistance to the VCP's
economic policy forced the Party to rethink its socialist economic
development policy. In August 1979, the VI Plenum of the CC (IV
Congress) moved to endorse production units' economic
activities outside the plan and in 1981, the output contract system
and the three-plan system became the main economic models for
agriculture and industry respectively.
The new economic order that emerged in the 1980s was the one
in which production units gradually replaced the plan and
became the main agents for mobilising and allocating economic
resources. Under central planning, government agencies at all
levels ranging from ministerial, municipal, and precinct
agencies to provincial, district, and commune units had been
entitled to own various sizes of industrial and agricultural
production enterprises. This system had given birth to the notions
of 'ministry-cum-owner and manager' (bo chu quan),
'municipal office-cum-owner and manager' (so chu quan), and
'district office-cum-owner and manager' (phong chu quan).
Generally called by the Vietnamese bo chu quan and often
translated into English as 'line ministry,' these government
agencies oversaw and directed the operations of their enterprises
administratively and economically.12 During the reform period
of the 1980s, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at all levels and their
'owner managers' at the central municipal, provincial, district,
and commune levels became the main beneficiaries of the new
economic order. Increasing economic autonomy and control
over resources on the part of these production units and their line
ministries strengthened the power of SOE managers, provincial
authorities, and many technocrats involved in planning
^ Nguyen Dinh Bich, 'Doi moi quan ly nha nuoc doi voi cac doanh
nghiep nha nuoc' [Reform state management in the area of SOEs], Tap Chi
Cong San, no. 482 (1995): 34-7.
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economic development strategies. Since certain SOEs Were
placed under the supervision of party committees at both local and
central levels, certain Sectors of the VCP had a direct stake in the
new economic arrangements.13 In 1986 when the VI Congress
met, secondary cadres from Wide-rang-ing Sectors joined forces
to push economic reform forward.
Business interests within the state and the party apparatus
persisted into the 1990s. Between 1989 and 1991, the state economic
sector suffered financial difficulties following a cut in Soviet aid
and Stricter budget constraints. However, by the early 1990s, it
had recovered, growing at an average rate of 13 per cent annually
from 1990 to 1994. Between 1990 and 1995, its Contribution to total
government revenue increased from 13 per cent in 1986 to 52 per
cent in 1992 and 67 per cent in 1994.14 Advocates of SOES have
remained vocal. In the 1990s, they have pointed to the sector's
better performance and its increasing Contribution to state
revenue to justify their call for continuing support and to counter
the push for privatisation.
Yet, the polity was being restructured, and the VII and the VIII
Congresses mirrored another dimension of sectoral interests
within the VCP. At these Congresses, delegates Were divided into
ñve groups: delegates from the army, those from the security
forces, those doing party Work, those from government sector,
and those responsible for mass organisations. It is not a
coincidence that in the 1990s, the ideological, the State, and the
army Sectors of party members became highly active in debating
the orientations of post~central planning development.
13 On party organisations in SOEs, see Le Quang Thuong, 'Ve to chuc
va hoat dong cua cac to chuc Dang trong cac doanh nghiep nha nuoc' [On
the organisations and activities of party organisations in SOEs], in Mot so
Uan de xay dung Dang Ue to chuc trong giai doan hien nay [Several
problems regarding the building of party organisation in the current
situation] (Hanoi: Chinh Tri Quoc Gia, 1996), pp. 85-100.
14 Gabriel Kolko, Vietnam: Anatomy ofA Peace (London and New York:
Routledge, 1997), pp. 54-63.
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The rise of these groups was largely a product of political
change (or lack of it) during the reform period of the 1980s. The
ideological sector of the Party represented the 'traditional' legacy
of the state socialist system. Prior to the reforms, one of its major
tasks had been to mobilise production units to fulfil plans and
supervise state officials in implementing party directives.
During the reform period, however, this mobilisational role
became increasingly irrelevant since the economic activities of
production units were driven by cost-benefit calculations rather
than ideological campaigns. Under the market system dating
from 1989, its decline could be seen in Politburo member Le Phuoc
Tho's complaint in 1992 that many party cadres refused to become
involved in party or mass organisation work, preferring instead
to be assigned to administrative or economic management posts
because they yielded higher material benefits.15 Yet,
increasingly through the 1990s, after the collapse of communism
in the Soviet bloc, the sector became more active in policy debates.
It began to develop a close relationship with the Chinese
Communist Party after Vietnam normalised relations with
China in 1991. Members from the ideological apparatus resorted
to the vocabulary of socialist ideology and national culture as
their weapons. They have tended to speak on behalf of peasants
and workers and advocated the modification of the traditional
concepts of socialist economic organisations including state-
owned enterprises and agricultural cooperatives.
The state sector, traditionally merged with the party as seen
in the label 'party-state', developed into a more separate entity
and rose to prominence in the 1990s parallel with the newly-
emerging calls for a law-governed state to facilitate the operation
of a market economy. The 1992 Constitution advocated power
sharing between the VCP and other political institutions,
granting more autonomy to the Prime Minister and his
15 Le Phuoc Tho, 'Mot so nhiem vu doi moi va chinh don dang' [Several
tasks on reforming the Party], in DCSVN, Mot so van kien ve doi moi va
chinh don dang [Resolutions on the renovation and the rectification of the
Party] (Hanoi: Chinh Tri Quoc Gia, 1996), pp. 71 and 75.
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cabinet.16 In January 1995, the VIII Plenum of the CC officially
endorsed the reform of the administrative system, focusing on
the reform of the structural organisation of the public
administration, the simplification of administrative procedures,
and the rebuilding of the civil service.17 By the mid-1990s, reform
of the administrative state sector became referred to as a
condition for further economic reform as well as for further
financial assistance from international agencies.1 8
Technocrats in the state sector resorted to the vocabulary of high
growth, efficiency, and modernisation in justifying their policy
positions.
The third sector, the Vietnamese People's Army (VPA), also
rose to prominence in the 1990s. Although a significant sector
prior to 1975, its representation in the Central Committees
declined after the IV Congress in 1976. Between 1989 and 1991,
however, during the crisis in the communist bloc, the VPA
rendered support to the Party, endorsing the resolution of the VI
Plenum of the CC in March 1989 that rejected political pluralism
and the resolution of the VII Plenum in August 1989 that
condemned imperialist forces' intervention in the internal
affairs of socialist countries. Around this period, the concept
'peaceful evolution', referring to political instability triggered by
an external enemy, became entrenched in speeches given by
military officers.
16 On the 1980 and 1992 constitutions, see articles published in David
Marr and Carlyle Thayer, eds, Vietnam and the Rule of Law: Proceedings
of Vietnam Update Conference November 1992 (Canberra: Department of
Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies,
Australian National University, 1993).
17 For detailed discussion, see Thaveeporn Vasavakul, 'Politics of the
reform of state institutions in the post-socialist era', in Suiwah Leung, ed.,
Vietnam Assessment: Creating a Sound Investment Climate (Singapore:
ISEAS, 1996), pp. 42-68.
18 Kolko emphasises a close connection between the state administrative
sector under the leadership ofVo Van Kiet and the World Bank and IMF.
See Kolko, pp. 31-64 and 130-48.
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In addition to its role in maintaining internal stability and
national defence, the VPA also claimed to contribute to national
economic construction policies. The VPA's involvement in
economic activities, similar to the experience of other state
agencies, was largely a product of the state socialist system
developed in Vietnam prior to the reform period. The IV National
Party Congress (1976) emphasised the role of the VPA in
economic reconstruction, while the V Congress (1982) assigned
the VPA responsibilities for both building socialism and
defending the Fatherland. Under the task of building socialism,
the VPA was expected to take part in productive activities in both
the agricultural and industrial sectors. In the 1980s, all defence
industries were engaged in some form of economic work,
amounting to 29.4 per cent of the army's total annual output, and
in 1984, the internal source of revenue raised by the army units
was estimated at 19.5 per cent of the national defence budget. By
1993, 70,000 soldiers, or 12 per cent of the entire standing army,
were employed full time in various commercial enterprises.
Local militia units reportedly had set up at least 160 enterprises
while the VPA main force had approximately 60 organisations
engaged in economic activities.19
Thayer observes that at the VII National Party Congress in
1991, military representation in the CC increased, reversing the
declining trend since 1960. David Elliott perceptively points to a
shift in military representation away from the Ministry of
National Defence towards the military services and the
military's own corporate interests.20 Generals Le Duc Ann and
Doan Khue were elected to the Politburo, and Le Duc Ann
assumed the position of President in 1992. The 1992 Constitution
placed the army in the same legal position as other state bodies
19 Carlyle Thayer, The Vietnam People's Army under Doi Moi
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), pp. 6-8, 38, and 53;
and Carlyle Thayer, 'People's Army Gets in Step with Era of Friendly
Reform', The Australian Special Survey, The Australian (6 September
1996), p. 18.
20 David Elliott, 'Vietnam's 1991 Party elections', Asian Affairs 19, no. 3
(Fall 1992): 159-69.
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and considered it as the 'backbone' of Vietnam's all people's
national defence and public security system.
By the mid-1990s, the VPA had adopted the vocabulary of both
national economic construction and national defence in
peacetime to justify their policy preferences. It highlighted its
economic self-sufficiency and its contribution to state revenue. It
also emphasised the need to be vigilant against the development
of 'peaceful evolution' and the need to take account of national
security concerns in formulating reform policies.
The VPA was by no means a monolithic entity. There were
differences among officials over how to modernise the army.
The 'nationalist' camp rejected dependency upon foreign
technology as the main source for modernisation, favouring the
modernisation of Vietnam's defence industry, while advocating
a military doctrine that combined people's war and modern
military technology. The 'modernist' group advocated the
opposite, calling for a complete modernisation of the armed
forces and the drawing-up of contracts with foreign military
establishments for aid and technology. Yet, this group remained
in the political shadows.21
The two-dimensional sectoral interests within the VCP
discussed in this section, although constituted along both central-
secondary/provincial and institutional lines, were not mutually
exclusive. That is, these two structures co-existed, and single
individuals could be situated in both simultaneously.
The VIII Congress, sectoral representation and recentralisation
The VIII National Party Congress, held at the end of June 1996,
was attended by 1,200 delegates representing 2,128,740 party
members. They elected the VIII Party CC and the Secretary
General and passed the political report, the report on socio
economic development directions and tasks for the period from
1996 to 2000, and the amended Party Statute.
See Thayer, The Vietnam People's Army under Doi Moi, pp. 55-6.
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The structural composition of the delegates to the VIII
National Party Congress, of the new CC, and the new Politburo
confirmed two major trends in the VCP leadership structure as
well as the importance of both the institutional and the central-
secondary/provincial structures (Appendix II-IV). One was the
rising representation of delegates from the party organisation,
the state sector, and the army. Delegates from the party work
sector increased from 34 to 41 per cent; the state sector from 22 to 26
per cent; and the army from 8 to 13 per cent. The per centage of
delegates responsible for mass organisation work only
increased from 10 to 11 per cent and that from the security forces
from 4 to 4.6 per cent. While the Party emphasised its working
class character, the per centage of representatives from the
working class fell from 9 to 8 per cent. At the Politburo level, three
main sectors of the party work, the state, and the army were also
well-represented.22
The other trend in the leadership structure was a marked
recentralisation and relative decline of provincial influence.
The Secretariat of the CC was replaced by the Standing Board of
the Politburo consisting of five members (Do Muoi, Le Duc Anh,
Vo Van Kiet, Le Kha Phieu, and Nguyen Tan Dung), the
majority of whom were from the party work and the military-
security sectors. According to the party statute, members of the
Board are appointed by the Politburo. The Board 'acts on behalf of
the Political Bureau to review the implementation of party
resolutions; to prepare issues for submission to the Politburo for
consideration; to direct the handling of affairs relating to
socioeconomic development, national defence and security,
22 Those affiliated with the party work sector were Do Muoi, Nguyen
Duc Binh, Nguyen Van An, and Nguyen Thi Xuan My. Those carrying the
banner of state technocrats were Vo Van Kiet, Phan Van Khai, Tran Duc
Luong, Truong Tan Sang, Nong Duc Manh, Nguyen Manh Cam, and
possibly Le Xuan Tung. Those representing defence were Le Duc Anh, Le
Kha Phieu, Doan Khue, and Pham Van Tra, and those representing the
security forces were Nguyen Tan Dung and Le Minh Huong. The mass
organisation sector was represented by Pham The Duyet, former
Secretary of the Hanoi Party Committee.
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foreign relations, party building, cadre-related work, and mass
mobilisations; and to handle the party's daily work'.23 These
stipulations, however, did not dispel questions about the power
and authority of the newly-created Standing Board vis a vis the
rest of the Politburo members and the CC. During the Congress, a
party delegate had challenged the legitimacy of the Board,
accusing it of being undemocratic. It remains to be seen whether
the Board will develop into an autonomous entity and stand above
the supervision of the CC. At the CC level, the proportion of central
vs secondary party members changed in favour of centralism.
The central party-state members in the CC rose from 43 in 1986 to
49 in 1991 and to 56 in 1996, while the per centage of secondary
party-state members dropped from 49 in 1986 to 43 in 1991 and 36
in 1996.24
Orchestrating the differences, 1995-96
Differences among party leaders over post-central planning
development strategies had to be discussed in the context of the
rise and consolidation of the different sectoral interests
discussed above. Each sector had its own institutional and
infrastructure base with separate sources of finance, research
institutes, publishing houses, journals, and newspapers, and it
relied on these resources to put forth its policy views. Between
Congresses, different sectors asserted their policy preferences at
different times, but the period leading up to each Congress was the
time when all voiced their opinions and campaigned for their
policy preferences simultaneously. A series of political events
and developments in 1995 and 1996 shed light onto this very
process. Sectoral competition, negotiation, and mobilisation for
policy support took the form of policy advances, policy
rectifications, continuous ideological campaigns and counter
campaigns, personnel reshuffling, and character assassination.
23 Dieu le Dang Cong San Viet Nam [The VCP Statute] (Hanoi: Chinh
Tri Quoc Gia, 1996), pp. 28-9.
24 Thayer, 'The Regularization of Politics Revisited'.
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Policy campaigns and counter-campaigns
Nineteen ninety-five began with the VCP leadership's attempt to
unify party ideology. In February 1995, the Politburo issued
Resolution No. 9 on major orientations in current ideological
work to ensure ideological uniformity. It confirmed Marxism-
Leninism and Ho Chi Minh thought as the direction for party
activities; the goal of linking national independence with
socialism; the development of the state as the state of the people
under the leadership of the party; industrialisation and
modernisation as the objectives during the transitional period;
the development of a multi-sectoral economy based on market
mechanisms under state management and socialist direction;
and the maintenance of Vietnamese cultural essence in the
process of cultural openness.25
In March 1995, however, intra-party conflict erupted, centring
on the anti-revisionist case of the 1960s which had first surfaced
in the lead-up to the VII Congress in 1991. The revival of this case
should be placed in the context of party members' disagreement
over the meaning of intra-party democracy. In March 1995,
Nguyen Trung Thanh, a retired cadre from the Party
Organisation Commission, sent an open letter to high-ranking
party members, urging them to reconsider the anti-revisionist
case in the 1960s and 1970s in which a number of middle-ranking
party cadres of the then Vietnam Lao Dong Party were charged
with anti-party/anti-state activities and pro-Soviet orientations.
Thanh's move implicitly challenged the infallibility of the
Politburo leadership of the 1960s and 1970s. Thanh was dismissed
from the Party on the grounds of violating Party discipline. In
June 1995, two former party veterans, Do Trung Hieu and Hoang
Minh Chinh, were arrested on a charge of circulating documents
'threatening the security of the state and social organisations'.
Several reports stated that some of these documents dealt with the
25 Ban Tu Tuong Van Hoa Trung Uong, Mot so dinh huong Ion trong
cong tac tu tuong hien nay (tai lieu hoc tap Nghi quyet 9 cua Bo Chinh Tri)
[Major orientations in the current ideological work — study materials on
Politburo Resolution no. 9] (Hanoi: Chinh Tri Quoc Gia, 1995).
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political activities of the Club of the Resistance Fighters between
1988 and 1990. The two were sentenced to 15 and 12 months
imprisonment respectively, a move possibly aimed at isolating
them during the lead-up to the Congress.26
In November 1995, the DC Plenum of the CC approved the draft
reports to Congress which, between December 1995 and April 1996,
were sent to party organisations at the central level, party
congresses at the grassroots level and directly above (district,
precinct, and municipality), and to workshops organised by the
Party Secretariat for medium and high ranking cadres. They
were also presented to the CC of the Fatherland Front and the
provincial and city Fatherland Fronts. Between April and June,
the public was asked to comment on the draft.27
Campaigns and counter-campaigns to publicise policy
differences and rallies for policy support continued in late 1995
and early 1996. Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet's memo to the
Politburo in August and a document entitled "The US Strategies
towards Vietnam after the Normalisation of Relations' were
leaked to the public in December 1995. The former contained
Prime Minister Kiet's views on reform programs, while the
latter, allegedly prepared by the ideological and security blocs,
discussed the US long-term strategies to undermine Vietnam's
26 Hoang Minh Chinh himself was one of the party members purged in
the 1960s and 1970s. In mid-June 1996, two weeks before the Congress,
Chinh was released. See the Paris-based overseas Vietnamese journal, Dien
Dan, nos. 41, 43, 44, and 47. For the VCP's version ofthe incident, see Ve vu
an 'to chu chong Dang, chong nho nuoc ta, di theo chu nghia xet lai hien
dai va lam tinh bao cho nuoc ngoai' [On the case entitled 'the organisation
of anti-Party, anti-state activities, the adherence to modern revisionism,
and espionage activities for foreign countries'], Thong Tin Cong Tac Tu
Tuong (August 1995): 10-4.
27 VOV, 9 April 1996 in FBIS-EAS, 11 April 1996, p. 101; Thoi Bao Kinh
Te Saigon, 27 June-2 July 1996, p. 4 in FBIS-EAS, 29 July 1996, p. 103;
VOV, 10 June 1996 in FBIS-EAS, 19 June 1996, p. 84.
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political and economic system.28 In December 1995, a Politburo
directive called for the implementation of campaigns against
'social evils', attacking prostitution, gambling, drug addiction,
'foreign negative products', and the use of foreign languages in
advertisements.
In January 1996, Dao Dinh Luyen, the Army Chief of Staff,
who advocated the 'open door' policy and modernisation of the
army was replaced.29 In late April, the X Plenum of the CC
expelled Politburo member Nguyen Ha Phan from the party.
According to an internal circulation memo issued by the Ho Chi
Minh City party committee in April and later leaked overseas,
Phan had been found guilty of revealing the names of communist
guerrilla strongholds when interrogated by South Vietnamese
police in the 1960s and having then failed to report his
wrongdoing to the Party after his release. The memo instructed
that the dismissal not be broadcast by the media. Phan, labelled a
conservative by Western observers, became a Politburo member
at the mid-term party congress in 1994 and had been viewed as a
possible successor to Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet.30 This was the
second time since Vietnam began economic reform in 1979 that a
Politburo member was dismissed. The first had been Tran Xuan
Bach in 1990. However, Phan's case was the first where the
revolutionary ethics of a Politburo member were at issue. Phan's
dismissal led to a stalemate in leadership transition. The three
top leaders, Do Muoi, Le Duc Anh, and Vo Van Kiet, remained in
28 Le Hong Ha, Nguyen Xuan Tu (also known as Ha, Ha Si Phu), and
Pham Que Duong were arrested on a charge of circulating these
documents. Dien Dan, no. 48 (January 1996): 14-5.
29 Carlyle Thayer, 'Vietnam's reform under threat,' IISS Strategic
Comments 2, no. 4 (16 May 1996).
30 During the DRV period (1945-1975), the only case involved Truong
Chinh after land reform errors in 1956. However, he was later
rehabilitated. Ngugyen Van Linh was dropped from the Politburo at the V
Congress in 1982.
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power, indicating a lack of agreement over leadership
transition.31
In May 1996, a Politburo directive called for a crackdown on
corruption in the areas of land and real estate where party
members had been allegedly extensively involved.32 In early
June, the Standing Committee of the Hanoi Party Committee
launched a campaign to mobilise young Vietnamese to resist
'social evils'. In mid-June 1996, a government decision allowed
foreign words to appear on advertisements where there was no
Vietnamese equivalent, where the word was commonly used, and
where it was a brand name, but it also required that Vietnamese
letters be placed below the foreign words and be at least half their
size.33
Amidst these campaigns and counter campaigns,
divergences among different sectors in the party on the strategies
for state and party building could be detected in Prime Minister's
Vo Van Kiet letter to the Politburo and writings and speeches by
major party members prior to the Congress.
31 According to an overseas Vietnamese source, it was the retired party
cadres and war veterans in southern provinces who put pressure on the
leadership in Hanoi to investigate the case. Their move was likely
precipitated by both their ethical consideration and pro-market position.
See Dien Dan, no. 53 (June 1996): 11. According to another overseas
Vietnamese source, between April when Phan was dismissed and June
when the VIII Congress met, a new list of political successors was
circulated, proposing that Nong Duc Manh, Nguyen Manh Cam, and Phan
Van Khai replace Do Muoi, Le Duc Anh, and Vo Van Kiet respectively.
However, the army bloc reportedly was dissatisfied with the list, and
subsequent intense competition between Le Kha Phieu and Nong Duc
Manh for the general secretary position forced a postponement of
leadership change. See Dien Dan, no. 54 (July 1996): 10.
32 Radio Australia, 27 May 1996 from BBC Monitoring Service: Asia-
Pacific, 30 May 1996.
33 Radio Australia, 24 June 1996 from BBC Monitoring Service: Asia-
Pacific, 26 June 1996.
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Negotiating socialist orientations
In a move not seen in preceding Congresses, a major criticism of
the draft documents came from Politburo member and Prime
Minister Vo Van Kiet himself. In his internal memo to the
Politburo, Kiet expressed his views on four issues: the nature of
the international system; the meaning of socialist orientations
and socialist deviations; the reform of the state administrative
system; and party reform.34
Kiet's first point concerned the characteristics of the
international system. He argued that international relations
were no longer characterised by confrontation between socialism
and imperialism. Instead, they reflected a situation of multi-
polarity in which national, regional, and global interests, rather
than conflict, served as the driving forces in the system. These
changes were the very basis for Vietnam having expanded its
international relations, joined ASEAN, and improved relations
with the European Union. Kiet highlighted the need to understand
both favourable conditions and challenges generated by this new
multipolar international structure. He downplayed the power of
imperialism, arguing that the United States could no longer use
anti-communist rhetoric to mobilise public opinion against
Vietnam. Although it had switched to the rhetoric of democracy
and human rights, its success had been limited by Vietnam's
changing foreign policy. Kiet also downplayed the importance of
socialist comradeship. Although socialist countries retained
mutual ties, their cooperation did not act as a united economic
and political force on the international scene. Vietnam's
relationships with China and North Korea had been dictated by
national interests, not socialism. Kiet rejected the prospect that
communist and international working class movements in the
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would resurface. He
maintained that regardless of the situation in the former
** Viet Luan, no. 1053 (5 January 1996): 30-1 and 58-60. Kiet's memo is
also printed in Dien Dan, no. 48 (January 1996): 16-23. I assume the
authenticity of the text I use since I have compared the one printed in Viet
Luan with that in Dien Dan and found no difference in wording.
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socialist camp, the VCP had been able to strengthen its position in
the international arena, and he urged the Party to capitalise on
this international environment, which he considered the most
favourable since 1945 for Vietnam to achieve its development
goals.35
Kiet's second point dealt with the meaning of socialist
orientations and socialist deviations (chech huong). He
identified socialist orientations as featuring a prosperous people,
a strong nation and an equitable and civilised society. He
argued that the degree of development of the state economic sector
was not indicative of a socialist orientation; that the state
economic sector was only one of the many instruments that could
help influence socialist orientations. He criticised party
members who considered the decline of the state trading and
transportation sectors as deviations from socialism, asserting
that it was the inefficiency of the state in these arenas that had
originally precipitated reform. Kiet maintained that problems
such as dumping, opportunism and transportation accidents
could not be eliminated by state intervention and that many state
enterprises were themselves involved in illegal trading
activities and smuggling. Finally, Kiet criticised party
members who saw the decline of the old model of the cooperative
as socialist deviation. He argued that the old model was no
longer appropriate for the current situation and that there was a
need to invent new forms of cooperatives that would fit the needs
of different times.
Kiet identified illegal economic practices, corruption,
mafiaism, bossism, anarchism, waste, and misappropriation of
state property as socialist deviations which undermined the
state's legal authority and capacity for macro-economic
management, leading to budget deficits, social differentiation,
social evils, and social inequality. Their continuation would
further undercut state authority, erode popular confidence, and
serve as a fertile ground for 'peaceful evolution'.
35 Viet Luan, p. 30.
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In order to achieve the development goals set by the Party, Kiet
suggested that the government treat all economic sectors equally
and refrain from imposing restrictions on them as long as they
operated legally. He also suggested that the state economic sector
be thoroughly reformed.36
Kiet's third point dealt with the reform of the state
administration. He expressed his concern that the Vietnamese
legal system had not caught up with changes in the economy and
society and that illegal practices had not decreased. Although
legislation had progressed, all aspects of the state's capacity to
enforce the law remained poor. He proposed the adoption of a
comprehensive policy to develop the state machinery, the state
macro-economic system, and the market.
Suggesting specific reforms in the administrative system,
Kiet called for a complete separation of economic production
activities and state management tasks, the abolition of the
wartime style of on-the-spot decision making, and the
redefinition of the relationship between the party and state
agencies and elected representative bodies. He emphasised the
retraining of officials in government agencies and elected
representative bodies, the role of the National Assembly as the
sole law making institution, and the reorganisation of party
committees in state agencies. Regarding improvements in the
macro-economic role of the state, Kiet emphasised the
promulgation of the Civil Code and the Commercial Code and the
development of a fiscal system including taxation, a stock
market, and banking. He criticised party members who
considered these developments as capitalist and called for the
leadership to commit itself to these projects. Finally, he called for
an end to existing separate economies: the civil economy (kinh te
dan su); the mass organisation-run economy (kinh te doan the);
the party-run economy (kinh te dang); and the military-run
economy (kinh te luc luong vu trang) to further develop the
market.37
36 Ibid., pp. 33-1, 58.
37 Ibid., pp. 58-9.
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Kiet's final point dealt with party rebuilding. He complained
that the structural organisation of the Party remained
unchanged: old organisations that were no longer relevant had
been maintained while new organisations had not been created.
Kiet also criticised the leadership style of the Party, arguing for
the need to grant autonomy to executive and juridical agencies,
elected representative bodies, and mass organisations. Finally,
he suggested that the principle of 'democratic centralism' be
replaced with democracy within the party, with the condition that
each party cadre would follow the party statute and the adopted
party resolutions.38
Kiet's views were not the only ones expressed. Prior to the VIII
Congress, other party leaders also voiced their opinions, focusing
on issues related to the sectors they represented. Their viewpoints
were not individual opinions but representative of those of their
constituencies both within and outside the party.
While Kiet highlighted the cooperative aspect of the multi
polar international structure, Senior Lieutenant General Le Kha
Phieu, a member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Party
Central Committee, maintained that there remained conflict and
competition between socialism and imperialism. At the Eleventh
Party Organisation Congress of the Politico-Military Institute in
March 1996, he discussed the confrontation between the two
camps, asserting that 'capitalism will certainly be replaced as it
has already become obsolete and unable to meet the people's
welfare needs at a time when mankind's economic, scientific,
and technological progress has reached a level that can better
meet the needs of every individual and every household'.39
Unlike the representative from the Army, Do Muoi seemed to
agree with Kiet's analysis of the international system, or at least,
he did not openly reject it. However, he differed on the meaning
of 'socialist orientations'. Interviewed by the Vietnam Economic
Times in May, he identified the following features as socialist
orientations: a society owned by the working people; a highly
38 Ibid., pp. 33-1, 58.
39 Nhan Dan, 25 March 1996, pp. 1-2.
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developed economy based on a modern productive force and
public ownership of the major means of production; an advanced
culture with high national identity; an absence of repression,
exploitation and inequality; ethnic solidarity; and cooperative
relations with people in other countries in the world. These
orientations would lead to a society with a prosperous people, a
powerful nation, and an equitable and civilised society.40
Kiet and Do Muoi also differed over economic development
strategies. While Kiet focused more on industrial development,
Do Muoi spoke on behalf of the agricultural sector. In late 1995,
when working with basic party organisations in several
communes in Thai Binh, Hai Hung, and Hai Phong, he urged
that local cadres stress the objectives of agricultural and rural
industrialisation at their grassroots level congresses.41 This
placed him on the same side as Dao Dung Tung who in the
summer of 1995 had evoked the resolution of the V Plenum of the
CC (June 1993) that endorsed the modernisation of agriculture,
forestry, and fishery.42 Kiet and Do Muoi also advocated
different approaches towards industrialisation. In his interview
in May, Kiet mentioned the need to combine a strategy of
increasing exports. In this process, the law would recognise
equality among all economic components.43 Do Muoi, on the
other hand, gave weight to the development of light industry to
provide for domestic consumption in both rural and urban areas.
Finally, unlike Kiet, Do Moi gave weight to the consolidation
of the state and collective economic sectors in industrial,
agricultural, and service activities. He argued that a socialism-
oriented market mechanism under state management would
40 Vietnam Economic Times (May 1996): 15 in FBIS-EAS, 6 June 1996,
pp. 92-9.
41 VNA (2 January 1996) in FBIS-EAS, 4 January 1996, p. 55.
42 See Dao Duy Tung, 'Nhung thanh tuu trong cong cuoc doi moi'
[Reform achievements], Thong Tin Cong Tac Tu Tuong (September 1995),
especially pp. 6-7.
43 Thoi Bao Kinh Te Viet Nam, 22 May 1996, p. 1 in FBIS-EAS, 19 July
1996, pp. 57-8.
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serve to reduce the negative social impact of a market
mechanism on Vietnamese society.44 In one of his speeches
delivered early in 1996, he specifically asserted that it was
impossible to carry out agricultural and rural industrialisation
without relying on agricultural cooperatives as the main basis.45
Many party members supported the leading role of the state in
the economy. Ha Dang, head of the Department of Ideology and
Culture, in discussing the draft reports, stated that there were
different types of ownership, which although legally equal, did
not have the same role and position in the establishment of a new
socio-economic regime. State ownership together with cooperative
ownership represented a more advanced production mode.46
Nguyen Ha Phan, a Politburo member and head of the Economic
Commission of the Party Central Committee, supported the policy
to develop the cooperative economy and cooperatives in a multi-
sectoral socialist-oriented economy.47 Dao Dung Tung, his ally
in the Politburo, had, since mid-1995, called for the revival of both
state-owned enterprises and cooperatives in the agricultural,
forestry, and fishery sectors.48 Phan Van Tiem, Head of the
Central Steering Committee for Renewal of State-Owned
Businesses pointed to the increasing contribution from state-
owned enterprises to state revenue.49 A similar view was
44 VOV, 15 March 1996 in FBIS-EAS, 18 March 1996, pp. 89-90.
45 VNA, 2 January 1996 1995 in FBIS-EAS, 4 January 1996, p. 55.
46 Vietnam Economic Times, December 1995, pp. 10-1 in FBIS-EAS, 5
January 1996, p. 71.
47 VNA, 1 February 1996 in FBIS-EAS, 2 February 1996, pp. 64-5.
48 See Tung, 'Nhung thanh tuu trong cong cuoc doi moi', pp. 6-7.
49 VNA, 23 June 1996 in FBIS-EAS, 25 June 1996, pp. 102-3. Tiem points
out that between 1991-1995, the GDP growth rate of the state sector was
almost 1.5 times that of the non-state sector and was more stable compared
with the pre- 1991 years. The ratio of industrial output to gross domestic
product was brought to 30 per cent in 1995 from 23 per cent in 1990, with
the proportion of state-owned output rising to 69 per cent from 53 per cent.
The services value to GDP rose to 43 per cent in 1995 from 39 per cent in
1990 with the state-owned sector rising to 46 per cent from 42 per cent.
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expressed by a deputy commander in charge of political affairs of
the third Military Region, his speech delivered in June
criticising the failure of the state-run trading sector to pay
attention to renovating and building the cooperatives economy.50
In early April, a move to buttress the role of the state in the
economy was confirmed by draft reports to the Congress that
stipulated that the state and the cooperative sectors' share of GDP
would increase to 60 per cent by the year 2020. This statement
prompted reaction from advocates of privatisation including
World Bank officials and was dropped in the final draft.51
Finally, regarding party building, party cadres from the
ideological sector and the army were also more concerned with
the decline of revolutionary ethics, the growing number of corrupt
party members, and economic stratification among party
members. Their concerns were not merely ideologically
motivated. Experiences in the Soviet Union had indicated that the
appropriation of party and state property in the long run could
precipitate party members' defection from the Party in times of
crisis.
Furthermore, many party members insisted that the term
'democratic centralism' be retained. Politburo member Le Phuoc
Tho recognised the rights of party members to express their
diverging opinions but demanded that they respect party
resolutions adopted by the majority.52 One article published in an
army journal in June stated that the negation of the principle of
democratic centralism would amount to the negation of the
principle of overall party leadership over the Army and the
Armed Forces, thus paving the way for the depoliticisation and
neutralisation of the Army and the Armed Forces and creating
Their total budget contribution increased by 135 per cent in 1992, 145 per
cent in 1993, 130 per cent in 1994, and 132 per cent in 1995.
50 VOV, 9 June 1996 in FBIS-EAS, 10 June 1996, p. 85.
51 Vietnam Economic Times (December 1995), pp. 10-1 in FBIS-EAS, 5
January 1996, p. 71.
52 Nhan Dan, 29 January 1996, p. 3.
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conditions for hostile forces to carry out their 'peaceful evolution'
strategy.53
Divergent opinions notwithstanding, it is striking that it is
impossible to put party leaders and their supporters neatly in
either 'reformist' or 'conservative' camps, since their policy
positions seemed to vary from one policy area to another.54 Kiet
and Do Muoi seemed to share similar views on the nature of the
international system, a position which separated them from the
Army. However, the two differed on the meanings of socialism,
socialist orientations, socialist deviations, and the general
direction for industrialisation. Do Muoi's positions resembled
those of, and were supported by, party members from the
ideological sector and the army. He voiced neither disagreement
nor strong support for Kiet's agenda on administrative reform,
the development of the state's macro-economic role, and the
development of the market. Yet, writings published in army
journals and newspapers considered the emphasis on a law-
governed state and the limited economic role of the state as signs
of distancing the state from the class viewpoint.
Hie Congress and the rebuilding ofthe state apparatus
Like previous political reports, the report to the VIII Congress
contained an ideological hodge podge. Compared with the two
previous political reports (in 1986 and 1991), the report to the VIII
Congress had a strong socialist overtone mirroring the concerns
expressed by party ideologues, central and local state businesses,
and party cadres from the Army.
53 Nguyen Nam Khanh, 'Struggle against opportunism and rightism—
an important party of party-building work at present', Tap Chi Quoc
Phong Toan Dan (January 1996):7-9 in FBIS-EAS, 2 February 1996, pp.
65-7.
54 Even a thoughtful observer like Brantly Womack also subscribes to
the conservative-reformist vocabulary. See Brantly Womack, 'Vietnam in
1996: reform immobilism', Asian Survey 37, no. 1 (January 1997): 79-87.
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The political report endorsed the two strategies of building
socialism and defending the fatherland, a similar emphasis
echoed by the V Congress in 1982. Building socialism would
include the acceleration of industrialisation and modernisation
with priorities going to the development of the rural economy, the
agro-forestry-fishery sector, maritime product processing,
consumer goods, and infrastructure construction. The first three
areas had been officially advocated by Do Muoi and Dao Duy
Tung. In developing a multi-sectoral economy, priority was
given to the state and collective sectors including state capitalist
enterprises and various types of production cooperatives. While
promising assistance to private and small businesses, the report
also advocated their participation in cooperatives and joint
ventures with state economic units. It vowed to protect private
capitalists' economic rights and legal interests on the condition
that they comply with the aims of national development. Although
recognising certain positive aspects of the changing
international and domestic order, it, echoing Le Kha Phieu's
concerns, highlighted the conflicting nature of the international
system, maintained that the world was still in a transition period
from capitalism to socialism, and interpreted regional
cooperation as strongly influenced by powerful countries and
containing elements of instability. The report also confirmed the
existence of the four dangers listed by the Mid-Terms Party
National Conference in January 1994: the risk of falling behind
other countries; the plot of peaceful evolution; deviation from
socialism, and corruption.
Although the political report reflected the rhetoric of party
cadres from the Army, Party ideologues, and state businesses, it
also contained elements proposed by the Kiet camp, including
state administrators, technocrats, and market reformists. In
reforming state-owned enterprises, the socio-economic report
endorsed the renovation and consolidation of selected state
industrial enterprises and the corporatisation of state enterprises
as a means of mobilising capital (with an emphasis on
encouraging enterprise workers to buy shares and to invest in
enterprises). In addition, the political and socio-economic reports
endorsed the development of education, training, science and
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technology. Finally, it advocated the development of the macro-
economic management role of the state and the reform of the state
administrative system. The state was to play an important role
in economic management by setting up a uniform legal structure
and suitable policies to limit any negative effects of market
mechanisms, but it would refrain from direct involvement in
managing production.55 The socio-economic report included
details of the development of state macro-management: the
implementation of the labour law promulgated in 1993; the
concretisation of ownership rights and the transfer of land use
rights; the introduction of a share holding system at a number of
state-run enterprises, the development of new industrial areas
and housing projects, the rebuilding of the financial and
monetary system; and the formulation of legal documents
fundamental to the market-oriented mechanism. The report
endorsed several aspects of administrative reform, including a
review of documents issued at all authority levels and the
abolition of those contrary to legal documents issued by the
National Assembly and the government; the division of state
management power between government agencies and local
administrations of provinces and centrally-managed cities, and
the clarification of the authority and responsibility at each
administration level.56
In policy terms, these endorsements confirmed the policy
trends towards the reform of the state and collective economic
sector and the public administration that had unfolded in the
1990s.57 To strengthen the state industrial sector, in March 1994,
the Prime Minister's Decision 90 and 91 had established state
55 See DCSVN, Van Kien Dai Hoi Dai Bieu Toan Quoc Lan Thu VIII
[Documents from the VIII National Party Congress] (Hanoi: Chinh Tri
Quoc Gia, 1996), pp. 55-152.
56 Ibid., pp. 232-43.
57 For a more detailed discussion of the political, economic, and cultural
sectors, see Thaveeporn Vasavakul, 'Vietnam: the third wave of state
building', Southeast Asian Affairs 1997 (Singapore: ISEAS, 1997), pp. 337-
62.
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business enterprises in key economic sectors using the general
corporation model which was aimed at relieving administrative
agencies from actually running the businesses and
concentrating state capital to enable the state economic sector to
play a leadership role in the market.58 In January 1996, Prime
Minister Kiet met with chairpersons of the management boards
and general managers of corporations in Ho Chi Minh City and
Hanoi to discuss the features of the general corporation.59 The
final agreement, in the long run, could change the division of
power among different central ministries and between them and
general corporations. In the area of agriculture, the V Plenum of
the CC (VII Congress) in June 1993 had already endorsed the
development of commodity production in agriculture. This
involved the institutionalisation of land transfer; the reform of
SOEs in forestry, fishery, and agriculture; the reform of
cooperatives; the reorganisation of state trading enterprises in
rural areas; an increase in agricultural investment; and
poverty reduction. The revival of the cooperative sector
materialised in a legal form in March 1996 when the National
Assembly adopted the Law for Cooperatives.60
Nineteen ninety-six also saw continued reform of public
administration, with the focus on central and local government
relations and the streamlining of administrative procedures.
For example, in June 1996, the National Assembly's Standing
Committee passed an ordinance supplementing the revised 1994
58 Under state socialism, the ministry served simultaneously as director,
manager, and administrator, with no separation between the functions of
management and production. The new model provides business managers
with opportunities to use initiative. See Vasavakul, 'Politics of the reform of
state institutions', pp. 55-7; and Thoi Bao Kinh Te Viet Nam, 25 September
1995, p. 3 in FBIS-EAS, 29 January 1996, pp. 62-4.
59 For the discussion, see "Ve mo hinh to chuc tong cong ty nha nuoc'
[On the organisational model for the state general corporation], Lao Dong
ua Cong Doan (4-1996): 2-3.
60 'Can thuc hien tot hon nua Nghi Quyet TW 5' [Let us better
implement the V Plenum Resolution], Thong Tin Cong Tac Tu Tuong
(September 1995): 11-3.
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law for local government authorising the People's Council to
rescind orders and decisions issued by the People's Committee at
the same level, and authorising the People's Councils at higher
levels to rescind or demand revision of orders and decisions
issued by the lower-level People's Committee where these are
illegal.61 After the Congress, in November 1996, the Assembly
passed the draft law to rectify the pervasive situation of
administrative agencies at various echelons issuing conflicting
circulars, directives, and notices of a legal nature, and to
establish the principles of hierarchical jurisdiction and
chronological order of legal documents.62 It also endorsed the
further division of eight existing provinces into 15 provinces and
one municipality.63 In the area of personnel, Prime Minister Vo
Van Kiet reshuffled his cabinet, dropping 12 ministers and
senior officials (see Appendix VI).64 Kiet's move could be seen as
an attempt to rejuvenate and upgrade government ministers: the
average age of the newcomer has dropped to 54, five of the eight
speak English, most have some economic expertise and all but
one is a member of the VCP's Central Committee.65 Finally, to
institutionalise the reform of administrative procedures, a
number of precincts in Ha Noi, Hai Phong, and Ho Chi Minh city
61 Nhan Dan, 10 July 1996, p. 2.
62 VOV, 11 November 1996 from BBC Monitoring Service: Asia-Pacific,
15 November 96.
63 After 1975, Vietnam's 71 provinces were merged into 40
administrative units. During the reform period, a number of provinces
were redefined, with 53 provinces and municipalities since 1991.
64 See Reuters, 11 November 1996. Those dropped were: Bui Danh Luu
(Minister of Communications and Transport); Do Quoc Sam (Minister of
Planning and Investment); Dang Huu (Minister of Science, Technology,
and Environment); Bui Thien Ngo (Minister of the Interior); Ho Te
(Minister of Finance); Phan Ngoc Tuong (Minister and Chief of the
Government Personnel and Organisation Committee); Nguyen Tan Trinh
(Minister of Marine Products); Tran Hoan (Minister of Culture and
Information); Le Xuan Trinh (Government Office); and Phan Van Tiem
(Minister in Charge of Government Tasks).
65 Reuters News Service, 7 November 1996.
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were officially designated to serve as experimental sites for the
'one stop' procedural method.66 In December, Ho Chi Minh city
officially launched an experimental 'one-stop' system at five
administrative offices in the city including the People's
Committee Office, the Construction Office, the Planning and
Investment Office, the Cadastral Office, and the City Architect
Chiefs Office.67
In summary, the political and the socio-economic reports
endorsed policy preferences put forward by different sectors, most
of which had been conceived between the VII and VIII Congress
and endorsed by different CC plenums (Appendix V). The
guidelines given in the reports, however, lacked necessary
details and it is likely that sectoral conflict and compromise will
continue during the post-Congress period.
Strategies for party building
The political report reflected the VCP leadership's concern over
the impact of economic liberalisation and the process of political
reform on the party. The VIII Congress re-endorsed party reform
measures proposed at the III Plenum of the CC in June 1992 where
both the renovation (doi moi) and the rectification (chinh don) of
the party apparatus had been endorsed, addressing issues related
to party ideology, revolutionary discipline, party organisation,
leadership style, and party members.
The III Plenum resolution had attempted to address
systematically the ethical and disciplinary framework that
governed the conduct of party cadres and their political character
(ban link chinh tri). It had also put forward measures to renovate
party organisations both at central and grassroots levels, and
had argued for the need to define the qualifications of party
cadres, the recruitment process, and job assignment regulations
eB Interviews with researchers at the Institute for the Research on the
State and Law and the National Administration Academy, Hanoi,
November 1996.
67 Lao Dong, 19 December 1996, p. 1 in FBIS-EAS, 19 December 1996.
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under the new economic order. Finally, it had confirmed party
leadership over other political institutions, while endorsing a
change of method from leading through party cadres to leading
through party organisation.68
The VIII Congress confirmed these reform measures and, for
the first time, imposed restrictions on party members'
involvement in business activities and advocated measures to
deal with corruption practices. It also urged the expansion of
party organisations in the non-state sector and the rebuilding of
party organisations in state and representative bodies.
Why party reform?
In a speech delivered to the III Plenum and in several others
between then and the VIII Congress, Politburo member Le Phuoc
Tho identified a number of reasons that precipitated the need for
party reform.69
The first dealt with the impact of economic reform on the
division of tasks among party members. Economic benefits and
prospects for material gains affiliated with particular job
assignments caused friction among party members and party
organisations. During the period of economic transition, control
of the party organisations allowed local cadres to enrich
themselves and protect the interests of their followers. As a result,
intra-party disputes for control over party bureaucracies and
territory grew substantially and intra-party struggles
increasingly focused on administrative jurisdiction. In a speech
delivered in early 1996, Le Phuoc Tho, reported on disunity
among key party members at middle levels: between secretaries
and chairmen of people's committees or people's councils;
between party committees and chiefs of state agencies; and
between local cadres and those assigned from other localities.
This developed during the redefining of the administrative
boundaries of provinces or in the mergers of departments,
ministries, and sectors. It also took place when personnel
68 Tho, 'Mot so nhiem vu doi moi va chinh don dang', pp. 77-9.
69 Ibid., pp. 70-7.
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evaluations, deployment, and proposals for promotions were
launched. These 'have weakened the internal structure of local
party organisations and have caused the masses to lose
confidence in party organisations'.70
The second reason for party reform concerned the ideological
crisis within the party following the disintegration of
communism in the Soviet bloc between 1989 and 1991. Prior to the
VII Party Congress in 1991, high-ranking party cadres,
intellectuals, and technocrats had questioned the appropriateness
of the Party's line in the past and voiced their doubts over the
future of socialism in Vietnam. Tran Xuan Bach and Bui Tin
were among the major figures to speak out.71 At the grassroots
level, party organisations in many localities reportedly became
paralysed and cadres demoralised.72
The third reason for party reform given by Le Phuoc Tho was
the need for the VCP members to stay united in the face of the
threat of 'peaceful evolution' whereby imperialist forces relied on
economic forces and capitalist ideology to undermine the
Vietnamese socialist regime. Tho identified this process as
involving attempts to damage the credibility of the VCP, promote
political and multi-party pluralism, divide the rank-and-file in
the party, and split the people from the party.
The fourth reason given to justify party reform was the
decline of party organisations and their cadres at all levels as
seen through a series of 'negative developments' within the party
70 Nhan Dan, 29 January 1996, p. 3.
71 For a summary of their views, see Thaveeporn Vasavakul, 'Vietnam:
the changing models of legitimation', in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Political
Legitimacy in Southeast Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995),
pp. 278-81.
72 See Chu Huu Quy, *Vai tro chinh quyen co so xa, thon trong cong
cuoc xay dung nong thon moi' [The role of local government in building
the new countryside], in Phat trien toan dien kinh te-xa hoi nong thon, nong
nghiep Viet Nam [Comprehensive socio-economic development of the
Vietnamese countryside and Vietnamese agriculture] (Hanoi: Chinh Tri
Quoc Gia, 1996), pp. 188-94.
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apparatus. Tho reported signs of disunity, competition for power,
individualism, and provincialism within the party. Cadres
formed factions or cliques, in Tho's words, 'finding ways to
"topple one another"' (tint cach 'lat do nhau').'73 Party cadres
became engaged in corruption, bribery, smuggling, and
misappropriation of the people's property, taking advantage of
legal or policy loopholes.74 Tho also reported cases in which high-
ranking cadres delivered didactic speeches but did not follow
what they had preached, and in which many cadres criticised
other cadres, departments, branches, and provinces for being
corrupt, but avoided criticising their own units, or became angry
when their units were criticised. In addition, there were cases in
which party cadres did not voice their opinions during formal
meetings but aired their disagreement in public.
Le Phuoc Tho identified a number of factors that had led to the
current decline: a loose structural organisation; the absence of
democratic centralism; shortcomings in cadre work; a lack of
review of party building experiences in leading the state,
mobilising the masses, managing the economy, and linking
theory and practice.75
Between 1992 and 1996, a series of measures were put forward
aimed at creating a framework to govern intra-party relations,
73 Tho, 'Mot so nhiem vu doi moi va chinh don dang', pp. 71 and 75.
74 In 1993, Nguyen Van Linh, former Secretary General, complained
that even leading cadres in charge of high-level leadership and
management apparatus had taken advantage of loopholes in policies to
misappropriate public funds, accept bribes, and seek personal gains. In the
mid-1990s, one widely-publicised case was Tamexco, an export-import
goods production, business, and supply services corporation set up in 1989
and subordinate to the Tan Binh District Party Committee. The company
reportedly lost nearly US $40 million because of corruption. AFP (Hong
Kong), 29 April 1996 in FBIS-EAS, 30 April 1996, pp. 82-3; Lao Dong, 28
April 96, p. 3 in FBIS-EAS, 18 June 1996, pp. 90-1.
75 'Nghi quyet ve mot so nhiem vu doi moi va chinh don dang'
[Resolution on tasks regarding the reform of the Party], in DCSVN, Mot so
van kien , p. 11.
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and neutralising the political groupings, competition, and
conflict that arose within the party apparatus.
Revolutionary ideology, unity, and ethics
In response to the ideological and organisational crisis in the
VCP following the collapse of communism in the Soviet bloc, the
III Plenum confirmed Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh
thought as party ideology.76 Earlier, the VII Party Congress had
officially endorsed Ho Chi Minh thought as one basis of regime
ideology. The Resolution called for party members to adhere to a
socialist path, cultivate revolutionary ethics, maintain party
unity, keep close ties with the people, and fight against 'peaceful
evolution'. To liberalise political discussion in the Party and
appease party members who held different views, the resolution
endorsed the rights of party members to 'register different
opinions' (quyen bao luu y kien), that is, to voice their
disagreement over policy issues. Their views would be
considered by the upper echelons. However, all members were
obliged to follow party resolutions once they were adopted by the
majority. The resolution prohibited party cadres from using
criticism and self-criticism sessions to launch personal attacks
and taking revenge for being criticised.77
The amended 1996 Party Statute states that 'party members
holding minority views have the right to their opinion and to
report it to higher party echelons up to the National Congress of
Delegates'. Yet, it also warns that 'they (party members) must,
however, implement resolutions scrupulously and must not
propagate their opinions at variance with the party resolutions'.78
76 For a brief discussion of the politics surrounding the release of
different versions of Ho Chi Minh's Last Will and Testament, see
Vasavakul, 'The changing models of legitimation', pp. 277-8.
77 Bao luu y kien appeared in the Democratic Republic ofVietnam in the
1960s, although at times, it lapsed into disuse.
78 See Dieu le, p. 17; and Le Quang Thuong, 'Tiep tuc hoan thien he
thong to chu cua Dang nham dap ung yeu cau cua thoi ky moi' [Continue
to perfect the party organisation system in order to meet demands in the
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The III Plenum resolution in 1992 did not immediately
propose measures to address the question of party cadres'
involvement in entrepreneurial activities; it only called for the
need to clarify the meaning of the statement 'party members
cannot exploit'.79 In 1996, the political report instructed that party
officials should refrain from taking advantage of legal
discrepancies and loopholes to conduct illegal business and
embezzle public funds. Regulations would be set up to clarify
business activities and services for foreigners and to govern the
acceptance of gifts. Party organisations would investigate cadres
who suddenly became unusually rich and issued clear policies
on the responsibilities of party officials whose spouses or children
conducted illegal business activities. The political report
prohibited party members from being involved in the private
capitalist economy (kinh te tu ban tu nhan). However, it allowed
them to do business in the state sector, the collective sector, and
sectors that advocated share holding or joint ownership with
workers, while condoning their engagement in household
businesses. For party members who were owners of private
capitalist enterprises, party organisations would help transform
them into share holding companies or collective companies with
worker participation.80
Party organisation
A second aspect of party reform addressed by the VCP centred
around party organisation. One concern was the relatively
small number of party members, accounting for only 2.9 per cent
of the overall population. The distribution of party members was
new era] in Mot so van de xay dung Dang, pp. 47-9. The author is the vice-
chairman of the Party Central Organisation Commission.
79 Tho, 'Mot so nhiem vu doi moi va chinh don dang', p. 78.
89 Article 1 of the Party Statute states that party members 'must refrain
from exploitation.' See Dieu le, p. 7; and Le Quang Thuong, 'Mot so van de
ve cong tac dang vien trong tinh hinh hien nay' [Several problems
concerning cadre work under the current situation], Tap Chi Cong San, no.
14 (July 1996): 18-9.
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uneven across the country: 3.5-4.5 per cent in the North; 1.5-1.7
per cent in the central and highlands areas; and 1.1 per cent in
the South.81
Another concern was how to reform the structure of the party
organisation inherited from the socialist period. After 1975, in
order to catch up with the expansion of the state apparatus, the
leadership had advocated the expansion of party organisations,
allowing party committees at all levels to set up as many
commissions as they needed to assist them in overseeing state
agencies implementing party directives. In 1986, prior to the VI
Party Congress, the Politburo (V Session) issued Decision 34 on
the streamlining of party organisations, leading to the merger or
the abolition of central commissions. At present, there are
reportedly 17 central commissions and specialised organs, half
of the number existing between 1980 and 1985. At the local level,
the problem of excessive intermediaries has remained.82
In addition, a range of party organisations had poorly
defined vertical and horizontal communications. Basic party
organisations had been set up at administrative, occupational,
economic, or work units and had been placed under the
leadership of party committees of districts, wards, towns, and
cities subordinate to provinces. Party committees had developed
different systems to lead these basic party organisations: the
party committee for a bloc of central state agencies (dang uy khoi
cac co quart trung uong); the inter-state agency party committee
(dang uy lien co quan); the people-government-party committee
at the provincial level (dang uy dan-chinh-dang cap tinh); party
committees for a bloc of enterprises (dang uy khoi doanh nghiep);
and party affair sections in universities under the jurisdiction of
the province (ban can su dang). In addition, party organisations
in major SOEs were place under various leading party organs of
the Secretariat, central party economic agencies, and party
committees in ministries, provinces or municipalities. Smaller
SOEs were placed under party committees at the district and
81
82
Thuong, 'Mot so van de ve cong tac dang vien', p. 15.
Thuong, 'Tiep tuc hoan thien he thong to chuc cua Dang', pp. 61-3.
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quarter levels. There seemed to be no clear regulation regarding
horizontal and vertical chains of command and authority
structure.83
Another related concern dealt with the absence of party
organisations in new economic and administrative units. The
split of administrative units, the demarcation of new
administrative boundaries or provinces, and the mergers of
departments, ministries, and sectors during the period of reform
all meant that the party structure from the pre-reform period
became irrelevant. For example, party organisation cadres
complained that the non-state sector including private
enterprises, joint ventures, and foreign-owned enterprises did
not have party organisations. They also debated how party
organisations in SOEs that were separated from their line
ministries should be placed and how party organisations in the
newly-established general state corporations (tong cong ty)
should be organised.84
To strengthen party organisation, the III Plenum Resolution
called for the expansion of party organisations into minority
areas and religious establishments as well as private enterprises
and joint ventures if possible. It endorsed the separation of party
organisations in SOEs from party organisations in ministries
and branches, with the reassignment of party organisations in
the SOEs to party committees at the provincial, district/ precinct,
or quarter/commune depending on the size of the SOEs. It also
called for the setting up of party committees in general
corporations and unions of enterprises. To reform central party
organisations, it endorsed the redefinition of tasks and the
authority of central commissions. At the grass-roots level, it
called for the reorganisation of party chapters according to
residential areas (such as hamlets and streets) and occupations.
83 Ibid., pp. 60-1.
84 Thuong, *Ve to chuc va hoat dong cua cac to chuc Dang trong cac
doanh nghiep nha nuoc' [On the organisation and activity of party
organisations in state-owned enterprises], in Mot so van de, pp. 85-100.
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Under state socialism, Party chapters and party organisations
had been attached to production units.85
After 1992, new party chapters were set up in several areas
and party chapters in rural and urban areas were organised
according to residential areas and occupational groups.86
Between 1992 and 1994, statistics from 17 provinces showed that
282 additional hamlets had party members and 398 additional
hamlets had set up party chapters. By the end of 1995, there were
40,330 party organisations at grassroots level. Hanoi had 142,409
party members with 1,517 party organisations at grassroots
levels; Ho Chi Minh City had 83,720 party members with 2,259
party organisations.87
The expansion of party organisations into the non-state
sector, however, only began in 1996. In January, the Party
Central Committee's Organisation Department met with
representatives of the non-state business sector at the 11th
Precinct in Ho Chi Minh City to discuss the establishment of
party organisations at grassroots level. In May, the party
committee of Hai Phong reportedly began to set up party cells in
joint ventures.88
Between 1991 and 1993, the leadership also moved to reform
party organisations at the central level, exemplified by the
reorganisation of the Institution of Marxism-Leninism into the
Institute for Research on Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh
Thought in 1992; the reorganisation of the Nguyen Ai Quoc
Academy into the Ho Chi Minh National Political Academy in
1993, and the setting up of the National Politics Publishing House
based on the merger of a number of party publishing houses.89
85 'Nghi quyet ve mot so nhiem vu doi moi va chinh don Dang', pp. 17-8.
86 Le Quang Thuong, 'Mot so van de ve cong tac dang vien', p. 16.
87 Ibid.; and Thoi Bao Kinh Te Saigon, 27 June, July 3, 1996, p. 4 In
FBIS-EAS, 29 July 1996, p. 103.
88 Sai Gon Giai Phong, 7 January 1996, p. 1 in FBIS-EAS, 2 February
1996, pp. 63-4; VNA, 6 May 1996 in FBIS-EAS, 7 May 1996, p. 80.
89 Su That Publishing House, Thong Tin Ly Luan Publishing House
(from the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought);
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This reorganisation drive also involved the setting up of a
Commission for the Protection of Internal Politics (Ban Bao Ve
Chinh Tri Noi Bo cua Trung Uong) in 1993.90 Between 1991 and
1993, the authority and responsibilities of all Party's Central
Commissions were also redefined.91
The VIII Congress confirmed the measures adopted by the III
Plenum, emphasising the expansion of party organisations in
state-owned enterprises, private enterprises, foreign-Vietnam
joint ventures, administrative units, and the military and police
units.92 This policy guideline was further elaborated in
December 1996 with the Politburo's instruction to establish and
strengthen a nationwide network of party cells and
organisations in foreign and private enterprises.93
The Party and other political institutions
A third aspect of party reform dealt with the relationship between
the party and elected representative bodies, the state, and mass
organisations. There have so far been three major types of party
organisations that served to link the party with other political
institutions: 'party grouping' (dang doan) in the National
Assembly and mass organisations; 'party affairs section' (ban
can su) in state agencies; and party committees in the military
and security forces.
Thong Tin-Van Hoa Publishing House (from the Ideology and Culture
Central Commission); and Phap Ly Publishing House (from the Ministry
ofJustice). See Mot so van kien, pp. 155-7, 199-201, and 202-3.
Mot so van kien, pp. 158-60.
91 Ibid., pp. 161-209.
92 Thuong, 'Mot so van de ve cong tac dang vien', p. 19; See also Le
Quang Thuong, 'Nang cao nang luc lanh dao cua cac to chuc co so dang
dap ung yeu cau cua su nghiep cong nghiep hoa, hien dai hoa dat nuoc'
[Raise the leadership capacity of basic party organisations in order to meet
the demands of industrialisation and modernisation of the country], in Mot
so van de, pp. 65-74.
93 VOV, 6 December 1996 from BBC Monitoring Service: Asia-Pacific,
10 December 1996; and South China Morning Post, 10 December 1996.
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The 1935 Party Statute of the first Congress endorsed dang
doan as a means to 'expand party influence and implement party
policies in workers' associations, peasant associations, and
popular organisations'. The 1951 Statute assigned party
committees at different levels to set up and lead dang doan in
government agencies and mass organisations. The 1960 Statute
reserved a separate chapter for dang doan, signifying its
institutionalisation.94
After reunification, the 1976 Party Statute introduced a second
type of party organisation, the party affairs section (ban can su),
to serve as a link between the party and executive and juridical
administrative units, while retaining dang doan for elected
representative bodies (the National Assembly and the People's
Councils) and mass organisations. The 1982 Statute, however,
abolished ban can su in government and legal administrative
units, leaving direct leadership of these units to party cadres or
through party committees.95
The III plenum resolution in June 1992 highlighted the
importance of both dang doan and ban can su. The Party would
lead the National Assembly by providing guidance to deputies on
constitutional building through dang doan in the National
Assembly. Dang Doan would oversee the activities of Assembly
deputies who were party members and would mobilise non-party
members to follow the party line. The Party would also lead mass
organisations through dang doan and would help to upgrade the
quality of workers in mass organisations. The resolution
declared that the Party was committed to the building of the state
apparatus and would work with state agencies through ban can su
which would report to the Politburo and Secretariat on
government decisions and implementation. At the local
government level, party committees' heads or deputies could be
elected chairpersons of the People's Councils. Party cadres would
assume the headship of specialised branches in local government
94 Thuong, Tiep tuc hoan thien', pp. 37 and 39.
95 Ibid., pp. 41-3.
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where they were qualified.96 In 1992 and 1993, the Politburo issues
directives defining the role of dang doan in elected agencies and
mass organisations, ban can su in executive and juridical
administrative units, and party organisations and political
commissars in the People's Army.97
Problems remained in the process of institutionalising dang
doan and ban can su. At the local level, one crucial problem was
the unclear relationship between dang doan and ban can su on
the one hand and a range of party organisations in executive and
juridical units, elected representative agencies, and mass
organisations, including 'bloc' party committees (dang uy khoi)
and 'organisation' party committees (dang uy co quan). At the
central level, there were problems between ban can su in the
government and ministries and between ban can su in
ministries and general corporations. Finally, many writers
called for a unification of party organisations in executive and
juridical agencies, elected representative agencies and mass
organisations under a single name.98
The VCP set up a separate system of party organisations in the
military and the public security forces. In 1983, the Politburo
issued a resolution introducing the 'one command system' that
abolished party committees organised vertically at each level of
command from the Central Military Party Committee, through
the Political General Department, to basic level. The executive
functions of the party committee at each level were assigned to the
unit commander, and a new body, the Military Council was
created in place. This move granted the unit military
commander more decision-making authority. The III Plenum
resolution, however, restored the system of party committees in
the military to strengthen party leadership over all aspects of the
army. This move, according to the military journal Quan Doi
96
97
96
'Nghi quyet ve mot so nhiem vu doi moi va chinh don dang', pp. 33-7.
Mot so van kien, pp. 210-31.
Thuong, Tiep tuc hoan thien he thong to chuc cua Dang', pp. 58-60.
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Nhan Dan, was aimed at strengthening the direct leadership of
the party over all aspects of the army."
The 1996 Statute discussed in detail responsibilities of both
dang doan and ban can su. The party committee at the central,
provincial, and municipal levels subordinate to the central
government would establish dang doan and ban can su to work
in the elected representative agencies, mass organisations, and
state and juridical agencies. Wherever such party groupings
were not set up, basic party organisations at these agencies would
assume the leadership function. The Statue also emphasised the
party control over the army and the security forces.100 These
confirmations signalled an official policy to tighten the VCP
control over other political institutions, while changing the style
of leadership from leading through party cadres to leading
through organisation.
Party members
The final aspect of party reform dealt with party cadre and
involved the age, recruitment, and qualifications of party
members. The VCP had not attracted great numbers from
younger generations of Vietnamese in decades. At the end of
1976, the average age of cadres was 38.6 years; with 27 per cent
under 30 years of age. By the end of 1995, however, the average
age had risen to 43.6 years and only 12 per cent of party members
were under 30. Meanwhile, the number of retired cadres
increased from 5 per cent in 1976 to 27 per cent at the end of
1995. 101 Between 1987 and 1991, the number of new party members
recruited fell from 100,000 in 1987 to 80,000 in 1988, 66,000 in 1989,
49,000 in 1990, and 36,000 in 1991.102
99 See Thayer, The Vietnam People's Army under Doi Moi , pp. 5 and 61.
100 Thuong, 'Mot so van de ve cong tac dang vien', p. 14; and Dieu le, pp.
39-46 and 59-61.
101 Ibid.,p. 15.
102 Tho, 'Mot so nhiem vu doi moi va chinh don dang', p. 90.
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Also, the party had not been able to raise the intellectual
quality of its members. A large number of cadres had been
recruited during the war and thus lacked appropriate skills for
the period of reform: 28 per cent of party members had graduated
from secondary schools; 12 per cent from technical middle
schools; and 14 per cent from colleges and universities.103
The III Plenum resolution advocated the rejuvenation (tre
hoa) of party members, the recruitment of qualified young
Vietnamese, and the strengthening of the Ho Chi Minh Youth
League.104 Since June 1992, the VCP had admitted 189,692
members, 9 per cent of the party membership. In 1995 alone,
around 85,900 new party members were admitted, reportedly 47
per cent more than in 1994. 105 After 1992, the proportion of party
members with a university education or above in provincial and
city party committees reportedly increased. The number of party
cadres with economic management training also rose from 9 per
cent during the 1977-79 office term to 36 per cent in 1991-95 office
term.
103 Thuong, 'Mot so van de ve cong tac dang vien', p. 14.
104 fjghi quyet ve mot so nhiem vu doi moi va chinh don dang', pp. 19-
20. For more details on the situation in the provinces, see Nguyen Thanh
Tuc, 'Dang bo Ninh Binh thuc hien Nghi Quyet Trung Uong Ba ve doi moi
chinh don Dang' [Ninh Binh party committee implemented the III Plenum
resolution on the renovation and rectification of the Party], Tap Chi Lich
Su Dang, no. 2 (1996): 10-3; Tong Quoc Huyen, 'Dang Bo Huyen Hoa Lu
thuc hien doi moi va chinh don Dang' [Party committee of Hoa Lu district
renovated and rectified the Party], Tap Chi Lich Su Dang, no. 4 (1996): 44-
5; Dang Van Cao and Phan Huu Tich, 'Dang Bo Hai Hung thuc hien doi
moi chinh don Dang~ket qua va kinh nghiem' [Hai Hung party committee
renovated and rectified the Party—results and experiences], Tap Chi Lich
Su Dang, no. 6 (9-1996): 12-4.
105 Since the VII Congress, the Party had admitted 267,914 members. Of
the members admitted since 1992, 20 per cent were women, 12 per cent
were from ethnic minorities, 56 per cent were members of the Ho Chi Minh
Communist Youth Union, and 17 per cent were college, university, or post-
university graduates. VNA, 12 January 1996 in FBIS-EAS, 26 January
1996, p. 84; and VOV, 28 June 1996 in FBIS-EAS, 3 July 1996, p. 59.
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The VIII Congress showed signs of rejuvenation of the Party
apparatus in a number of respects (Appendix II-III). First, the
revolutionary and political backgrounds of delegates to the
Congress and the CC differed from those at the previous Congress,
with a rise in the number of the delegates who became party
members between 1955 and 1975 and after 1976 at the expense of
the 1945-1954 generation. Some 74 per cent of the delegates had
entered the party between 1955 and 1975 compared with 66 per cent
for the VII Congress, while 17 per cent became party members
after 1976 compared with 9 per cent for the VII Party Congress.
Only 8 per cent had entered the party between 1945 and 1954
compared with 22 per cent for the VII Congress; and only 0.8 per
cent (or 10 delegates) had entered the Party prior to 1945. At the CC
level, 89 per cent entered the party between 1946 and 1975; 9 per
cent entered the party after 1976, an increase from 0.5 per cent at
the VII Party Congress.
Another departure was the age structure of the delegates to the
Congress and of the CC members whose average age had
declined. (See details in Appendix II-III). Finally, delegates to
the Congress and the CC members possessed high educational
qualifications: some 88 per cent of the CC members held
university degrees compared with 56 per cent for the VII Party
Congress.
While the top leaders at the Politburo level were senior party
leaders from the first two revolutionary generations, most of the
CC members were from the 1955 to 1975 and the post-1975
generations with less 'revolutionary' experience but a higher
level of formal education.106
Concluding remarks
Despite the label 'one-party rule', Vietnamese apex politics in the
1990s shared many features of 'interest group politics'. The rise of
sectoral interests was largely a product of structural change in
106 For detailed analysis, see Thayer, 'The Regularization of Politics
Revisited', pp. 7-8.
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the VCP following the period of economic and political reform in
the 1980s and 1990s. It is likely that the sectoral composition
within the VCP will continue to change. For example, the
continuing division of provinces through 1996 could contribute to
the increase in the number of secondary/provincial-party state
cadres in the future. The expansion of party cells into the non-
state economic sector and the strengthening dang doan and ban
can su in the elected bodies and government agencies could in the
long run justify the non-state sector having representation in the
Party and strengthen the position of the party work sector.
The VIII Party Congress opted for policy inclusion. While it
employed socialist vocabulary in formulating reform policies,
emphasised the semi-malevolent international context and
promoted the leading role of the state and the collective economic
sectors advocated by party ideologues, army and security
representatives, and state businesses, it also adopted elements
proposed by party cadres cum technocrats.
Since both the political and the socio-economic reports
endorsed by the Congress merely served to provide general
directions for Vietnam's future reform plans, it likely that
sectoral conflict and compromise will continue during the post-
Congress period. In the economic area, it will be seen in the
debates over which state industrial sectors receive priorities, how
far the privatisation of SOEs goes, and how state economic and
administrative functions will be separated. It will also be seen in
the extent to which the agricultural, forestry, and fishery sectors,
so far unattended, receive investment benefits and in how
resources are allocated to minorities and mountainous areas.
Culturally and socially, it will be seen in the debates over
national culture, globalisation, education and modernisation,
social policy, and poverty reduction programs. Politically, it will
be seen in the transformation of policy guidelines into laws,
government decisions, local administrative directives, and their
implementation. It will also be seen in the process of redefining
party revolutionary ethics, the reform of party organisations, the
recruitment of cadres, and power sharing between the VCP and
other political institutions.
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In the context of intensified competition for economic
resources among different sectoral interests and their formal
and informal alliances (khoi) and in a changing ideological
environment, the VCP leadership has attempted to establish a
framework within which competition and conflict could be
lessened. It remains to be seen whether the measures put forward
between the VII and the VIII Congress will revive the spirit of
collective/collegial leadership among the rank-and-file within
the party.
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Appendix I: A Profile of the Delegates to the VI National Party
Congress (1986)
No. of delegates per cent
Total 1,129
Sectoral Representation
Members from Provinces, Municipalities and Special Zones 925
Members from Central Party Organisations 197
Female Delegates 153 13.53
Labor or Military Heroes 50 4.42
Direct Production Workers 72 6.37
Class Composition
Industrial Workers 175 15.50
Peasants 325 28.75
Cadres and Civil Servants 337 29.84
Petty Bourgeoisie and Students 150 13.28
Others 142 12.57
General Educational Level
General Secondary School Level or Higher 804 71.21
Specialised Educational Level
Specialised Secondary Schools or Higher 558 49.38
College or Higher 481 42.60
With Knowledge of Economic Management 334 29.58
With Knowledge of State Management 42 3.72
Political Educational Level
Advanced Level 691 81.11
Middle Level 246 21.78
Age
Between 31 and 40 132 1 1.69
Between 41 and 50 339 30.02
Between 51 and 60 460 40.74
Between 61 and 70 162 14.34
Over 70 Years Old 14 1.24
Party Seniority
Entering the Party before 1930 7 0.62
Entering between 1931 and 1941 35 3.10
Entering between 1941 and August 1945 45 3.90
Entering between September 1945 and July 1954 407 36.05
Entering between August 1954 and April 1975 547 48.45
Entering after May 1975 88 7.80
Source: Nhan Dan, 15 December 1986, pp. 3-4.
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Appendix II: A Profile of the Delegates to the VIII Party
Congress Compared with that of the VII Congress
VIII Congress VII Congress
no. per cent no. per cent
1 . Number of the Delegates
Total 1200 1176
In Presence 1198 1 176
Sectoral Representation
Female Delegates 153 12.80 113 11.31
Minorities 153 12.80 124 10.54
Workers 100 8.30 116 9.80
Labor or Military Heroes 29 2.40 27 2.30
Delegates from the Army 158 13.16 97 8.25
Delegates from Security Forces 56 4.60 47 4.00
Delegates Doing Party Work 490 40.80 404 43.35
Delegates from the Government Sector 321 26.00 226 22.28
Delegates Resp. for Mass Organizations 132 11.00 123 10.46
2. Age
Below 30 1 0.08 1 0.09
31-40 62 5.10 51 4.34
41-50 428 35.72 391 33.35
51-60 575 47.99 503 42.77
Over 60 134 11.18 230 19.56
Average Age (in years) 52 53
Maximum Age (in years) 79 86
Minimum Age (in years) 28 29
3. Party Seniority
Entering the Party before 1945 10 0.80 34 2.89
Entering between 1945-1954 90 7.50 259 22.02
Entering between 1955-1975 891 74.37 780 66.33
Entering after 1976 209 17.44 102 8.67
4. Educational Level
General School Level
- First Cycle 9 0.75 16 1.63
- Second Cycle 98 8.10 188 15.99
- Third Cycle 1093 91.23 969 82.40
Specialised Educational Level
- Middle Level 73 6.09 78 6.63
- College and University 750 62.60 743 63.18
- With MA, PhD or Professorship 192 16.00 158 13.43
Political Educational Level
- Middle Level 179 14.19 256 21.77
- Advanced Level 998 81.80 841 71.50
Source: Xay Dung Dang, no. 7 (1996): 24-5.
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Appendix III: A Profile of the Central Committee of the VIII
National Congress Compared with that of the VII Congress
VIII Congress VII Congress
1. Number of the CC Members
no. per cent no. per cent
Total 170 146
Female 18 10.50 12 7.05
Minorities 16 9.41 13 7.64
Workers 17 10.00 20 11.76
2. Age
31-40 0 0
41-50 39 22.94 21 12.35
51-60 102 60.00 60 35.29
Over 60 29 17.05 65 38.23
Average Age (in years) 54 57
3, Party Seniority
Entering the Party before 1945 4 2.35 7 4.11
Between 1946-1975 151 88.82 138 81.17
After 1976 15 8.82 1 0.50
4. Educatipnal Level
By Degree
- University & Post-University 150 88.23 95 55.88
By Political Educational Level
- Advanced 140 82.35 115 67.64
Source: Xay Dung Dang, no. 7 (1996): 25.
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Appendix IV: List of Politburo Members
(As Endorsed by the VIII National Party Congress, July 1996)
1. Do Muoi Secretary General, the VCP
2. General Le Due Anh President
3. Vo Van Kiet Prime Minister
4. Nong Due Manh Chairman, National Assembly
5. Lt-General Le Kha Phieu Military Political Commissar
6. General Doan Khue Defence Minister
7. Phan Van Khai Deputy Prime Minister
8. Nguyen Manh Cam Foreign Minister
9. Nguyen Due Binh Director, Ho Chi Minh National
Political Institute
10. Nguyen Van An Head, Party Central
Organisational Commission
11. Lieutenant-General Pham Van Tra Vice-Minister of Defence and
Army Chief of Staff
12. Tran Due Luong Deputy Prime Minister
13. Nguyen Thi Xuan My Head, Party Central Control
Commission
14. Truong Tan Sang Ho Chi Minh City Party Chief
15. Le Xuan Tung Hanoi Party Chief
16. Lt-Gen. Le Minh Huong Minister of Interior
17. Nguyen Dinh Tu Died 28 June 1996
18. Pham The Duyet Party Mass Mobilisation
Commission
19. Nguyen Tan Dung Vice-Minister of Interior
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Appendix V: Central Committee Plenums from the
VII to the VIII Congress
24-27 June 1991
21 November-
4 December 1991
18-29 June 1992
10-14 January 1993
3-10 June 1993
24 November-
1 December 1993
20-25 January 1994
25-30 July 1994
16-23 January 1995
6-14 November 1995
12-20 April 1996
Early June 1996
28 June-1 July 1996
The VII National Party Congress met.
The II Plenum discussed guidelines for the
implementation of the VII Congress Resolution
and the revision of the 1980 Constitution.
The III Plenum discussed Vietnam's foreign
policy, national defence and security, and party
reform.
The IV Plenum discussed cultural tasks, education
and training, family planning, and youth work.
The V Plenum discussed the socioeconomic
development in rural areas.
The VI Plenum discussed the preparation of the
mid-term party congress.
The Mid-Term Party Congress met to review
the implementation of the VII Congress
Resolution. It endorsed the acceleration of
modernisation and industrialisation and identified
four dangers confronting the country: falling
behind, socialist deviations, corruption, and
peaceful evolution.
The VII Plenum discussed industrial and
technological development and the strengthening
of the position of the working class.
The VIII Plenum officially promulgated reform of
the administrative system.
The IX Plenum discussed and endorsed the draft
reports to the VIII Party Congress.
The X Plenum discussed the views contributed
towards the draft documents of the party congress
before releasing them for public comments. It
expelled Politburo member Nguyen Ha Phan from
the Party
The XI Plenum studied the opinions collected
on the draft reports and officially scheduled the
dates for the Congress.
The VIII National Party Congress met.
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Appendix VI: List of the New Cabinet Government
(Reshuffled 6 November 1996)
Prime Minister
Deputy Prime Ministers
Ministers /
Agriculture & Rural Development
Construction
Culture and Information
Defence
Education and Training
Finance
Foreign Affairs
Industry
Interior
Justice
Labour, War invalids and Social Welfare
Marine Products
Organisation and Personnel Committee
of the Government
Planning and Investment
Public Health
Science, Technology & Environment
Trade
Transport and Telecommunications
Without Portfolio
Chairs and Ministers of State Commissions and Other
Committee for Anti-Corruption and Smuggling
Committee for Child Care and Protection
Committee on Ethnic Minorities
and Mountain Regions
Committee on Population and Family Planning
Evaluation Commission for State Projects
Flood Protection and Mekong River Commission
Government Office
State Bank
State Inspectorate
Vo Van Kiet
Phan Van Khai
Tran Due Luong
Nguyen Khanh
Nguyen Cong Tan
Ngo Xuan Loc
Nguyen Khoa Diem
Doan Khue
Tran Hong Quan
Nguyen Sinh Hung
Nguyen Manh Cam
Dang Vu Chu
Le Minh Huong
Nguyen Dinh Loc
Tran Dinh Hoan
Ta Quang Ngoc
Do Quang Trung
Tran Xuan Gia
Do Nguyen Phuong
Pham Gia Khiem
Le Van Triet
Vacant
Ha Quang Du
Bodies
Vacant
Tran Thi Thanh Thanh
Hoang Due Nghi
Mai Ky
Vacant
Nguyen Canh Dinh
Lai Van Cu
Cao Si Kiem
Ta Huu Thanh

6Vietnam Since the VLli Party Congress: What Does It
Mean for Australian Business?
Susan Boyd
According to the international and Australian press reports
about business in Vietnam, you'd think that Vietnam is a
difficult business environment, but this is far from the truth. It is
difficult, but notwithstanding this, more than 100 Australian
companies have a presence on the ground in Vietnam, and there
are currently 51 investment projects, with a total value of $A 865
million (US$ 683.7).
Australia used to top the foreign investment table. In 1986, the
Communist Party of Vietnam changed its economic policy from
that of a centrally controlled soviet style system to what they call
Doi Moi, or renovation, and turned to a more open market style
economy. Telstra, (then OTC) was the first western investor to
come to Vietnam, providing international telecommunication
services which were an essential underpinning for an open
economy and also provided hard currency for Vietnam's
development needs.
Many other Australian companies followed, and the current
line up of the Australian business presence includes 31 of the
Business Review Weekly's (BRW) recent Top 1000 Australian
Companies list. It is also perhaps worth noting that of the BRW's
top 20 performers, those in Vietnam include seven of the
companies showing biggest net profits, eight of those with most
improved profits, six of those with most improved revenue, and
only three of the biggest loss makers. Now I am not suggesting
that the companies' activities in Vietnam are the main
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determinants of those rankings, but it gives you some idea of the
sort of companies who have come to Vietnam and are
painstakingly and carefully working their way through the
minefields and difficulties of an economy in transition. There
are, of course, also a few very successful smaller companies.
The main sectors where Australia is active in Vietnam are
telecommunications (Telstra and a number of others, including
small companies who have coat-tailed on their success);
petroleum and gas (BHP, Anzoil and a number of smaller
petroleum industry service companies); construction
(Transfield, Thiess-Leightons, John Holland, Baulderstone
Hornibrook); building materials (BHP Steel, Austnam, James
Hardie, Pioneer, two readimix concrete companies); business
services (ANZ and Commonwealth Banks; lawyers Deacons,
Graham and James, Phillips Fox, Freehills Hollingdale and
Page; accountants Bourne Griffiths, Pannel Kerr Forster and
Australian members of the bigfour accounting companies);
Media (Packer, AAP, Reuters, News Limited); transport
(Qantas, DHL, a Ho Chi Minh City bus and taxi company);
energy (Pacific Power, Prospect Electricity) and mining and
mining services (Normany Poseidon, CRA, North, Auridiam,
IC1 Explosives, Minproc); consulting engineers (SMEC, Coffeys,
Maunsells) and hotels (Accor Asia Pacific). In the education and
training sector, more than 50 Australian establishments—
Universities, TAFEs, schools and colleges—are active. We now
have our first Alumnus Minister, Minister Khiem of the
Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment—a graduate
of the University of Canberra, and three members of the Party
Central Committee are alumni.
We are now also seeing Australian companies establishing
manufacturing operations here and the beginnings of profitable
food exports into a market of 75 million with growing consumer
capacity and changing tastes. Notwithstanding this, it is
currently the case (until investments come on stream) that most
Australian companies are providing services for other expatriate
businesses, a pattern which can be expected to change as the
economy develops.
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Though we were once top of the investment table, we have now
slipped to tenth place, as the capital exporting economies of the
region continue to move their manufacturing operations
offshore. At or near the top of the table are Taiwan, Singapore,
Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, the British Virgin Islands, Malaysia,
USA and Thailand.
Of course, many Australian investments in Vietnam also
come in via Hong Kong, Singapore or the British Virgin Islands
and to an extent lose part of their Australian identity in the
process. The latest Australian investment, the Dairy
Corporation's new joint venture in Danang, has a Hong Kong
tag.
The environment for the foreign investor
The USA normalised relations with Vietnam in 1995 and
American companies have now started to move into Vietnam,
despite the absence of MFN status and export credit insurance.
(The early American companies into Vietnam beat the embargo
by coming in through their Australian subsidiaries—like IBM
and Kodak). The Europeans have also woken up to Vietnam
lately, and the French, building on their previous colonial
presence, are now ranked number eleven. The Canadians will
challenge us in the emerging mining sector.
I mentioned earlier that the business environment is difficult
—and it is. There is no proper underpinning of transparent,
predictable law and a rudimentary law enforcement
mechanism, though a system of laws is being drafted and
passing slowly through the National Assembly. Australia helped
draft the Construction and Mining laws ( the former yet to pass
through the National Assembly. A contract in Vietnam is a
reflection of the shared perception of mutual advantage at the
time of signing, not a predictor of future activity. If the balance of
advantage changes, then the Vietnam consider it logical for
arrangements to be adjusted.
Of necessity, Vietnam works by consensus, and every
stakeholder in a new venture needs to be consulted and brought
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on board. Power is widely dispersed, between central
government agencies, provincial agencies and local authorities,
so negotiation of any new arrangements is a slow and
painstaking process. The Fred Hollows foundation needed
authorisation from 23 different authorities before it could build
its intra-ocular lens factory—and has still not started
construction.
Manufacturing companies which have established
themselves in industrial zones in the provinces near Ho Chi
Minh City—in Dong Nai and Song Be, have had a much easier
time, and the industrial zone management acts as a one-stop
-shop for all necessary clearances. The Ministry of Planning
and Investment is well aware of this serious impediment to
business and is working towards a one-stop-shop for all
investment, but this is still some way off.
Corruption is a growing problem. It is very diffcult to manage
in the context of growing disparities in income between those in
the business sector and those in government service, whose
authority is necessary for business to proceed. For despite the
outward appearances of rapid growth in affluence, especially in
Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam is still a poor country,
with an official per capita income of $270. A public servant earns
about $40.00 a month. The top leadership has set its face firmly
against corruption and the National Assembly spent much of its
latest session debating how to combat it. The Assembly refused to
rubber stamp the new government nominees for ministerial
positions, endorsed by the party, and grilled them on how they
planned to beat corruption in their ministries. One failed to pass
muster.Corruption is increasing and confronts business with
practical difficulties.
Business and the Vlll Congress
Political changes occurred in 1996 also, which did not make life
easier for business. In the run-up to the VIII Party Congress, in
June, all decisions were on hold, including those relating to
business and investment. The Ministry of the Interior, whose
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over-riding concern was internal security and the absence of
any disruption to the congress by external agents, placed a
clamp-down on visa issues, which affected business and tourism
alike and hotels, restaurants and tour operators saw a sharp
downturn.
An anti 'social evils' campaign in the run-up to the congress
focused on drugs, prostitution, pornography and destructive
cultural manifestations, such as books, videos, karaoke and
unauthorised and exciting musical performances. It also took a
swipe at unauthorised advertising, and overnight, many foreign
language signs were obliterated, including proprietary names
like Kodak and Sony.
The Congress did not in fact make changes to the top
leadership, confirming the current incumbents, though with
warnings about the Prime Minister's performance, in
particular, and deferring change for the time being. There was
considerable renovation in the Central Committee, reducing the
average age, retiring the oldest, and now including the heads of
many of the State-Owned Corporations—Coal, Dairy, Steel and so
on.
In mid-November 1996 a number of Ministerial changes
were made, principally replacing older Ministers who had lost
their Central Committee membership. Of interest were the new
Ministers for Planning and Investment, the Interior, Science
Technology and Environment, Finance, Culture and
Information, The Office of Government and the Office
responsible for the public service. Some more key Ministerial
changes are expected next year, after the mid year National
Assembly elections. Among those expected to change are the
potentially important Minister of Trade. If, as is expected, the top
three leaders change at the same time, there will be other
consequent Ministerial changes.
All these changes and uncertainty are acting as a brake on
decision making.
There is another important tendency which has come out of
the party congress and which is affecting business. The
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Congress confirmed that the process of Doi Moi should continue,
but that Vietnam will continue to work towards 'a socialist
oriented market economy'. And they do not have the Australian
model in mind. The party is concerned that the economy should
develop with social equity—that the benefits of growth should
extend equally to the farmers and those in the remote areas, and
not just the rapidly emerging middle class in the main cities.
Similarly, it is determined that Vietnam will not import the
socially destructive aspects of a capitalist society, that traditional
Vietnamese culture and customs will not be undermined, that
modernisation of state-owned enterprises will not be at the
expense of the existing labour force, that state-owned enterprise
will continue to be the major form of economic activity, while
being modernised and partially 'equitised'. The private sector is
recognised, though the playing field is tilted heavily in favour of
the state-owned enterprises. Vietnam is impervious to the World
Bank's warning that, no other country to date has seen economic
growth and employment gains come from the state sector.
What the party congress has done is give the forces of control
a renewed mandate, and foreign businesses and others are
suffering increased harassment by agencies of the Ministry of
the Interior, including the economic police and the Taxation
Department. This is also providing increased opportunities for
extortion and corruption. Those now trying to negotiate new
joint-venture arrangements are finding that their Vietnamese
partners are more openly demanding a degree of control
incommensurate with the ratio of their contribution to the joint
venture.
There was a slow-down earlier in 1996 in the number of new
business licences issued, but Vietnam argues that quality is
more important than quantity, and those new businesses now
approved have been carefully assessed and are more likely to be
actually realised. Many of the earlier licences granted have
failed to turn into real businesses — many were unrealistic in
their scope and failed to meet their financing obligations. Many
early licences, including those from Australian companies,
have been withdrawn or lapsed.
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The successful players in this increasingly complicated
market are those where position derives from culturally
sensitive, relationship-oriented representatives on the ground. It
is only by forming good relationships with key Vietnamese
associates, and bringing flexibility and creativity to the game,
that foreign companies can survive and make profits which
match the long-term risk. Vietnam is not a short-term market,
and the major players are in there for the long haul, they need
deep pockets and patient money.
Having worked closely with a number of Australian
companies in Vietnam, I see that flexibility and relationship
orientation are key elements, and this is an area of challenge for
Australian companies. Companies have a tendency to put a
relationship person in to get the business and negotiate the
licence, and then pass the baton to the operating technicians. The
result is that when problems arise, as they always do, the
technicians see them only as technical problems, and try to apply
technical solutions, when, in most cases, the issue is a
relationship issue. The company representative on the ground
lacks the skills to identify it as such and adopt the appropriate
strategy.
I see another danger: on the whole, the smaller companies
have the management structures to provide the person on the
ground with the necessary flexibility to find the way around
problems. But they lack the capital backing to stay in for the long
haul, when things get tough. The larger companies have the
financial staying power, but their rigid management, financial
control and accounting structures do not provide the necessary
on-the-ground flexibility required for success. As Australian
companies review their management structures, this is an
element which needs to be addressed.
Outlook
We expect Vietnam to continue to grow and develop at about 9 per
cent per annum, despite intermittent checks, like the current
record US$3.3 billion balance of payments deficit—a jump of one
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billion in one year—which is causing some concern. There will
continue to be some unpredictability and inconsistency in
decision making as the government responds to the various
pressures—both domestic political pressures and those coming
from the foreign investment and aid community. We do not
expect any major or sudden change in the political system itself.
The annual World Bank Consultative Group meeting of all
the donor countries and agencies was held in Hanoi in late 1996.
The World Bank, ADB and bilateral donors, including
Australia, were expected to pledge some additional $US2 billion.
(Our current aid program is worth $A200 million over four
years). Vietnam has provided estimates of required domestic
revenue generation, domestic savings, FDI and ODA to meet its
development plans as set out in the new five year plan. Most
observers believe that these targets will be met only with careful
government macro and micro guidance and discipline, but that
they are for the most part realistic and attainable. Government
knows that it needs to continue to control inflation, manage the
level of borrowings, rationalise and stem the drain from
inefficient enterprises, use ODA wisely and encourage
continued foreign investment. It also need to move deliberately
on international trade reform.
There are few new Australian players coming in now — the
early movers are now established, and there have been a few
failures and withdrawals. We expect the next wave of companies
to be the miners and food and beverage industry as consumption
capacity grows, and vocational training and education services.
A good number of foreign companies have made their own
assessment of Vietnam and decided the risk is manageable and
they should be in Vietnam now, and grow with the market. If they
wait for better conditions, it may be too late. We in the Embassy
in Hanoi and in our Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and
Austrade are ready to help Australian companies, if making
their own assessment.
7The Vietnamese Economy in 1996—
Events and Trends—The Limits ofDoi Moi?
Adam Fforde
Introduction
This paper presents an overview and summary analysis of the
Vietnamese economy in 1996. It has three main sections. The
first—'Historical trends and the 1996 conjuncture', presents the
argument that Vietnam's shift to a market economy, and current
situation, do not reflect what would normally be understood as
process of reform, viewed as the proactive implementation in a
relatively coherent manner of considered policies. This section
also identifies processes of 'state rent-seeking' that are important
to understanding the current situation. The second—'Overview
of the economy in 1996—main trends', looks in detail at the
events of 1996. The final section—'Implications for various
Australian-Vietnam relations' draws some conclusions.
Historical trends and the 1996 conjuncture
Recentralisation and modes of state rent-seeking
The origins of Vietnamese reforms and their meaning are
subject to considerable debate in the academic literature.1 A
1 See Stefan de Vylder and Adam Fforde, From Plan to Market: the
Economic Transition in Vietnam (Boulder: Westview, 1996), pp. 246-53 for
a literature survey.
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common and rather orthodox position dates the shift to a market
economy to the epochal VI congress of 1986. The Congress
advocated Doi Moi as a basic slogan that would take the country
away from central-planning and towards a multi-sectoral
market economy of some form or other, but within a 'Socialist
Direction'. Others date reform earlier, often to the VI Plenum of
August 1979. The Plenum led, after a short period of
experimentation, to the partial reform measures of early 1981.
These included partial decollectivisation of cooperativised
agriculture with the '100 Contracts' system, and the "Three Plan'
system in SOEs that legalised their involvement in markets.2
Some Vietnamese scholarly work has traced reform debates back
to the early 1960s. Then the US military presence in the South was
still minimal, the Sino-Soviet split an emerging reality, and the
north Vietnamese economy suffering great tensions as a result
of the attempt at orthodox industrialisation under the slogan of
the 'priority development of heavy industry'.3
An alternative view is also common in some parts of
Vietnam, and also amongst some foreign academic researchers.
This is that the process of change in Vietnam should be viewed as
such—as a process. In that process an essential element is the
cognition (nhan thuc ra) of reality (cuoc song) by those in a
position to assist in the adoption and implementation of
measures. The hope is for measures and policies appropriate
(.thich hop) to that ever-changing reality. Thus, within that
community of inquiry, policy can and should be assessed in
terms of whether it does or does not meet that goal.4 Further, the
2 See for example, Le Duc Thuy's work, published in English.
3 Phan Van Tiem, Chang duong 10 nam cai cach gia 1981-1991 quoc
doanh [10 years of state price reforms] (Hanoi: NXB Thong Tin, 1990).
The overseas analysis of this period has tended to place great stress upon
the war that was to come, rather than the domestic political and economic
implications of the decisions of the late 1950s. For an early analysis, much
criticised for 'ignoring the war', see Adam Fforde and Suzanne H. Paine,
The Limits ofNational Liberation (London: Croom-Helm, 1987).
4 Whilst I owe my clearest understanding of this to the patient
explanations of Tran The Duong of the Institute of Labour Science, Hanoi,
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process should not be seen as, and almost never is, the
implementation of policy-derived blue-prints 'from above' upon a
passive reality. There is debate about the extent to which policy
shifts in response to political issues, to changes in cognition, or
interests; and also in attempting to analyse the reasons for the
frequent ineffectiveness of official policy, and the practical
difficulties in implementing it. Yet this overall paradigm seems
to be one to which many researchers seem to gravitate, whatever
the background they come from—Vietnam seems to 'be like
that'.5
Table 1: Vietnam—Modes of state rent-seeking
Mode 1 : 'Traditional Central-planning'—ca 1957 to 1962-63
(when state rice procurement prices fall below free
market levels)
Mode 2: The 'DRV model'—de facto acceptance of parallel
markets led to 'endogenisation' of the imported
institutions of neo-Stalinism. These modifications
reduced the power of central planners, making
output more sensitive to local interests.
I have gained much from discussions with countless other Vietnamese
scholars, including most outstandingly Professor Dao Xuan Sam. In the
Australian Vietnam Research Project (AVRP). I also owe much to
cooperation with Melanie Beresford and David Marr, as well as Professor
Tran Phuong, Dang Phong and others. Note that cuoc song is not at all the
same as a 'society' impacting upon 'the state', in other words the absolute
subject-object dichotomy that lies within state-civil society views is
lacking. This is hardly surprising in a country whose language draws
upon different (and crucially not neo-Platonic) epistemological resources.
5 This of itself argues that the underlying 'world view' inherent in a
country's experience, language and culture may dominate over the
'transcendent' notions of some modern social science, for example
economics. More practically, note the resource creation and utilization
processes needed to establish institutions suitable to a market economy.
Since these are the outcome of highly political processes, the country's
political culture at least will impact upon the process.
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Mode 3 : The 'Transitional Model'—plan and markets co
exist legally—dated from partial reforms of early
1981, ends with 1989 and termination of two-price
system' 1989—? 1992-93—period of confusion, no
clear mode of state rent-seeking
Mode 4 : "Vietnamese market economy'—commences with
recovery of state finances ca 1992-93
The break-out from the residual elements of central-
planning in the hybrid economy of the 1980s occurred in 1989,
when the state ceased supplying inputs through administrative
orders and at low costs. This isolated many capital
accumulation sites from important material support and
changed profoundly the sources of under-priced economic
resources available in the economy. Indeed, it can be said that yet
another mode of 'state rent-seeking' then made its appearance in
post 1954 modern Vietnam.6 Under the traditional socialist
system, mechanisms of administrative resource allocation had
relied upon the 'socialist transformation' of free markets and
commercial activities. Under neo-Stalinism, the state sought to
create substantial economic resources subject to its own control
and used to focus development efforts upon the state industrial
enterprises. These were the 'spear point' of 'heavy
industrialisation'.7 This followed the basic Stalinist model,
6 The notion of 'state rent-seeking' used here draws upon the work of
Mushtaq Khan. His ideas focus upon the ways in which the state becomes
a tool, through its capacity to influence and change the property-rights
regime, for the creation of appropriable economic resources. The links to
neo-Institutionalist and Marxian ideas are obvious. The crucial difference
from older neo-classical thinking (eg the work of Anne Krueger) is to see
rent-seeking as being the outcome of state activities, thus endogenising
institutions. The older view sees rent-seeking as the search for rents
created by institutions whose nature is not the main object of analysis.
Therefore, to study a region such as that ruled from Hanoi, where state
activities have had major effects upon institutions, the newer ideas are far
more valuable.
7 See Fforde and Paine, The Limits ofNational Liberation.
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appropriate in many ways to wartime conditions, but not (as the
successful struggle against the French may have shown) perhaps
necessary for war.
Arguably, this model was never successfully implemented in
north Vietnam. Whilst arguably it remained intact for a few
years during the very late 1950s and early 1960s, a second mode
of state rent-seeking replaced it (see Table l).8 In this second
mode, the centralised power of the traditional system was
lacking. Macroeconomic effects, most importantly the rise of
parallel systems of distribution competing with the plan, led to
important modifications of the basic Stalinist framework.
Politically, this reflected the compromises of the early 1960s,
during the First Five Year Plan. This period remains greatly
under-researched. However, it is noteworthy that the 1960
Constitution was developed at a time when central political
stability had been subject to the effects of Truong Chinh's loss of
the position of Party general secretary as a result of Land
Reform. He was replaced by Le Duan, supported by Le Duc Tho,
in a major peak political re-alignment. The 1960 Constitution
granted provincial and city level state authorities a status
equivalent to central government Ministries. This implied,
under conditions of one-Party rule, a need for continual
adjustments (ket hop) to secure any chance of coherent
implementation of government policy. This way of structuring
the state was very different from that in the Communist countries
of Eastern and Central Europe and the Soviet Union, but perhaps
similar to that in China.9
8 This is the main argument of Fforde and Paine, The Limits ofNational
Liberation . It remains unorthodox.
9 On China, see Gabriella Montinola, et al, 'Federalism, Chinese style: the
political basis for economic success in China', World Politics 48, no. 1
(October 1995); and, for Vietnam, Melanie Beresford and Bruce
McFarlane, 'Regional inequality and regionalism in Vietnam and China,' ,
Journal of Contemporary Asia 25, no. 1 (1995). By failing to see that the
essence ofthe issue is the inability to resolvejurisdictional conflicts that are
institutionalised, Montinola et al fail to distinguish between the federalism
of systems where such conflicts have been addressed with those where
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This second mode has been referred to elsewhere as the DRV
model.10 It saw state rent-seeking of a new type. Here, de facto
acceptance of parallel markets led to processes of endogenisation
of the realities of the imported institutions of neo-Stalinism.
These modifications reduced the power of central planners and
made output more sensitive to local rather than planners'
interests.
The partial reforms of early 1981 permitted SOEs to be
directly and legally involved in markets, and so the formal
property-rights regime was fundamentally altered. This
introduced a third mode of state rent-seeking, which has been
elsewhere called the 'transitional model'.11 State 'property'—
SOEs' fixed assets, inputs, labour with its welfare and other
subsidies—created resources both for accumulation according to
the plan and for commercial activities within SOEs and
elsewhere. Current inputs needed to operate state property (apart
from labour, mainly derived from aid and agricultural
procurement) were syphoned off to 'local' use; in the Vietnamese
phrase of the time, the outside foot is longer than the inside foot—
resources 'flow outside'. This was despite considerable attempts
by some within the party-state apparatus to use state power to stop
such behaviour. Policy debates reflected conflicts between such
'local' and 'central' interests. In any case, access to 'low-priced'
resources derived through the state was a crucial element of
much economic behaviour.
they have not, such as China and Vietnam. I would like to thank John
Gillespie for helping me work this out in conversation with him.
10 The notion of the 'DRV model' was introduced in Paine and Fforde
(1987), and further developed, along with that of the 'transitional model' in
Stefan de Vylder and Adam Fforde, Vietnam—An Economy in Transition
(Stockholm: SIDA, 1988) and the later work already cited.
11 De Vylder and Fforde, From Plan to Market (1996); see also Adam
Fforde, 'Macro-economic adjustment and structural change in a low-
income socialist developing country—an analytical model, Discussion
Paper 163, Dept. of Economics (London: Birkbeck College, 1984).
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The mid 1990s—emergence of a fourth mode ofstate rent-seeking
The prime cause of the shift to a one-price system in 1989 was
precisely the loss of Soviet aid, securing which had been perhaps
the greatest success of Vietnamese state rent-seeking. After 1989,
however, the Vietnamese economy was extremely odd—by
Vietnamese standards. The state had very little with which to
support politically-prioritised sectors: state rent-seeking was, for
the first time since the late 1950s, failing. This can be seen from
Table 2, which shows how, in 1990 when we have some data, for a
nominal GDP of perhaps US$ 7.5 billion the state influenced very
little. The Soviet aid program had peaked in the late 1980s at
around US$ 1 billion a year, but by 1990 support had collapsed to
near zero. As yet there was very little to replace it. This was to
change. By 1995 tax revenues had recovered to around 25 per cent
of GDP compared with 14 per cent in 1990. 12
The political economy of the period 1990-92 is of great interest
to these issues, in particular the relationship between state and
economy. Many SOEs were under great pressure. This partly
resulted from lost subsidies but was also due to the effects of the
1989 opening of the borders that had had such a major impact on
popular psychology by increasing market supply. It is
reasonably clear that the government was willing to threaten the
macroeconomic stability acquired in 1989 by using bank credit
1 2 The data to support these assertions requires further work. However,
the changing attitudes of planners are quite clear. One can compare, for
example, the tone and overall stance taken by foreign analyses. The World
Bank's Agricultural Marketing Study (June 1994) was based upon
fieldwork in 1993. It argued that Vietnamese markets for farm produce
were relatively free at the farmgate level. It was assumed that private
capital would, relatively quickly, enter into a normal set of processing and
marketing institutions linking farming families to final markets in a
coherent manner. It based this view upon a general sense that the key
issue for the Vietnamese government as far as SOEs were concerned was
the need to reduce their demands upon state resources. There were
considerable fears of inflation. Major privatizations were expected. Yet by
1997 none had occurred. Planners continued to follow the line that SOEs
were to reflect the 'guiding role' of the state sector.
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and tax breaks to support SOEs in trouble. This usually required
approval in Hanoi, which was typically granted if necessary.
This in itself is strong evidence that political processes at
national level were involved, implying that the polity was
restructuring rather than fragmenting.
Table 2 : Opportunities for state influence and intervention
1990 1995
US$ billion US$ billion
Real tax revenues 1.1 5.0
Foreign trade taxes 0.1 1.7
Bank credit outstanding 1.0 4.1
FDI disbursements 0.1 1.8
State investment 0.2 1.2
Source: Vietnam: Economic Commentary and Analysis, No. 8,
ADUK3 Pty Ltd November 1996.
By 1992 the climate was changing. SOEs had shown an
ability to survive and remained key elements of the party-state's
range of concerns. There had been no formal privatisations. The
events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union perhaps supported
a desire to move back from some of the basic elements of Doi Moi
as understood in the late 1980s. 13 These had involved a more-or-
less level playing-field' to permit fast expansion of the private
sector, and a rapid and coherent shift in the role of the state
towards a regulatory approach and away from direct
involvement in the economy. This would protect new entrants
from harassment and reduce transactions costs. Such an
13 This interpretation of the late 1980s is also contentious. Other analysts
argue that the party's commitment to the state sector remained
fundamentally unchanged from the early 1980s, see forthcoming work
within the AVRP by Melanie Beresford.
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'inclusive' approach to those whose economic activities had been
anathema to traditional Socialism implied the state apparatus
itself becoming increasingly subject to formal regulation and a
'Rule by Law'. However, granted the multi-level nature of the
state structure as laid down in the 1960 Constitution as well as the
1980 and 1992 versions, this implied major shifts in power
relations within the state and a real recentralisation of power.
Under the existing system, however, this flew in the face of
important entrenched ideas and interests. In a balancing of
powers between local province and cities on the one hand and
central government Ministries on the other, their leaders were
given equivalent rank.14 No clear method existed to sort out
jurisdictional conflicts between them. Appeals to the need to
harmonise state management by 'territory' (lanh tho) and
'branch' (nganh) were never unambiguously answered. This is
perhaps not surprising as few other states have ever tried such a
division of powers without clearly establishing areas of authority
for each organ.
As ever in Vietnam, the situation was never as black and
white as its essential character implied. For example, the
decisions taken by many provinces in the early 1990s to remove
district-level state budgeting pointed towards attempts to resolve
this issue locally. At a national level, this would have been
equivalent to abolishing provincial and city level budgets, which
was politically unthinkable given the power of the provincial and
city interests in such fora as the Party Central Committee. And
the trend was in fact reversed by the 1996 State Budget Law.15 The
Law not only left things basically unchanged, but reinforced the
district and the sub-district commune levels as budgetary units.
Underpinning all this refound confidence and energy was
the recovery of state resources (see Table 2). SOEs supported this,
14 This was marked by broadly equivalent status as members of the Party
Central Committee.
15 See Lenh so 47 L/CTN cong bo Luat Ngan sach Nha nuoc - Luat Ngan
sach Nha nuoc [Order of the Head of Government #47 announcing
budget laws], 3/4/96, in Cong Bao for 30/6/96.
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by becoming less of a burden on the budget, and indeed in some
instances starting again to be major sources of resources. This
permitted important macroeconomic changes. After 1989 SOEs
had enjoyed for a while a situation where interest charged on
loans to them were set below rates paid to depositors. The latter
were consistently positive in real terms. Then in 1992 the
authorities pushed through interest rate reforms that introduced a
positive margin between deposit rates and those charged to SOE
borrowers. This led to widespread complaints but was by then
politically possible.16
Around 1992-93, however, a fourth mode of state rent-seeking
emerged, the apparent success of which can be seen from Table 2.
The main beneficiaries of this process were intended to be SOEs,
since 1994-95 grouped into the new Groups (Tap Doan) and State
Corporations (Tong Cong Ty).17 The sources from which the state
drew these resources were now quite different from before. New
mechanisms, both political but also administrative, were needed
to monitor and guide them. These resources are quite typical for
a poor nation possessing rather well-developed social
institutions—the tax base (including the import tariffs gained
from again controlling borders), bank deposits, foreign direct
investment ... To these have been added ODA as 'Western'
donors developed assistance and lending programs. By 1995-96,
the Vietnamese economy was once again, and in terms of its
recent past quite normally, interacting with powerful processes
of state rent-seeking. What are these processes and what is their
likely impact?
16 See ADUKI Pty Ltd, Vietnam: Economic Commentary and Analysis,
No. 4.
17 See Quyet dinh so 91-TTg ve viec thi diem thanh lap tap doan kinh
doanh [Resolution of the Head of Government # 91 on the experimental
establishment of business groups], 07/03/94, Cong Bao for 15/04/94; and
Chi thi so 272 TTg ve khan truong hoan thanh viec to chuc, sap xep lai cac
Lien hiep Xi nghiep, Tong cong ty [Order of the Head of Government
#272 on the rapid completion of reorganization and restructuring of
Enterprise Unions and General Corporations)] 3/5/95, Cong Bao for
15/8/95.
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To answer this question we need to look at current
developments in the Vietnamese economy. The state sector's
'guiding role' was a slogan of the 1991 VII as well as the June 1996
VIII Party Congresses. In combination with the entrenched
ineffectiveness of the state in many areas (which is not at all the
same as denying the strength of the regime in terms of its ability
to maintain social stability, and its own position), this is now
tending to reduce economic growth as unreformed institutions
increasingly drag upon the economy. 'Transactions costs' are
rising and resource losses mounting.
Transactions costs—sludge in the arteries
Transactions costs, viewed in terms of the resources required to
establish and then implement the relationships needed to do
business, are clearly high in Vietnam. Far from falling, they
have been tending to rise. This represents a real resource loss.
To it can be added the considerable costs of the inefficiencies in
important state activities—infrastructural planning, urban
planning, allocation of state resources (ie state bank credits) to
inefficient commercial activities. Also to be mentioned is the
drag from protecting industries that should be subject to
international competition (now matter how much they may not
like it). Clear examples are cement and paper, where domestic
prices are already well above world market levels.
The fact of increasing transactions costs in the mid 1990s is
clear. Yet for many Vietnamese these high costs are somewhat
invisible. The absence of the cheap governance activities
available in other countries is not something immediately
obvious to those who merely experience the frustrations
involved—for example, when trying to legalise their house
ownership situation.
Many impediments to commercial activities continue to
reduce the attractiveness of investment in business rather than
safer areas such as education, real estate or simple bank
deposits. This is especially true for the medium and small-scale
businesses that have proven so effective at absorbing labour in
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Vietnam's highly 'labour-surplus' economy. The main issues
here are:
• The high costs in terms of time and bribes involved in
both setting up and then running a small business.
Kafka-esque stories abound about the large number of
decisions and 'opinions' (for example officials' views of
the personal character of company directors) needed
before companies are established. Downright
harassment is the fate of companies and private
businesses (and SOEs) who run foul of the interests of
those who can, for example, initiate audits of labour
conditions.
• The relatively high amounts of funds needed to meet a
business' 'legal capital' requirements.
• The current universal need for business permits. This
could conceivably (but at present this is unlikely) be
replaced by simple business registration. At present the
business permit itself has to be augmented, after
registration, by a technical permit issued by the local
provincial or city authority and the line Ministry.
Regulations also require other permits, for example for
land use. This imposes high transactions costs, which
reduces competitiveness.
The fundamental reasons for the ineffectiveness of the state
are much debated. For example, in the program of Public
Administrative Reform, it is often argued that the basic issue is
the need to redesign an administrative system that was
originally set up to meet the requirements of the traditional
socialist central-planning system. It therefore finds it novel to
have to cope, for example, with the question of how to regulate
private businesses. Other arguments, however, point to the ways
in which the rush of legislation and government directives since
around 1992-93 have themselves created problems. Often, it
appears that the desire is simply to control and 'manage in order
to manage' (quart ly de quan ly) rather than to rely upon indirect
methods and a philosophy of creating a 'supportive
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environment'. This again, however, is in some ways hard to
explain—does it stem from a misunderstanding of the role of the
state in a market economy? Or perhaps from simple weaknesses
in the development of effective and efficient law? Or from the
desire of particular interests in Ministries and elsewhere to
maintain their influence and scope of activities? In any case,
whilst the origins are still debated (especially to what extent they
are or are not the result of the one-party system)18 it is clear that
they remain an issue in 1997, over one decade after the 1986 VI
Congress. So it is rather hard to blame them entirely upon the old
traditional socialist system. Their origins are more complex,
and so they are more difficult to address.
Other structural and policy-related issues coming to the fore
in the mid 1990s are also tending to reduce growth. The two most
important are:
first, the effects of the concentration of state resources upon
SOEs, under conditions where they are unlikely to be able to
use them profitably;
second, the drag upon rural incomes growth of the lack of
good markets and the continual downward pressure upon
farmgate prices from various structures above farmers.
These include private traders, linked to state export
companies and supported by local political structures in
imposing entry barriers; and an emerging pattern of
attempted state control through a combination of state-
18 Other countries have been able to address these issues without
abandoning a one-party political system. Examples could be - Taiwan and
South Korea. It would be interesting to know about how the KMT
—reportedly a Leninist party—dealt with the relationship between party
and state functions in the choice of administrative personnel. This would
suggest that there is something particular to the experiences of China and
Vietnam that distinguishes them from these others. One might hypothesise
that this perhaps might be found in the political situation, and the evidence
for high level political conflicts, in the early 1960s, when the centre-
periphery (trung uong- dia phuong) relationship was institutionalised in
forms that remain in Vietnam and China to this day.
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sponsored investments in commercial processing activities
with state extension, credit and other 'rural development'
activities.
The view taken here of the overall stance of development
policy is one that diverges strongly from those agreed in the mid
1990s between the Government of Vietnam and the Bretton Woods
institutions—the World Bank and IMF. SOE reform is perhaps
the area where the Vietnamese government's commitments
depart most strikingly from the political position expressed at the
1996 VIII Congress. To quote one agreement—'the Government's
plan for state enterprises is to retain ownership of a group of
firms which provide important public services— largely public
utilities—and to divest other enterprises'. Yet there is no sound
evidence that this is in fact the policy of the Vietnamese
Communist Party, and indeed by early 1997 there was no
evidence that any program of divestment was in place. The
program of corporatisation (co phan hoa) did involve bringing in
outside capital, but its pace and content were a long way from
what a true program of privatisation would have done to change
the political rules of the game.
The establishment since around 1995 of State Groups (Tap
Doan) and Corporations (Tong Cong ty) as mechanisms for
capturing economies of scale and market power confirms a state-
focussed development strategy with powerful supporters.19 Efforts
to bring new capital into SOEs by their equitisation will not be
allowed to remove them from the party and state 'sphere of
influence and control'.20 The agreement also states that
19 It is worth noting that the garments sector—light industry well suited
to privatization— was included. See Nghi dinh so 55 CP phe chuan Dieu le
To chuc va hoat dong cua Tong cong ty Det May Viet Nam - Dieu le ve To
chuc va hoat dong cua Tong cong ty Det May Viet Nam [Resolution of the
Government #55 approving regulations for the establishment and
operations of the Vietnam Clothing Corporation], 6/9/95.
20 See, in the latest policy measure, Nghi dinh so 28 CP ve chuyen mot so
doanh nghiep nha nuoc thanh cong ty co phan [Resolution of the
Government #28 transferring a number of government businesses to
private share companies], 7/5/96, Cong Bao for 15/8/96. Here it is worth
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'companies fully or partially owned by the Government will
raise their own investment funds without government support or
guarantees'.21 This implies in turn that state control over bank
credit will remain important, and that the IMF will continue to
face great difficulties in its attempts to acquire adequate and
accurate information about the relationships between the state
banks and their SOE clients.
There are other areas where official agreements run counter
to official Vietnamese policy as laid down in the VTII Party
Congress, but the above provides sufficient evidence to expect
major tensions in the relationship between the Vietnamese
authorities and the IMF and World Bank to continue. Major
areas of dispute are likely to be:
• Access to information about crucial issues related to the
allocation of state resources—budgetary spending, state
bank credit and access to foreign markets. It is clear that
the political economy of the current situation relies upon
the continued use of discretionary powers in these areas.
• Failure on the part of the Vietnamese to move towards the
divestiture of SOEs.
pointing out that the common translation of the Vietnamese term co phan
hoa as privatization is simply incorrect. It is better to understand this as a
process of the diversification of the ownership status of the businesses
involved; the word privatization (tu nhan hoa) is almost never used.
21 Contrast this with the ways in which the expansion of the Sugar
Processing sector was to be financed as part of the '1 million tonnes by
2000' plan announced in 1995. Here almost all investment funds were to
come from bank credit or FDI. The 'Sugar Plan' was reported in TBKTVN
21/5/95, through an interview with Minister Nguyen Cong Tan. See Thoi
bao Kinh te Viet nam (8/2/96) for an early analysis arguing that over
capacity was coming and sugar quality would indeed hamper competition
with imports, or indeed to export. In essence, the Ministry's not
unreasonable plan appears to have run foul of the combination of
significant FDI with provincial autonomy in investment decisions,
perhaps in the run-up to the VIII Congress.
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• Continued harassment of the private sector and the
related increases in transactions costs.
• Pressures upon foreign investors in order to re-establish
Vietnamese control over JVs.
Were we too long-sighted"?—investor assumptions of the early
1990s proven questionable
State rent-seeking has not benefited all equally. Also, its re-
emergence and direction has run counter to some predictions.
1996 and 1997 saw FDI slow. In many areas there appears to have
been a reconsideration of basic assumptions made when
companies developed their strategies in the early 1990s. At root,
the observation that decisions were perhaps 'too long-sighted',
can be understood as the realisation that the government of
Vietnam, whilst well capable of maintaining social order and
stability, lacks the power to implement many of the measures
required to reduce transactions costs.
From an analytical and academic point of departure, the
origins of this can be found in a problem common facing much of
the overseas literature on Vietnam. This follows the typical
'policy-focus' of much social science, with its tendency to assume
that policy is the main source of social and economic change. In
Vietnam, this is not only not the case, but there is (as outlined
above) a strong philosophical current arguing that it is a mistake
to believe that it ever could be so. The influence of these academic
issues upon business decisions remains to be researched. Yet
many seem to have believed that the situation in the very early
1990s reflected the outcome of a coherent implementation of
reformist policies, rather than interactions between various
factors as outlined above. Perhaps reform everywhere is like
this. Yet it is often phrased by commentators in terms of the
authority of government and its political will, whether or not this
is ever the determining factor in such affairs. Arguably, though,
for many investors whether party and state priorities would move
in favour of the state sector or not was not so important as the
assumption that transactions costs would decline. This assumed
The Vietnamese Economy in 1996 161
that the Vietnamese would learn rapidly the 'rules of the game' in
relation to commerce. After all, almost all inward FDI has
involved joint ventures with SOEs ... It is these assumptions that
are now being re-examined.
Overview ofthe economy in 1996—main trends
Introduction
The political circumstances of 1996 lead to the following broad
implications for economic performance of the political events
before and after the VIII Congress.
• Policy and policy-formation has become more
'exclusive'. They focus upon political groups and
constituencies that provide immediate political support.
In practice, this means party-linked businesses and
SOEs rather than the emerging private sector.
• The processes of political recentralisation are designed
to strengthen party influence over the economy and
society. They have not, however, led to a concentration of
power and authority. 'State power' is being eroded and
prospects for a 'State ruled by Law' are receding. The
main reasons for this are the internal divisions within
the party.
• As key economic actors feel excluded and face rising
risks and costs, investment is being cut back.
Transactions costs are rising. As the considerable scope
for easy efficiency gains left over as a hangover from the
old economic system has been largely used up, economic
growth is suffering. The alliance between state
businesses and FDI, and the political attention paid to
creating a favourable environment for foreign investors,
accompanies transactions costs for foreign interests that
are lower than those experienced by Vietnamese
business. Helped by the Foreign Investment Code, they
operate within a more predictable and 'legal'
environment and enjoy important tax and other benefits.
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Yet as all businesses must operate within Vietnam's
markets, SOEs are also facing problems, and exposed to
greater levels of economic competition than they had
expected or been promised. However, the economic power
unleashed by the structures of inward investment
linking Vietnamese factors of production to global
markets can be seen reflected in the explosive growth of
light industrial manufactures.
The historical meaning of the late 1990s— the limits ofDoi Moi ?
Fundamental to any assessment of the issues confronting
Vietnam's policy-makers in the late 1990s is the gathering sense
that the economic model that emerged around 1992-93, with its
focus upon use of state power and resources to support the state
sector's 'leading role', is proving to be highly problematic.22
Vietnamese economic growth is now slowing as the economy
starts to run up against rising transactions costs resulting from
the increasing drag of unreformed institutions.23
22 There is an important and valuable debate to be held about the extent to
which the policy stance of the late 1980s marked any fundamental
deviation from the dominant pro-state position advocated from the very
earliest days of Vietnamese socialism. Some work within the AVRP
suggests that no such deviation occurred. This remains somewhat
contentious.
23 Of the multinational donors, the UNDP appears to have been the first
to go public with its concerns. Its presentation to the late 1996 Donor
Consultative Group meeting, prepared by David Dapice, was noticeably
strong in its warning messages; the paper by Kokko and Zizhang in April
1996 should also be mentioned. ADUKI's Vietnam: Economic
Commentary and Analysis revised its position in late 1995. By early 1997
the ADB was flagging concerns about 'the sustainability of high growth—
(being)—dependent on the continuation of a positive international
investment climate and strong donor support', reported in the Financial
Times 18 April 1997. An important foreign investor, Peregrine, produced a
highly critical report in early 1996; Matthew Chapman, Viet Nam:
transition under threat (March 1996). However, over the winter of 1996-
97 both the World Bank and the IMF turned in rather optimistic reports,
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Paradoxically, this is offset to some degree by the high levels
of savings and investment, and the growth of manufactures
exports. Yet the signs of gathering distributional tensions are
there, including inflationary pressures, a rising balance of
payments deficit, a move out of direct state financing of
education and health and a softening of the budget constraint
facing SOEs. An important outcome is also the widening
regional and sectoral differences, and growing resentment from
the private sector that is creating nearly all of the new
employment.24 Whilst Ho Chi Minh City is expected to show total
GDP growth ofnear 15 per cent in 1996, this far outstrips the rest of
the country. After subtracting population increase, per capita
GDP growth in the rest of the country is unlikely to be much over 5
per cent.25
What role has Doi Moi played in these trends? Doi Moi, as a
shorthand for the political and economic changes embraced by
the Vietnamese Communist Party in the mid 1980s, has been
mainly understood in economic terms. Yet such a major event as
the move away from neo-Stalinist central-planing must be more
than merely economic in its nature. The arguments advanced
here imply that wider issues determining the direction of
institutional change in Vietnam are more important.
Understanding these is the most effective way to grasping a wide
range of social and economic issues. As outlined above, this
approach leads to a less optimistic short-term view. In the long-
term, as in the past, Vietnam will find its own way to exploit its
considerable human and natural resources. What is becoming
far clearer, however, are the constraints, mainly political but
including, importantly, the Bank's 'Implementation Completion Report' on
Vietnam's performance in managing a Structural Adjustment Loan.
24 See Hy Van Luong, Adam Fforde and Raymond Gautier, 'Regional
Development In Vietnam: Local Dynamics, Market Forces and State
Policies', Eastern Asia Policy Papers No. 13 (University of Toronto, York
University: Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1996).
25 There are also reasons for doubting whether official growth data is
entirely reliable , see below.
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also social, to putting in place the changes required. These
constraints arise out of the tensions between a viable national
'vision' of what future development should entail, and the social,
political and economic institutions that would enable the country
to realise that vision.
Across a wide range of issues, the processes initiated a decade
ago by the VI Party Congress of 1986—Doi Moi—appear fast
reaching their limits. Doi Moi, as a political and social project,
possessed considerable vision and, in terms of its ideas,
dynamism. The notion that the traditional socialist development
model could be dismantled and replaced by an economy based
upon markets and open to the world economy and 'global
capitalism' was one that required profound, if not heroic,
changes in beliefs. The reform of the state, and its relations with
the population which was part of the Doi Moi project, ran into
problems in the early 1990s, as political trends saw links between
commerce and the state reinforced. Crucial to this was the
decision around 1991-92 to continue state funding of the mass
organisations. These, the Trade Unions, Farmers' Union et al,
are the mechanisms that express Leninist ideas of the
integration of all formal and acceptable political activity into
party-controlled organisations. At local level, in the late 1990s
they remained a crucial backbone of party political activity, the
key channels through which aspirants could rise. Yet, under
conditions of market economy, the situation is one where, as
argued by leading Vietnamese in the run-up to the VIII Congress,
there is a profound and penetrating erosion of state power in
certain areas, although not to any weakening of the regime per
se.26
The Vietnamese economy is growing at least 7-9 per cent
annually in terms of total GDP and with luck and reasonable
economic policies can be expected to continue to do so. Yet the
problem of 'falling behind' (tut hau) has been identified as one of
26 See the discussion in the chapter by Thaveeporn Vasavakul in this
volume of the position taken prior to the Congress by Prime Minister Vo
Van Kiel
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the 'four dangers' facing the country. How can Vietnam 'catch
up' with its neighbours? The pattern in the region is that this
happens when growth amongst the leaders slows. In the early
stages, and so long as they do not slip along the way, latecomers
like Vietnam typically grow at around 7-9 per cent. There is thus
not so much that Vietnam can do to catch up, except for increasing
its trend rate of growth to levels near the Chinese rate, in other
words well into double figures. This would, under Vietnamese
conditions of rather low domestic savings (see Mallon's paper in
this volume) require more coherent and effective state action to
improve the institutional environment and reduce the drag from
transactions costs and macroeconomic issues such as trade and
other protection for the wrong sectors.
More effective state action naturally has political
prerequisites as well as implications. A basic dilemma here is
the political logic of the 'exclusive' policy stance, and its focus
upon the state sector. However, a crucial element of the exercise
of state power must be a concentration of political authority. This
would permit effective implementation of the programme of
reform that Doi Moi has begun. Yet would it be accepted by such
important political forces as the provinces and cities, not to
mention those fearing that it would simply lead to yet further
support for the economically inefficient? Such a project would
entail reform of banks, SOEs, public investment, rural
development and so forth. This would be different from the
original Doi Moi project, which was defined with reference to the
old traditional socialist system, with its central-planning,
material balances and agricultural producer cooperatives. One
way of putting it is that the 'limits of Doi Moi' have been
reached—the easy part is over. Another is that the logic of
political development has led to the current situation, and without
some new element to the equation, why should things change?
The year 1996 saw in heightened clarity the effects of these
issues. This was in combination with various conjunctural
factors:
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First, the continuing effect of the political re-centralisation.
This was leading to increased transaction costs and rising
levels of corruption and waste;
Second, the gathering pace of the first cyclical slowdown in
the Vietnamese market economy since its emergence in
1989-90; across the economy goods were increasingly hard to
sell as many markets become 'blocked' (be tac);
Third, the increasingly rapid emergence of Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) as a source of employment, demand for
imports and, most strikingly, the beginnings of extremely
rapid light manufactured export growth. The presence of
FDI-supported factories and the increasing support given to
import substitution by new producers was putting great
pressure upon domestic business;
Fourth, the issue of support for the state sector. With the state
now controlling significant levels of economic resources (a
major change from the early 1990s), policy stress upon SOEs
and their 'guiding role' in the national economy had major
implications for state policy. This raised the issue of how the
recipients of state support were to be chosen, and how the
authorities could reduce the risk that they will prove to be
unprofitable.
One interpretation of the slowdown is that it reveals the
gathering dualism of the Vietnamese economy. Exports based
upon FDI are booming, and FDI based businesses rapidly
gaining market share at the expense of domestic businesses.
Meanwhile, the valuable Vietnamese resources poured into SOEs
as state rent-seeking recovered are increasingly seen to have
been unwisely spent. Decisions were mainly based upon political
criteria and the bureaucrats of the line Ministries and planning
departments rather than more commercially oriented cadres in
the state banks. The rising levels of bankruptcies in 1996-97
reflects the lack of good commercially-based investment
processes—in other words, capital markets to bear risk in place
of the government who must deal with the consequences of its
participation in the decisions.
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The Vietnamese economy in 1996
The single most important fact about the Vietnamese economy in
1996 was its low income levels and consequent small size. This
reflects the widespread poverty (see Table 2).27 Vietnam, with a
population of around 75 million, remains a country made up
primarily of poor farmers. These people nevertheless enjoy
cultural and educational levels that are far above those in many
other countries at similar per capita income levels. It may well
be said that Vietnam is more poor than underdeveloped ....
Although there are considerable doubts about the reliability of the
official data, GDP in 1995—the latest year for which we have
complete data—was near US$ 20 billion (around $270 per capita).
Exports of goods and services were near US$ 7 bn, amounting to a
high proportion—35 per cent—of total demand in the economy.28
Since around 60 per cent of the country's exports originate in Ho
Chi Minh City (population around 5 mn), this immediately shows
27 For recent studies on poverty in Vietnam, see Poverty alleviation in
Viet Nam: strategies for accelerating progress, United Nations
Development Programme (Hanoi: UN Children's Fund & UN Population
Fund, July 1995); ADUKI, Poverty in Vietnam (Hanoi: SIDA, 1995); and
Vietnam: Poverty Assessment and Strategy (The World Bank, Country
Operations Division, 1995).
28 Ofitself, this hints at major problems in measuring Vietnamese GDP in
conventional terms. Purchasing Power Parity data is another matter. It is
likely that absolute levels are being underestimated, in part due to
problems in reaching elements of investment and private consumption.
We also believe, however, that GDP growth in 1995-97 has been over-
reported. Reasons for this include: suspicions based upon the desire to
produce a good image, especially in the run-up to the Congress; a belief
that farmgate price data has been increasingly overestimated, thus
leading to over-estimates of farm real incomes growth; deep concerns
about the ways in which the large revisions to aggregate investment were
carried out — not least as total GDP was not changed; and finally a
tendency to place rather more reliance upon the data from the retail sales
and private disposable incomes growth sectors, which showed from late
1995 strong signs of reduced real private consumption. See ADUKI Pty
Ltd, Vietnam: Economic Commentary and Analysis, No.s 7 to 9.
168 Fforde
the way in which the very rapid growth in exports has led to a
highly concentrated impact. Ho Chi Minh City grows far more
rapidly than the rest of the country.
In 1995, of the US$ 20 billion GDP, some 30 per cent (US$ 6
billion) was invested. Of this, around one third went into
increasing stocks (US$ 2 billion) and the rest into fixed capital
(US$ 4 billion).29 It should be born in mind that US$ 4 billion is a
rather small number in terms of international capital flows.
Inward foreign direct investment actually spent is thought to
have been around US$ 1.8 billion in 1995—estimates vary—but
was therefore close to one third of total investment in the country.
It is not surprising, therefore, that its impact is starting to gather
great strength.
Much stress is placed upon state businesses. They have been
the site of the majority ofjoint ventures with FDI. Yet both SOEs
and the state sector as a whole possess rather little market power
by comparison with the competition, backed as it is by regional
and global businesses. It is only in terms of its position within
the Vietnamese economy, where it produces around 40 per cent of
GDP, that things look rather different. Yet 1996 has been showing
how hard it is to insulate the domestic economy from outside
forces.
The parameters of the Vietnamese state sector were shown up
by a detailed survey in 1995. This was very revealing. Many
SOEs belonging to Party and Mass Organisations were covered,
with only a very small minority not reporting. Total gross assets
were put at VN dong 70,000 billion (around US$ 7 billion). Of
these, some US$ 5 billion belonged to central SOEs, with the rest
belonging to locally managed units. Reported debts amounted to
around 12 per cent of gross assets. These figures excluded real
29 The very high level of reported investment in stocks points to the
possibility of large multiplier effects when and if a hardening of budget
constraints forces, as in 1989, sharp changes in desired asset holdings by
SOEs. A shift from $2 billion of stocks building to a $2 billion stock
rundown amounts to a fall in aggregate demand of US$ 4 billion, or
around 15 per cent ofGDP.
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estate, which formally belonged to the state. Large debtors
included—the southern Staples Corporation (US$ 14 million), the
Silk Corporation (US$ 25 million) and (the biggest reported) the
Nam Dinh Textile Union (at the time US$ 50 million) with
dozens of others owing (at the time of the census) tens of millions
of US$s. In aggregate terms, however, the SOE sector in 1995 was
generating a gross return on assets of some 19 per cent in 1995,
compared with 21 per cent on Treasury Bills.
Most Joint Ventures see the Vietnamese side contribute
mainly land and 'connections'. At a more aggregate level,
however, domestic savings are needed to complement the large
inflows of FDI. These would finance complementary inputs
ranging from infrastructure and education through to vertical
linkages. As in other market economies, they derive from a
combination of the retained earnings of various Vietnamese
businesses with the savings of private households. But the
banking system has been used as a conduit for credits to
implement the state credit plan. This has meant that deposit rates
have been kept down, discouraging intermediation. Also, the
policy of low lending rates has inhibited banks developing new
clients as they have been prevented from charging enough to
offset the risks involved.
The overall result has been to hit the banks' natural role—in
the absence of a stock market—as the main formal intermediary
between savings and investment. Instead, savers have tended to
use informal channels. Little is known about the magnitudes of
those flows that do not—the majority—go through the formal
financial system. However, the information from the banking
system suggests that increases in bank deposits have been
running at around 15-20 per cent of total domestic savings, at
around US 0.7 billion (see Graph). These are rather small
numbers compared with, for example, the reported figure of US$ 2
billion for stock-building in 1995.
Now, the US$ 7 billion of reported SOE gross assets excludes
land, but almost certainly underestimates the real value of SOE
liabilities. The reported numbers tend to rise as businesses get
closer to bankruptcy. For example, by late November 1996 the
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debts of the Nam Dinh Textile Combine, whose Manager had
been arrested, had been put at over 1,000 billion dong—or over
US$ 100 mn. Whilst the proportion of these that may be
recoverable is not clear, it is unlikely, going on news reports,
that it will be high.30 This suggests that the ability of the state
banking system to deal with the resource losses implied by the
bankruptcy of SOEs is extremely limited. The small size of the
Vietnamese economy permits very little scope for cushioning
prioritised sectors in the face of foreign competition. Under the
economic conditions of the very late twentieth century, once the
economy is opened up, and especially if the state has weakened
itself by attempting to support a structurally weak sector—SOEs—
successful state rent-seeking confers very little economic power.
Is this a good or bad thing?
Macroeconomy
In 1996 the Vietnamese market economy was experiencing the
first macroeconomic slowdown since its emergence in 1989. Is
this cyclical in nature, or does it reflect the various processes
associated with the integration of the Vietnamese and global
economies—the onset of rapid FDI-associated light
manufactures exports and competition from imports? An
additional factor is the slowdown in real private consumption
growth that started in late 1995. 31 However, whatever the origins,
we may see a 'hard landing' in 1997-98. The massive stock
buildups point in this direction, as does a macroeconomic policy
30 The saga has been extensively covered in the Vietnamese press, most
notably Thoi Bao Kinh Te Viet Nam [The Vietnam Economic Times]. The
business employed around 20,000 people; the General Manager has been
charged with corrupt activities. A business with less than 2 per cent of
national SOE employment could therefore lose a sum equivalent to around
15 per cent (l/7th) of the total increase in bank deposits annually. And
there are many other examples like it.
31 See ADUKI Pty Ltd, Vietnam: Economic Commentary and Analysis,
No.s 7 and 8.
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caught on the wrong foot and sought to prevent overheating
through tight credit.32
Answering the question as to whether the economic problems
of 1995-97 are cyclical or not (or both) relates to the manner in
which the Vietnamese macroeconomy is understood. Clearly,
some official analysts failed to heed the warning signs coming
from shifting demand patterns and the labour market in mid
1995. Towards the end of 1995, the monetary authorities and the
IMF were concerned, not about cyclical slowdown, but
overheating. This was related to the acceleration in price rises
through 1995, as well as reports of continued GDP growth near 10
per cent and the ongoing weakness of indirect mechanisms of
monetary control. However, by the middle of 1995 it was already
clear, based upon an analysis of the changing pattern of demand
and the labour market, that the economy was starting to slow.33
Twelve months later sharp increases in stocks were pointing to a
likely 'hard landing', worsened by the maintenance of close
limits on bank lending as part of the Adjustment Program.
However, such mistakes are not surprising given the
weaknesses in understanding of the Vietnamese macro-
economy, and especially its micro foundations.34 Rates of output
32 Tight credit was in part imposed by requiring state banks to keep high
levels of deposits at the central bank. Suspicious commentators may ask
whether these funds were not then used for direct support to SOEs in
various ways.
33 See ADUKI Pty Ltd, Vietnam: Economic Commentary and Analysis,
No. 7.
34 Here a key issue is the nature of the formal capital market. Should the
banking system be seen as part of a capital market where supply and
demand for credit are matched through changes in interest rates, or as
part of a quasi-administrative system where ceilings on interest rates keep
them well below free market levels and create an economic rent whose
beneficiaries are chosen through political and bureaucratic processes? A
PhD thesis from Stockholm discusses these issues from a neo-
Institutionalist perspective (Lisa Roman, 'Institutions In Transition—A
Study of Vietnamese Banking'. PhD Thesis, Stockholm School of
Economics, 1995).
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increase in 1995 (especially in the state sector) were probably
over-reported: official statements of 9-10 per cent GDP growth
can be compared with unofficial estimates near 6-7 per cent.
The slowdown is almost certainly moving towards a 'hard
landing'. As businesses become increasingly aware that prices
cuts alone will be insufficient, they will cut back output to clear
unsold stocks. The political consequences of this will be made
more significant by various factors:
• foreign products are increasingly out-competing
Vietnamese products in terms of price, quality and
marketing;
• there is a lack of coherent and implementable policies to
support those domestic businesses that are viable in the
long-term rather than simply throwing money at those
SOEs (and various private companies who 'sit in the
shade') who should have been buried long ago;
• the downturn coincides with the strong medium term
trends of the explosion of FDI-financed business activity
and the increasing levels of resources available for
government to intervene in the economy.
There is, of course, a finite possibility of macroeconomic
collapse: a loss of confidence in the Vietnamese government's
ability to maintain itself and its core institutions intact, for
example manifest in runs on the banks. With fears of inflation
still strong, it is not impossible to envisage a scenario where the
state would be forced to sell-off SOEs in order to raise funds. One
option would be that of securing IMF loans conditional on
extensive and real privatisations. Another would be a range of
local solutions, possibly involving links to regional investors.
FDI
Foreign Direct Investment is about to become a major player in
the domestic economy. Vietnamese businesses are increasingly
feeling the pressure of competition from them as the output and
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exports of foreign-invested firms race ahead. Ho Chi Minh
City's foreign-invested firms are now officially showing a year-
on-year growth of around 50 per cent. At these rates of growth
economic structure changes very fast indeed. For example,
simple extrapolation implies that perhaps 50 per cent of exports
could come from this sector by the beginning of 1999. Some are
asking whether the economic forces unleashed by the market
economy are increasingly out of control.
Chinese experience suggests that the impact of FDI in terms of
commercial activity—export growth, employment creation and
cash flow—is not felt until some five years after the gates are
opened. This is what appears to have happened in Vietnam,
where non-petroleum FDI dates from around 1990/91. Through
1996-97 we can thus expect the Vietnamese to start feeling the
impact of the very high levels of investment that are being made,
almost entirely (in terms of officially sanctioned flows) with
SOEs. Some 1/3 of total investment is now overseas financed.
Almost all involved major foreign intervention in
management, marketing and other investment decisions. This
means that a very high proportion of Vietnamese state businesses
are increasingly dependent upon foreign investors, not only for
investments but also for access to markets, technology and
management.
A further complication is the way in which through 1996
certain Vietnamese businesses and joint ventures were been
getting around Dong bank credit limits by borrowing from
overseas sources, such as through the delayed payment of Letters
of Credit. Whether these loans are premised upon the lenders'
idea that the state will wish and be able to protect the sectors
within which their borrowers are operating is another matter.
Vietnam is still far from being a normal East Asian Tiger in
terms of state-business relations, and some assumptions may be
about to be proved false. In early 1997 international press reports
started to refer to non-payment of trade credits by Vietnamese
banks, and were interpreted as signs of an impending banking
crisis.
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State intervention
The Vietnamese government now controls measures that give it
significant options to intervene in the economy and realise the
'state sector priority' policy. This was strongly restated at the 1996
Congress. Implementation poses a multitude of problems.
Resources have certainly increased substantially, but their value
is proving to be rather low. For example, budgetary revenues
from foreign trade taxes, around US$ 100 million in the early
1990s, were in 1996 near US$ 2 billion. This shows that the
economy has shifted 180 degrees in the past few years. In the very
early 1990s it was one of the most open in South East Asia, yet by
the middle of the decade it is one where domestic business can
now be protected from foreign imports.35 Yet state investment
remains scattered; there is no sign yet of a ruthless approach to
revenue-yielding privatisation and closure of loss-making and
non-competitive state businesses. The macroeconomic
difficulties of 1997 may, however, be forcing events in these
directions.
The policy of export-oriented import substitution was noted
rather early on by perceptive Scandinavian economists.36 What
can be seen are strong trends to protect domestic markets and
stimulate exports. The government has greatly increased the
protection it offers and grants to businesses in Vietnam, but there
is little attempt to make the population understand the economic
costs of protectionism. The Vietnamese economy risks becoming
one of the more closed in the region. Any analysis of the extent of
protection has to look at reality—falls in tariff rates has to be
placed beside the tax revenue from trade taxes, which has moved
35 The relationship between this trend and Vietnam's membership of
ASEAN and relationship with such regional organizations as AFTA
remains to be seen. Certainly the view that this will reduce the scope for
protection is premised upon a misreading of the shift from the early to mid
1990s from an open to a more closed economy.
36 Kokko and Zijuan, Vietnam at the Next Stage of Reforms (Stockholm
School of Economics, April 1996).
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in the opposite direction. The very high tariff rates of the very
early 1990s were simply not applied in practice.
Vietnam in comparison with other East Asian economies
The issue of the further improvement of Vietnam's social and
economic institutions is therefore surfacing and being driven by
evidence that the situation is deteriorating. Here the role of the
government comes under scrutiny. A recent article by Prof
Joseph Stiglitz, Chairman of President Clinton's Council of
Economic Advisers, argued that the success of East Asia's tigers
could be seen in establishing the following roles for government
(this is necessarily somewhat idealistic, as no one country—
even in East Asia—was capable of implementing all these
policies without mistakes and difficulties):
• Policies that actively sought to ensure macroeconomic
stability.
• Making markets work more effectively by, for instance,
regulating financial markets.
• Creating markets where they did not exist.
• Helping to direct investment to ensure that resources
were deployed in ways that would enhance economic
growth and stability.
• Creating an atmosphere conducive to private investment
and ensur(ing) political stability.37
The Vietnamese situation differs from past East Asian
experience and the areas of risk associated with this. Crucially,
the Vietnamese government:
• Does not help to make markets work more effectively.
Intervention by local state authorities—especially in
37 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Some Lessons from the East Asian Miracle (The
World Bank Research Observer, August 1996).
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agricultural product markets—is often more intended to
increase monopoly and concentration. It is important to
distinguish between two quite different factors. The
earlier positive impact of policies that 'made prices
matter' by increasing the scope of markets has been
replaced by policies that seek to make markets work in
desired directions by interfering with their operation and
failing to put in place the institutions required to protect
them from monopolistic concentrations of economic
power.
• Does not help to direct investment to enhance economic
growth. There are continued weaknesses in the public
sector expenditure reform program (with the World Bank
and IMF facing extraordinary problems in gaining
access to data), and high levels of corruption in
infrastructure projects.
• Has not undergone the political changes required to
create an atmosphere that is both conducive to private
investment and political stability.
In Stiglitz's analysis what remains is macroeconomic
stability and the creation of good markets. The former could be
said to be on the right track (with provisos about such issues as the
growing balance of payments deficit and regular price fevers in
strategic commodities) whilst the latter is seriously at risk. Land
and labour markets have been allowed to emerge and now
operate reasonable effectively38 but the use of the banks as
instruments of support to politically important businesses is
gravely hampering the emergence of a normal capital market
38 Although the amount of red tape involved is so great that, according to
personal reports, some 65 per cent of dwellings in Ho Chi Minh City and
95 per cent in Hanoi remain strictly speaking 'illegally occupied' in that
paperwork has not allowed occupation to be formalised (hop thuc hod).
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Conclusions
The prospects of the 1996-97 cyclical slowdown, and the other
factors mentioned above, suggest that the Vietnamese leadership
is currently being presented, not entirely unexpectedly, with
their biggest set of policy problems since 1989. In 1989, somewhat
contrary to many predictions, the economy recovered robustly
from the loss of Soviet aid to show very rapid growth. Possibilities
emerged for fast development as higher domestic savings, added
to big increases in FDI, booming exports to hard currency
regions and rapid private sector employment creation saw the
economy shift onto a quite new growth path compared with the
1980s. This success drew upon the way in which the economy had
'grown out of the plan' in the 1980s, and therefore the great efforts
and social costs implied by this. In the early 1990s, as Party
Congresses have correctly recognised, economic growth was
outstanding. Yet many difficult decisions were not tackled—for
example, the reform of SOEs, the relationship between party and
state, and the market environment facing farmers. Rapid
growth, especially in the rural areas, to some extent occurred
despite the absence of answers to these big questions. This showed
the fundamental strengths of the Vietnamese economy and the
talents and capacity of its population, including many SOE
managers and workers.
Now, things are different, but has Vietnam really emerged
from its economic and social crisis as the Congress stated? We
argue that conditions are now fundamentally different to those
of the early 1990s. Severe problems are evident and may get far
worse. What political changes have taken place to enhance the
decision-making capacity of party and government? It appears
that decisions now lack the rather high level of political
consensus of the late 1980s. Indeed, the reasons why particular
policies are adopted are often unclear; there is evidence of a
decline in self-confidence. This shows up most clearly in the
lack of clarity in the ongoing establishment critique of the
current situation in contrast to the situation that was so apparent
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in the late 1980.39 Then, most public servants were clear what was
wrong and what they were trying to do, especially in the topmost
policy-making Institutes.
Table 3: Economic growth targets ofthe 1996 VHIth Party
Congress and forecasts from ADUKI Pty Ltd, late 1996.
Vlllth Congress ADUKI
forecasts
1990-1996 growth 8.2% 7.9%
1996-2000 growth 12.0% 7.3%
1990-2000 growth 9-10% 7.6%
Ratio per cap gdp in year
2000 compared with 1990 2:1 1.7:1.0
Source: Vietnam: Economic Commentary and Analysis, No. 8,
November 1986
2000 GDP structure
Investment 30% n/a
Agriculture 27% 19-20%
Industry 34-35% 31%
Services 45-46% 42%
39 Judging by the nature of the problems and the debate, the most
appropriate year of comparison may be 1983, when pro-market solutions
were still extremely rare in open publications, but it was becoming
increasingly obvious from grass-roots experiments that that was the way
things were moving. It is not yet clear just how the program of Public
Administrative Reform fits into this framework, however, but discussions
within it are certainly starting to address the issues of power and
institutionalised jurisdictional conflicts that may be the targets for local
experimentation and later for wider discussion and dissemination. Time
will tell.
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This is no longer the case. For example, there is no open,
detailed, and operationalised analysis of the effects of party and
bureaucratic business involvement. Granted the political
disunity, officials cannot take open positions without fear of
penalty. Thus, in another example, the State Bank is unable to
openly discuss and research the effects of politically guided
credit upon monetary policy, and the consequences for the
monetary economy of the odd and diverse capital structure of
many SOEs. It does not appear that any political force, or
politician, is yet well placed to cut into the 'Gordian knot'.
Our main expectation is therefore for 'no change'; implying
economic slowdown. Table 3 gives some basic data and forecasts
drawn from ADUKI work.
Implications for various elements of the Australian-Vietnam
relationship
Private business—large and small-scale FDI
The tendency towards a recentralisation of political power,
combined with the continued problems in actually exercising
effectively the power thus attained, implies that large-scale FDI
is likely to need greater access to policy-making than before.
Conversely, smaller investors, and those in ventures with SOEs
whose market positions are under great pressure, will experience
increasing risk and rising transactions costs. This will require
additional outlays of time, management attention and money,
most likely at a time when it had been expected that such issues
would have been resolved, or on the way to it.
NGOs
NGOs are mainly and rightly concerned with rural development
issues. Here the focus upon the state sector and the officially-
judged importance of inward capital in supporting farming
strategies suggests that the main elements of the learning curve
through the second half of the 1990s will be in avoiding the
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consequences for farmer investments of falls in prices offered by
processors and others when market conditions change.40 This
will also create difficulties for those involved in local credit,
extension and other support activities, and likely also create
difficulties for formal farmer organisations such as the
Farmers' Union and other mass organisations.
Bilateral cooperation
Bilateral cooperation will likely face two main problems in 1997-
98:
First, securing the promised counterpart resources to finance
the Vietnamese inputs to projects, when those represent a real
resource costs to the Vietnamese government, such as those
involved in infrastructural projects;
Second, addressing the complexities that arise as the state-
focus of official development policy as laid down in the VIII
Congress confronts Western orthodox ideas about the importance
of the Rule of Law and the development of the private sector.
40 There is anecdotal and other evidence in abundance for the problems
this causes, the latest being the failure of VinaMilk to meets its promised
obligations to farmers around Hanoi who had invested in dairy capacity
when it as found that world milk powder prices were (perhaps cyclically)
well below the domestic liquid price.
8The Issues of Social Change after Ten Years
ofDoiMoi in Vietnam
Tuong Lai
Since 1986, Vietnam has experienced ten years of social
transformation that would have been difficult for anyone to
imagine some years before. Mr Edouard de Penguilly—a French
architect remarked in a workshop in Hanoi that: 'Ancient and
contemporary histories of this nation have shown its strange
capacity to find original solutions to its problems'. It could be
asked whether determinative policies which have been set forth
in the course of 'Doi Moi' (Renovation) in Vietnam over the last
ten years are original solutions?
Nowadays many foreigners who have been in Vietnam can
see clearly social change as compared to before 1986: the tempo of
life is more active, the exchanging and receiving of information
is more open-hearted and broad-minded in the context of urban
life which reflects the rise of private economic sectors: private
shops, the signboards of the limited companies and joint-venture
companies which are bold and dazzling. One can even see the
names of private schools from elementary to higher education in
the daily and weekly newspapers. And new buildings have
mushroomed, some constructed by the state, but most by the
private sector, also the boom in land values in Hanoi urban
areas. Someone said that in some attractive areas the price of
land is more expensive than in Tokyo!
The basis for that vibrant tempo of life is the GDP growth rate
which is about 9 per cent. Even in 1996 when three regions of the
country have suffered from natural calamities, the Prime
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Minister's report in the National Assembly session from 15
October to 15 November recently estimated a GDP increase at 9.5
per cent, with agricultural growth of about 4.8 to 5 per cent with 28
million tons of rice, industrial growth rate of about 14 per cent, an
increase in foreign trade turnover about 27 to 28 per cent, the
inflation rate maintained at the level of 6 to 7 per cent,
overspending of about 4 per cent, and the domestic cumulation
about 19 per cent of GDP.
Nevertheless, at the end of this year, 1996, the optimism seems
to stop short, with some speculation.
The waves of 'Doi Moi' which were uninterrupted and fast at
the beginning of the transformation period now seem to be
slowing down and more muted. The course of 'Doi Moi' has
shifted into a more difficult stage, and weaknesses have been
revealed more clearly, for example in the legal environment
and macro economic strategy, as well as in finance and money
activities. Together with these, more information has been
revealed about corruption, which is considered as a 'national
catastrophe'; employment is more difficult to find for the labor
force, and drug abuse, prostitution, child sexual abuse and AIDS
are reported with alarm by the newspapers. In this situation,
there are attitudes oriented towards circumspection. The people
wait for something new to act as the basis for their decisions about
the futureand their belief in their society's capacity to progress.
Employment for young people has been scarce and the
inadequacies of the secondary schools, colleges and universities
are becoming serious problems. The questions of levels of
training which are unsuited to the demands of employment, or
the lack of jobs that are suited to the level of training, have not
been answered clearly.
Earning good wages has become more difficult. The
relatively easier earnings in the initial years of Doi Moi and the
'open door' policies have been replaced by the strict requirements
of serious and productive labor. There are some who have been
able to find suitable jobs with a high income thanks to their
effective working capability which meets the requirements of
employment. But at the same time, large numbers of people have
The Issues of Social Change 183
been queuing up for jobs in front of the job centers, these
gathering places for rural laborers, simply named 'labor
markets', are always crowded. Workers' tools are simply a
shoulder pole and hangers, and usually just their shoulders,
hands for carrying and tough feet acquainted with farming.
Besides these, they have no skills. These 'labor markets' cover
only 40 per cent of surplus laborers in rural areas (where 70 per
cent of the country's labor force resides). The face of urban life
has been marked by these features, as rural people flooding into
the urban areas to search for jobs. Labor and employment are
becoming urgent problems which have emerged only recently,
and in my opinion, that is the main reason for the social
maladies mentioned above.
Together with those problems, environmental pollution is
more and more apparent in the processes of urbanisation and
industrialisation. In addition, the heavy consequences of floods,
both in urban and rural areas, show nature taking revenge for
human actions that have ruined their natural environment and
their own resources.
From this sketch about the face of Vietnamese society after ten
years of 'Doi Moi' what can be raised as the most crucial issues?
Surging social dynamism
The tempo of social life has changed, especially urban life. With
the transformation from the central planning and subsidies
mechanisms, profound changes have followed. The basis of
society has been characterised by the way of life of small peasant
communities and the communal spirit and village democracy,
but, with the market economy, people seem released from
constraints and hurry to compete for suitable positions. These
processes involve 'each person', by which I refer to the easing of
the traditional communal ties which constrained individual
dynamism.
A strong communal spirit was an inherent and salient
attitude in the mind of Vietnamese who lived in an old
agricultural society. This dominant attribute has always been a
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strong force in the nation, but development of individual
consciousness was constrained as the individual was diluted
into the community. In the period of central planning and
subsidies, this salient attitude continued to be brought into play
and it maintained the egalitarianism which was basic to the
village democracy. Individuals had few chances to affirm
themselves.
Consequently, with the coming of the market mechanism, in
the competition for livelihood and development, individual
liberation began to take advantage of new opportunities. The
bustling economic activities are both push and pull forces for the
potential development of each person. Thus, social mobility is
markedly greater than before.
The social dynamism has created a groundswell of energy.
This energy is a combination of the strength of each person and
each social group in both urban and rural areas. They are not
simply passively enjoying the achievements of 'Doi Moi'\ they
are 'co-authors' of 'Doi MoV. Therefore, it was easier to
acknowledge that the achievements of 'Doi Moi' were welcomed
broadly by the masses because it was they themselves who had
created the motivation for the process of 'Doi Moi', developing it
so deeply and broadly that sometimes leaders themselves could
not predict it when it was heading. And, because of this, the
masses demanded more and more from the leaders to whom they
have entrusted their lives.
In relation to this social dynamism, the capacity of youth
deserves special attention. Young people quickly adapted to the
new tempo of life. Although some of them may show extremist
thinking and short-sightedness, in general their dynamism has
contributed much to the quickening tempo of social life.
The vitality of that social dynamic is noteworthy. It was not
by chance that there arose 'people-founded' private schools and
private health centers; there was even a spontaneous migration
from the mountain areas in the North into the Central
Highlands. It must be that civil economy, civil society, and self-
governance were coming into existence. Although these
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phenomena were fragile, they have prospects because this is
democratisation from the bottom.
Of course, the waves of Doi Moi didn't spread everywhere -
not, for instance, to the mountain areas where travel and
communication were difficult and the people still suffering from
disadvantages. Changing such areas quickly is very difficult.
Such social dynamism is one outstanding feature of
Vietnamese society after ten years of Doi Moi, and it has been a
great driving force speeding up the Doi Moi process.
Social stratification
Competition under the pressure of the market has resulted in
accelerated social stratification. Egalitarianism, which lasted a
long time whilst agricultural production remained too backward
to be transformed into a market economy was strengthened by the
central planning and subsidy mechanism. With Doi Moi, social
stratification is bringing about opposite reactions.
Obviously, a fact which must be accepted is that social
stratification created the motivation for production and economic
growth. The market mechanism picks and chooses very quickly
the talents suited to it. Under this process of screening, each
person can or must be placed in the jobs and social positions that
correspond to their capability. In order not to be eliminated, each
individual has to struggle and persevere. Competition has
resulted, while the quantity and quality of products have
improved more and more. Because of these conditions spending
power has increased. The noteworthy thing is that, if thoroughly
observed, one will see that, in general, the standard of living was
increased for all citizen groups because of the achievements of
'Doi Moi'. In other words, there may be some who suffer a loss
compared to the increase of the common level, but there are no
classes or social groups which have been pushed down.
For example, of the one million laborers who were dismissed
from factories and companies belonging to the state sector when
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the new system came into effect, the majority found new places in
the informal sector with a higher income.
Table 1: Gini coefficients and average income per person per
month (in VND)
Place Gini
coefficient
Average
income
dong
Hanoi City 0.44 224.520
Ho Chi Minn City 0.35 491.390
Can Tho City 0.32 265.580
Da nang City 0.29 148.300
Hai duong Town 0.25 181.900
Rural areas in Can Tho 0.40 188.430
province
Rural areas in Quang 0.37 135.370
nam Da nang
Rural area in Hai Hung 0.27 100.590
province
Average 0.34 165.000
Of course, one cannot fail to note those who continue to free
hardship. They include vulnerable persons with little capacity to
protect themselves when facing sudden accidents and or
confronted with natural catastrophes, who were disabled and
lacked necessary skills or means for earning a living.
Previously they were supported by the agricultural cooperatives
or state factories and enterprises.
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Quite different from these people is an important new feature:
the appearance of young entrepreneurs. They have little
experience and basically no training; however, by means of
their youthful energy, they have made noteworthy advances.
They are the ones who will be an important force for the new stage
of development.
In order to figure out the shape of income stratification, I
would like to present the data from a survey which was conducted
by the Institute of Sociology in eight provinces spread among
three regions—the North, Center, and South of Vietnam—in 1994.
The data shows that the average income level in Hanoi is
only half the income level in Ho Chi Minh City, and even lower
than in Can Tho City. However, the Gini coefficient was highest
in Hanoi.
Similarly, one can see that the Gini coefficient was high in
the rural areas where the market economy was undeveloped, for
example, the Gini coefficient was 0.37 in rural areas of Quang
Nam Da Nang province.
In order to make clearer the stratification in terms of income,
as mentioned above, we used a relative poverty index in order to
understand more about social stratification.
In our study, those considered relatively poor were the 40 per
cent of the population having the lowest income, and those
considered relatively rich were in the 20 per cent of the population
having the highest income. Our survey revealed that the
structure of income among the 40 per cent of the poorest and the 20
per cent of the richest in the regions was as in Table 2 below:
The difference of average income level between the poorest 40
per cent and the richest 20 per cent or the gap between two these
categories was lowest in Hai Hung province (nearly two times).
The highest gap was in Hanoi, where the ratio was nearly 7:1.
Also in Hanoi, we can see that the average income level among
the 20 per cent of the population having the highest income in
Hanoi was three times higher than the average income of the total
population in Hanoi. This index was much higher than the index
188 Tuong Lai
in other provinces, even in Ho Chi Minh City, where the
difference was only two times.
Table 2: Average income perperson per month amongthe 40 per
cent with the lowest income and the 20 per cent with the highest
income
Place The 40 per The 20 per
cent with cent with
the lowest the highest
income income
Average
Hanoi City J.000 601.750 224.520
Ho Chi Minh City 234.000 1053.690 491.390
Can Tho City 130.000 527.520 265.580
Da Nang City 88.000 288.410 148.300
Hai Duong Town 111.000 313.190 181.900
Rural areas in Can Tho
province
86.000 439.840 188.430
Rural areas in Quang
Nam Da Nang
64.000 305.810 135.370
Rural area in Hai Hung
province
63.000 189.850 100.590
In general, except in some provinces, the bottom 40 per cent of
the population had an average income under 100,000 VN dong per
month. The lowest income was in the rural areas in Hai Hung
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province. The average income level among the poorest 40 per cent
was 63,000 VN dong per month.
From all this, at the time of the survey, we established that: the
poverty line was the group having an average income below
75,000 VN dong per person per month. We created five income
categories, each higher one being double the previous (lower)
bracket. The results showed that: 23 per cent of the population
were living below the poverty line (with an average income
under 75,000 VN dong per person per month), of which 6.4 per cent
were in urban areas and 27 per cent in rural areas. The details
are presented in Table 3:
Table 3: The average level of income per month per person
Place <75000 75-150 150-
300
300-
600
>600.00
0
Total
% %
% % %
%
Hanoi City 12.9 42.2 29.3 8.8 6.8 100
Hai Duong town 3.3 38.0 50.0 8.7 0.0 100
Da Nang City 13.0 56.2 26.0 3.4 1.4 100
Can Tho City 1.4 27.7 39.5 270. 4.1 100
Ho Chi Minh City 0.4 2.5 35.5 38.0 23.6 100
Hai Hung rural 37.5 54.5 6.5 0.5 1.0 100
areas
QNDN rural areas 29.7 47.4 16.6 5.1 1.1 100
Can Tho rural areas 12.0 48.5 29.0 8.0 2.5 100
The stratification is obviously not only the result of ten years
of Doi Moi. But in the market system, stratification has become
more marked. However, a thorough analysis of poverty and the
lowest income category shows that deprivation is the consequence
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of the long backward economic period in Vietnam, including the
direct consequences of central planning and subsidies, even
though at that time it was thought, incorrectly, that inequality had
been eradicated. In our study about Vietnamese social structure,
we drew the conclusion that the slower the development, the
higher the inequality in society. It is only by comparing the Gini
coefficients between rural and urban areas from 'the sociological
survey about social stratification' (conducted in 1994) which was
published in the Sociological Review, Number 3, 1995 that one can
see this situation clearly (refer to Table 4):
Table 4 : Gini coefficient between rural and urban areas
Place Urban Gini Rural Gini
coefficient coefficient
Hai Hung 0.249 0.266
Quang Nam - Da nang 0.291 0.372
Can Tho 0.321 0.368
Income differentiation is only one of the factors which leads
to social stratification. Another limitation of these data is this
collecting them was not simple and they are not necessarily
entirely accurate. These data should be combined with many
other factors which were defined differently in the sociological
study in order to properly reflect social stratification in Vietnam
at present. These factors are not new. They include three issues
which were raised by Max Weber in the last century: wealth,
power and prestige.
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In the concrete context of Vietnam nowadays, we consider
that the determinant factors in the process of stratification are:
possession, power and knowledge. The thing we want to
emphasize is what Max Weber also noted when he analyzed the
market: 'In the market economy, the opportunity was a
determinant factor and a common condition for the destiny of the
individual. It means that 'the class condition', in the final
analysis, was 'the market situation'.
Besides the survey conducted by the Institute of Sociology,
other survey results also revealed that:' Where the process of
social stratification occurred more strongly, there were more
products for society and the standard of living of the majority of
population had been increased'. 'As for the wealthy in Hanoi,
they often belong to two social groups: state employees, especially
the high-ranking officials, and the entrepreneurs. Among the
wealthy households belonging to the state economic sector, 80 per
cent of them were high-ranking officials working for
organisations involved in foreign trade, such as foreign affairs,
foreign trade, maritime transport; and 20 per cent were working
for organisations involved in Air Communications, customs,
and economic policing. These households often have connections
with private businesses. So the researchers generalised that in
Hanoi, the wealthy households were ones having family
members including both high ranking officials and private
joint- venture business people.
The education level of the heads of the wealthy households
outside the state sector was lower than in the state sector (25 per
cent versus 90 per cent respectively, graduated from
Universities). Among these households, only 40 per cent were
earlier classified as members of the old 'bourgeoisie class'; 86
per cent of laborers worked in the non-state sector, and 12 per cent
of laborers worked both in the state and non-state sectors. The
majority of these households were involved in trade (75 per cent);
7.5 per cent of them were involved in both production and trade.
1 Do Nguyen Phuong, About The Social Stratification in Our Country at
Present Period (Hanoi: KX07.05, 1994), pp. 8,12,18,32.
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Their mode of activities included taking advantage of loopholes
in policies through relationships with acquaintances and
through bribery. Among those with business establishments 40
per cent of their commodities were imported, 26 per cent of their
commodities were exported; 14 per cent of them carried out
business in silver, gold, precious stones and antiques. So, when
talking about the crowded and bustling activities in Hanoi, we
are in the main talking about economic activities in the non-
state sector.2 The researchers also noted: 'The surveys in Hanoi
and Ho Chi Minh City revealed the appearance of private
entrepreneurs who had their own capital of about 10 to 20 billion
VN dong and who hired large numbers of labourers (from 1000 to
9000). Their businesses have made much profit, and their
business efficiency has been higher than in the state and
collective sectors'.3 Based on this data, it was concluded that:
'Social stratification has occurred strongly and has diversified.
This was a direct result of the transformation of economic
mechanisms and economic structures, which increased social
mobility and the redivision of social labor'.4
Unfortunately, besides these positive factors, a negative
problem emerged from social stratification that has caused
many social reactions.
If the social stratification has resulted from the market
economy, especially after a long period which was dominated by
egalitarianism and by the subsidy system that constrained and
often wiped out the motivation for production, the stratification
was also necessary for creating the motivation for development.
However, this stratification has bad side effects. What has
emerged is that it is very difficult to define, among the nouveau
riches, whether their wealth is the result of their real capability or
of their social position(s). Might it be that power is the source of
possessions and property, which was the point we investigated in
the 'Sociological survey about social stratification' carried out
2 Do Nguyen Phuong, About the Social Stratification.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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recently? The unclear blend of business talent, administration
skills, and opportunism indicates that taking positions in the
state body makes it easier to earn money. This has occurred in
the present context where the legal controls are low, and the legal
system contains many shortcomings. This is closely connected
with excessive red-tape and the weak capacity and experience of
the public administration. All this must be a source of the
corruption which is considered a national catastrophe; that was
'the theme which was most talked about and criticized among
other themes' when Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet spoke on 11
November 1996 at the Tenth session of the Ninth National
Assembly. The Prime Minister also remarked that: 'Compared
to other themes, the theme of corruption was the one most
criticized; however, there was little discussion about finding
solutions to prevent and to push back this national catastrophe'
while 'the corruption occurs licentiously within every branch,
everywhere, every level and is only different in terms of
measure and form'. The Prime Minister recommended that the
National Assembly empower him 'with full responsibility in
accordance with the law of government organisation, rights to
punish (reproachment, warning, dismissing from office,
forcing resignations, and bring to the court) according to the law
for all the officials whom the Prime Minister has found to be
corrupt'.5
The issues of social mood
From the central planning and subsidy mechanism which only
accepted two forms of properties, the economy has been
transforming into a market mechanism with a diversification
of forms of possession. This important transformation has
changed rapidly the social positions of many people who have
taken advantage of the opportunities which were created by the
market situation. There were some who became nouveau riche,
5 Nhan Dan on 8 October, 1996: 1, 3 .
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as well as many others who ceased to advance or regressed to a
lower position seeing now that they are outdated!
Everybody has been concerned about the question of how to
affirm one's social position. In a sense, they have been obsessed
by the idea that they would have something greater than what they
actually have. In the special context of Vietnamese society with
all its turbulent changes during recent decades, especially the
latter half of the 20th century when the changes were greater, that
idea is obsessing a rather large number of people.
The traditional society, in which relationships were based on
ascribed statuses, has been transformed into the new society
based on functions. In the past there were many deficiencies in
social administration and this resulted in some chaos within
social activities; high ranking officials in the social
administrative system were chosen according to the criteria of
'morality and talent', which were abstract concepts, rather than
by systematic training to implement defined tasks. So there was
the illusion that one could take on any position regardless of its
functions. The consequence was that bureaucracy expanded
more and more, and reducing the number of staff proved
impossible. Thus the effectiveness of administration was very
low and in general did not meet the ever-increasing demands of
society. A deeper and more complex problem was competition for
positions that would be a way to earning profits, make fortunes,
and get promoted rapidly, without any basis in knowledge,
talent, serious work, or experience. The market economy has
been built on these experiences, while also rewarding individual
potential and a high social dynamic and creating conditions for
the promotion of those with the necessary skills. At the same time
there are those people who are unsure about their social positions,
especially people who have little capability and little opportunity
for competing in the market. The market has grown too fast for
everyone to understand their capability and strong points to fit
into corresponding positions. In addition, at present there is not a
complete market system organised according to the law. The
shortcomings of the law and the ineffectiveness in
administration have created conditions for illegal business,
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which has resulted in social insecurity. Public opinion has
condemned illegal business strongly for its corruption, waste,
and red-tape.
So we see that for stable social development, on the one hand
social mobility must be high, and the desire for social promotion
should strengthen motivation; on the other hand citizens should
define clearly for themselves the social position which
corresponds to their knowledge, talent and circumstances.
Without the formation of these attitudes, the stable society that is
necessary for development will not emerge. For a country which
has undergone such turbulent changes during two thirds of this
century, as Vietnam has, the stability of society is even more
necessary than before in order to allow rapid and stable
development to emerge. This stability of society will not
necessarily conflict with development as it will help everyone
pursue their own goals. This raises an issue which was brought
up by Aristotle a very long time ago: 'The Potential of each person
is a combination of different functions about the behavior and
state of mind which he or she has the capability to choose'. This
issue is emerging as a challenge for development in Vietnam.
This issue has emerged because of other considerations.
With the large loss of capital by over 2000 state enterprises,
newspapers now often print news of hundreds and thousands of
billion VN dong being lost. The culprits are government staff
and even state offices; for example, the State Bank lost 3000
billion VN dong; Tamexco company (a district company) lost 500
billion VN dong; the Nam dinh textile company lost 600 billion.
The Mulberry and Silkworm enterprises had similar losses.
Many billions of dong were lost by the health insurance system.
And so on. Even the General Post and Telecommunications
Department casually placed outside of the state budget about 800
billion VN dong, accumulated from different levels of prices
customers applying for phones must pay, and nearly 200 billion
VN dong for changing networks and so on.6 In a poor province
such as Son La, the deputy head of the budget planning section at
6 Mian Dan 24 October 1996:4.
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the provincial Department of Finance is said to have
appropriated 292 million VN dong.7
Once 'common possession' is appropriated brazenly like this,
the social mood of the masses asks as to how rights of use of
'common property' should be considered. This gives rise to the
question of the grounds for regulating the relationships between
man and man in the society when the ownership framework has
not been clearly defined? This lack of clarity will be the
fundamental obstacle to the formation of necessary regulating
policies leading to the definition of a modern society, as the target
put forward by the Eighth Communist Party Conference. That
modern society, according to the common understanding, is
supported by the middle classes who are increasing more and
more in number and significance, and whose property comes
from working hard with their talents, which was consolidated by
legitimate ways of working and an appropriate legal system.
Social regulation is a necessity for socialstability, and is a
basic premise for steady development. From the egalitarianism
of the central planning and subsidy period, profound social
regulation has been implemented by accepting the market
mechanism with diversified ownership.
Having been transformed from a society which only accepted
two forms of possession (common and collective possession), the
current system of diversified ownership has helped to create the
motivation for 'Doi Moi'. Nowadays, with its policies for
speeding up industrialisation and modernisation, Vietnam is
entering the orbit of regional and global development processes.
Now the challenge has become how to regulate society in order to
create the conditions for speeding up this development.
Social regulation is sometimes not only the demand from
inside but also the pressures from outside, for Vietnam to
integrate rapidly into the World. I mentioned the problem of
corruption and the mood of the masses wanting to consider what
7 Nhan Dan 21 September 1996: 4; Investment Review, November 1996:
2.
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is the right of use of common property. That is one problem which
arises not only for Vietnam. According to Flora Lewis, an
American journalist specialising in World news, corruption is
a global phenomenon, that is 'a phenomenon which has existed
for as long as society'.8 And Donarella della Porta, professor in
political science from Florence University, Italy, said that
'corruption probably grew in the transitional period (which is
usually sudden) from a traditional society into a modern society
where there was a demarcation between the government and
private sectors'.9 According to her, 'corruption probably is an
informal measure for changing structures aimed at patching up
formally a society which is breaking down under the pressure of
an economy and political system that is undergoing the threat of
disappearance after market forces and democracy become
standardised'.10
It must be that the problems of Vietnam are not for Vietnam
alone as she reaches out to be friends with other nations in the
world.
Vietnam has been changing rapidly towards a modern
society with a market economy aimed at creating a prosperous
people, a strong country, and an equitable and civilised society.
The achievements after ten years of 'Doi Moi' are engraved into
the material and spiritual life of Vietnamese society. The new
thinking resulted in new attitude towards speeding up the cause
of Doi Moi. That attitude gave support to the leadership of the
Vietnamese Party and Government. At the same time, with that
attitude, the masses also demand that the quality of leadership
must correspond to the process of Doi Moi. Vietnam enters this
new period, a more difficult one, perhaps, but one with more
prospects. All this is a direction which cannot be reversed. The
issue is really only a matter of speed. The obstacles, of course,
will not be few. Nevertheless, the resolve of the leaders as well as
of the majority of people who support and expect rapid
8 UNESCO informant, N6 - 1996:15.
9 UNESCO informant, N6 - 1996: 18.
10 Ibid.
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development in order to narrow the gap between Vietnam and the
region and the world will be the guarantee for a rounded and
broad development process within Doi Moi in the coming years.
The issue of social change in Vietnam is an. interesting
research theme not only for Vietnamese social scientists but also
for international scientists interested in Vietnam and the
Southeast Asia region.
